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Freedom and Order:
How Democratic Governments Restrict Civil Liberties after Terrorist
Attacks—and Why Sometimes They Don’t
by
Gabriel Rubin

ABSTRACT
This book is driven by one question: “After terrorist attacks, why do some governments
strictly limit civil liberties and others don’t?” For example, in the United States, it was
not until a year after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing—and three years after the 1993
World Trade Center bombing—that Bill Clinton signed major civil liberty-limiting,
counterterror legislation in the form of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act. By contrast, George W. Bush passed the much more comprehensive and
repressive Patriot Act through a divided Congress in a month-and-a-half after the
September 11, 2001 attacks. In contrast, following the July 5, 2005 bombings in Great
Britain, Tony Blair’s own party blocked clauses in his anti-terrorism legislation that
would have created national ID cards and extended the duration terror suspects could be
held without charge to 90 days. Yet liberty-reducing counterterror laws were easily
passed time and again after IRA terror attacks in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. In Israel,
Yitzchak Rabin’s government largely eschewed any efforts to abridge liberties during
the Oslo peace process, but Ariel Sharon passed numerous liberty-abridging laws such as
one passed during the second intifada that prohibited citizenship to Palestinians that
married Israelis.
This work forwards the theory that chief executives in government, be they presidents or
prime ministers, drive civil liberty-abridging responses to terrorist attacks, though they
are constrained by public opinion and institutional factors. Spikes in public fear levels
after terror attacks, along with other factors, create a window of opportunity for executive
action that can lead to the passage of civil liberty-reducing counterterror legislation. This
work looks at cases where such legislation is passed, blocked and not pursued, in order to
decipher the factors that best explain the variations in executive and legislative responses
after terror attacks.
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Chapter One
A Crisis or Opportunity?: Constructing a Theory of Terror Response

The 21st century began with a whisper. The predicted global computer meltdown dubbed
Y2K amounted to nothing. The presidential election of 2000 between George W. Bush and Al
Gore centered around the issue of what to do with the money from America’s budget surplus. A
sleepy summer of 2001, labeled “the summer of the shark” by a news media grasping at straws i,
passed uneventfully. A year earlier the USS Cole had been bombed off the coast of Yemen,
eight years before the World Trade Center suffered a truck bombing and the 1980s and 1990s
experienced their share of airline hijackings, hostage takings, and terrorist bombings committed
against Americans. Yet terrorism was a distant reality to an America just gaining its footing in
an age of unipolarity and computerized globalization.
On the morning of September 11, 2001, the new century looked bright to Americans. It
was a sunny day with blue, clear skies. And into that unconcerned world, a world where the best
threats the media could drag out were computer bugs and sharks, an airplane shot into one of
New York City’s tallest buildings. And then it happened again. By the afternoon, four civilian
airliners had been deliberately crashed. Three into buildings, one into the ground.
On the night of September 11, 2001 in the wake of the World Trade Center’s ruin and the
suicide hijackings of four US airliners, the first mission the world had seen where civilian
airliners were used as missiles, President George W. Bush appeared on television before
Americans for the first time since the tragedy.
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Bush sat behind his mahogany desk in the Oval Office that night. Watching him was a
country stunned. The words that he selected that night and in the proceeding weeks would shape
the response of a nation. Yes, the nation was scared and, yes, Americans wanted revenge ii and to
feel secure again. But polls showed that, more than anything, Americans were willing to give
their leaders the tools necessary to make things right again. After all, Bush’s approval rating
skyrocketed after 9/11 from 52% to 88%iii, the percentage of Americans’ willing to cede liberties
for security after the attacks was 55% iv, and the number of Americans fearful of becoming terror
victims jumped from 34% in May 2001 to 58% v.
Though individuals in the public may have been willing to evict Arab-Americans or enact
a police state, their elected representatives were the ones who would have to fashion policy. But
more than anyone else, in the fog following the attack the chief executive suddenly had the
opportunity to choose the domestic and international response to the events of that terrible day.
He would be able to choose whether stricter enforcement of existing laws would suffice or new
legislation was needed to respond to the threat – granting him wide-sweeping authority over the
future privacy and rights of all Americans. In fact, difficult as it may be to believe, he would get
to choose whether to respond to the attacks at all. Indeed, Osama bin-Laden’s previous attacks
on American interests yielded measured military responses from the Clinton Administration and
no significant changes in legislation.
President Bush’s words would not only shape the response, but also the perception of the
threat that Americans faced. Was this a threat that required war? Was it a one-time event? Or,
more broadly, was Islam the threat? Domestically, did Muslims represent a fifth column? The
smoke billowing from what was now dubbed Ground Zero presented the President with an
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opportunity to shape the threat, to determine the response. It would be facile to say that he
simply did what he had to do, when in fact those in similar situations chose different courses.

Why Protecting Liberal Democratic Practices is Important
Liberal democracies are special due to their commitment to government by the people
and to a set of negative rights that allow citizens to live their lives free of heavy-handed
government interference vi. As Michael Ignatieff writes, “Thanks to the rights they entrench, the
due process rules they observe, the separation of powers they seek to enforce, and the
requirement of democratic consent, liberal democracies are all guided by a constitutional
commitment to minimize the use of dubious means—violence, force, coercion, and deception—
in the government of citizens” vii. The fact that liberal democracies espouse these kinds of rights
presents a particular dilemma in times of crisis: balancing national security against civil liberties.
This point is not just an academic one, since a strong body of theory provides the backbone for
why liberal democracies are structured the way they are. Works such as The Federalist Papers,
the US Constitution, John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government, and Montesquieu’s The
Spirit of the Laws detail the careful logic behind the institutions of government in liberal
democracies. In all of these writings, it is emphasized that democratic government should be
constructed with the people’s rights as its main focus because this is the only route to a fair and
legitimate government.
In this tradition, this book is about government responses to terrorism that affect civil
liberties. Underlying this view is a belief that there is something deeply important about
maintaining democratic values and civil liberties. Liberal democracies were founded as
countries that protect individual rights, support government by the people, and adhere to a moral
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and legal code that promotes human dignity. Eroding those values would be a detriment to all
who support the projects of liberalism and democracy.
Some people will read this book and point to a blind spot: national security. It is not the
intention of this text to cover all of the possible ramifications of terrorism or all of the
dimensions of a government’s response. The focus here is on civil liberties alone because these
liberties are inherently important to liberal democracies. For those who would say that security
is given short shrift here, it is important to bear a few things in mind. First, though liberty and
security are viewed by many as pitted in a zero-sum contest, this is not necessarily the case.
Liberties can and are reduced without gains in security. The opposite can also be true. Security
and liberty are not necessarily connected.
Second, as will be evidenced in chapter three, when liberty-security tradeoffs are broken
down, it appears that democratic citizens are willing to trade other people’s liberty for their own
security. For example, Americans may want to reduce Muslim-Americans’ liberties to enhance
the majority’s security. Americans’ unwillingness to restrict their own civil liberties, when
liberties are broken down, speaks to a public that does value liberty sometimes more than
security. Reductions in the rights of targeted minorities are also troubling because of the
introduction of bias and discrimination into a polity that is normatively based on equal and fair
treatment.
In Terror in the Balance, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue that executive action in
emergencies is both necessary and rational. Congress and the courts, they say, “rationally defer”
to the executive during these periods. The executive, they argue, is the only organ of
government that can act quickly and decisively in crisis situationsviii. In sum, there is nothing
wrong with the way governments react to terrorism; governments are supposed to act this way.

4

Further, checks on executive power should be eroded during crisis periods so that the leader can
act.
There are numerous problems with this thesis. First is the assumption that democracies
are supposed to act in this way. Just because American democracy has survived past crises, does
not mean that the mechanism of executive power-grabs is flawless. Liberal democracies are
based upon government by the people not trust in an autocratic leader. Nascent democracies in
Russia, Zimbabwe and pre-modern times have been undone at least partially due to emergency
powers. Michael Freeman organizes democratic states by those that abused and did not abuse
emergency powers in their fight against terrorists. He finds that Peru and Uruguay abused
emergency powers—thus significantly eroding their liberal identities—through sweeping
military powers and the torture of prisoners ix.
Further, why have democratic checks if they are not useful in times of crisis? And if
executives are so good at acting in these times, why not just live under an efficient autocracy at
all times? Finally though some executive action is certainly necessary to quickly respond to
some emergencies, the cases presented here deal with legislation regarding liberties that is often
not necessary in the immediate aftermath of attacks. Careful thought about such legislation is no
detriment to national security as seen in the slow passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act after the Oklahoma City bombing x. Perhaps an active executive is necessary
for fast and flexible emergency management as well as humanitarian and military responses, but
potentially permanent legislation that restricts liberties requires vigorous debate and, in most
cases, is not immediately necessary after a terror attack.
Political scientists have given great attention to the value of good institutionsxi. The
argument goes that if democracies are created with the right electoral mechanisms, the right veto
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powers and the right balance of power between the branches of government, everything else will
fall into place. That is, with the right institutional mechanisms, peace can take hold and the rule
of law can be maintained even in the most divided nation. Crises challenge this belief to its core.
Cass Sunstein asserted: “Simply because of fear, the public and its leaders will favor
precautionary measures that do little to protect security but that compromise important forms of
freedom”xii. As will be seen in chapter five, it is not at all clear that institutions matter in the
face of great calamities. If institutions cannot protect the people from their leadership in times of
crises, then what is their real value? This book will look into how institutions affect the
outcomes of domestic counterterrorism reactions and show why these reactions vary so greatly
over time and between cases.

Research Question and Theory
This book is driven by the following question: After terrorist attacks, why do some
governments strictly limit civil liberties and others don’t? In the United States, it was not until a
year after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing—and three years after the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing—that Bill Clinton signed major civil liberty-limiting, counterterror legislation in the
form of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act xiii. By contrast, George W.
Bush passed the much more comprehensive and repressive Patriot Act through a divided
Congress in a month-and-a-half after the September 11, 2001 attacks. In Great Britain, Tony
Blair’s own party blocked clauses in his anti-terrorism legislation that would have created
national ID cards and extended the duration terror suspects could be held without charge to 90
days after the July 7, 2005 London bombings xiv. Yet liberty-reducing counterterror laws were
easily passed time and again after IRA terror attacks in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990sxv. In Israel,
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Yitzchak Rabin’s government largely forewent abridging liberties during the Oslo peace process,
but Ariel Sharon passed numerous liberty-abridging laws such as one prohibiting the granting of
citizenship to Palestinians that marry Israelis during the second intifadaxvi.
This study systematically compares liberal democratic governments’ domestic, legislative
responses to terrorism. The goal of this study is to create a theoretical framework from which all
domestic responses to terrorism can be compared. I do this by showing that the main
determinants for terrorism reactions are executive response, how the chief executive decides
legislatively to respond to the attack, and threat-shaping, how the executive molds the perception
of the terrorist threat and of the government’s subsequent reaction through public
pronouncements. Indeed, domestic civil liberties-reducing reactions to terrorist attacks vary
widely from case to case and from leader to leader. I will show here that the source for this
variation is how the head of government, regardless of whether the government system is
presidential or parliamentary, shapes the threat.
This study works as a test and synthesis of the three main causes explaining why liberal
democracies react the ways they do after terror attacksxvii. First, it is argued by authors such as
Cass Sunstein and Paul Slovic that public opinion or mass fear determine a government’s
reaction xviii. In other words, a swell of fear pushes the government from the bottom-up to pass
laws stifling civil liberties—in effect, fear causes the public to restrain itself by way of the
government. Public opinion scholars, such as John Mueller and Richard Sobel, also hold that
government approval ratings and a rally ‘round the executive are important factors in
determining whether or not counterterror legislation will pass xix. Proponents of the second
theory for why governments react the ways they do after terror attacks hold that a government’s
institutional structures determine policy outcomes. This causal story is rooted in the works of
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Arend Lijphart, Matthew Shugart and John Carey, John Locke, Montesquieu, and in The
Federalist Papers. These works contend that the checks and balances inherent in liberal
democratic institutions and the differences between presidential and parliamentary governments
determine whether or not liberties will be limited after terror attacks. Finally, executive response
and threat-shaping is argued to be the main causal factor behind reductions to liberties. This
theory, supported by authors such as Geoffrey Stone and Harold Laski, holds that prime
ministers and presidents through their bully pulpit are able to shape what the public and the
legislature view as a threatxx. They, for this reason, are able to push civil liberty reducing
legislation when they see fit.
This chapter will be organized in the following manner. I will first explain the book’s
overarching theory, the logic of my case selection, then the methods used in the study and
definitions for the concepts employed. Lastly, the main findings of the book and a chapter-bychapter outline will be covered.

Description of Theory
After a terrorist attack occurs, a government seems to convulse into a quick and forceful
reaction. But the theory that is forwarded and supported here shows that the process of reaction
is far more complex and that reactions vary much more than public perception holds.
It begins with the terrorist attack. That attack is viewed as an exogenous variable, that is,
something that occurs outside of the governmental process. It gets the process going, but doesn’t
determine how the process will transpire. This may sound like a risky statement to make. After
all, wouldn’t the nature of the attack determine the government’s response in a sort of eye-foran-eye dynamic? The answer, which will be supported by the findings of later chapters, is no.
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The reaction to 9/11 was not typical of reactions to terror attacks. An important point made by
this study is that the nature of legislative responses to terror attacks cannot be predicted by the
nature of the attack or by the number of fatalities. The limited reaction to the 7/7 bombings in
London, the 2004 bombings in Madrid, and numerous other attacks are testament to that xxi.
<Insert Figure 1.1 here>
The above chart depicts this book’s primary theory. The terror attack creates an
opportunity for the chief executive to pass legislation or enforce legislation that will abridge civil
liberties in the name of national security. In this study, the executive’s response and the threatshaping he employs to forward this response act as the independent variable. However, in
formulating his response to the attacks, the executive is also constrained by both the public and
the legislature.
The executive’s role, the independent variable in this study, has two components. First is
what I call the executive response. At this stage the executive decides generally how to answer
to the attack. He could try to seek new legislation, seek to deport immigrants (among other
options) or not seek to respond at all. The executive forwards his plan by employing the second
component of the independent variable: threat-shaping. Threat-shaping is the mechanism by
which the executive pushes his counterterrorist agenda. Though this study is focused solely on
the civil implications of this strategy, the way that executives attempt to shape the terror threat
colors the state’s international response to terror as well. I codify threat-shaping strategies by
organizing them into themes such as threat magnitude and conflict framing. These themes are
uncovered through careful analysis of executive speeches.
The executive’s response and threat-shaping strategies are constrained by two broad
factors. First is public opinion/mass fear. In this study, mass fear levels, public willingness to
9

forgo liberties and executive approval ratings as well as other factors are measured using public
opinion trend analysis. These factors work either to temper or enable executive action. The
second constraint variable I dub political constellations. This variable encapsulates the
following three factors: political institutions, party competition and government
composition/party in power. Though all of these constraint variables will be looked at, two will
be shown to have especially strong explanatory power: approval of the executive and the
government’s partisan composition.
The legislature, the theory’s intervening variable, enters the picture in the next stage of
the process. It can either support or block the executive’s proposed legislation. If it attempts to
block the new counterterror laws, an interplay between the executive and legislature may occur
wherein the executive tries to push the legislature to pass new legislation by shaping the threat
accordingly. This give-and-take is depicted by the dashed line in the above chart. The final
stage is passage of civil liberty-abridging legislation and enforcement of civil liberty-abridging
legislation. These two outcomes are the dependent variables of this book.
Case Selection
The cases herein are organized as a systematic classification of the differing threatshaping and legislative outcomes that can occur. The executive can either maximize or minimize
the importance of the terrorist threat. As a proxy for this process, maximal threat-shaping is
categorized as “threat framed as war” and minimal threat-shaping is dubbed “threat framed as
crime.” Then, the legislature can support or oppose the executive’s legislative agenda. The
cases that will be covered in this study are illustrated in the chart below. Other corollary cases
will be touched on in the conclusion.
<Insert Figure 1.2 here>
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These cases were chosen for two main reasons. First, they all occurred in three countries,
the US, UK and Israel, whose similarities outweigh their differences. These countries exhibit
high-income levels, common law governance, robust immigration levels, strong democratic
traditions, and multiethnic societies. What differs between them, among other things, is their
geographic size, their population levels, the nature and duration of the threats they face, and their
government type. By comparing multiple cases from each country, the importance of threatshaping will be exhibited. Second, the typology above, though clearly not exhaustive, is
representative of the universe of terror attack cases that led to proposed legislation. For instance,
when threats are shaped as war, legislation is almost always passed. The Tony Blair 2005 case,
then, is a particularly interesting outlier.
Methods and Definitions
This section covers the methods used in the book, defines terms, and also serves to
circumscribe the scope of the project.
Executive Response and Threat-shaping (Independent Variable): The threat-shaping variable
measures how chief executives in government, be they prime ministers or presidents, shape the
magnitude of a threat through public pronouncements. As Jeffrey Simon writes, “Through their
actions and statements, presidents can either help fuel a crisis atmosphere over terrorism or they
can help defuse it” xxii. He notes that President Clinton urged caution after the explosion of TWA
flight 800 in July 1996. Clinton at the time stated that, “I want to remind you that when we had
the terrible tragedy in Oklahoma City, a lot of people immediately concluded that this must have
been done by some force outside our country, and it appears that that was not the case now. So
let’s wait until we see the evidence” xxiii. Contrast this with President Bush’s call to war on
September 11, 2001, stating, “A great people has been moved to defend a great nation” and, “We
11

will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor
them”xxiv. Certainly the crises varied greatly in degree, but the responses could not have been
more different.
The independent variable here has two components. The first is executive response,
which consists of the executive deciding how to act after a terror attack. This action could
include pursuing legislation, seeking to bring terrorists to justice, or not doing anything. The
executive tries to get the legislature and public on board with his plan by using the second
component: threat-shaping. If the executive tries to tamp down the threat and seeks not to
respond, this too is seen as threat-shaping. Threat-shaping will be measured by looking at
themes that the chief executive pushes in speeches made after the terrorist attack. These themes
will be gleaned by categorizing executive statements into the following eight categories. The
first three themes deal with threat and conflict framing, and are the most important ones for this
study.
•

Statement of Threat—these executive statements highlight the existence of a threat to the
populace and define, with varying degrees of specificity, what that threat entails. In the
extreme, these statements may emphasize that a “new normal” exists in the country. For
example, after 9/11, statements that “oceans no longer protect us” point to a new reality
facing the nation xxv.

•

Threat Magnitude—these declarations speak to the caliber of the terrorist threat. Most
important here is whether the executive views the threat as war or crime, that is, whether
he maximizes or minimizes the threat. A subset of threat magnitude statements are
nightmare scenarios: these statements depict a nightmare scenario for the country that
terrorists pose. They may or may not realistically depict threat magnitude, but clearly
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and intentionally ratchet up mass fear levels. For example, an executive saying, “We are
at war with terrorists,” maximizes the terror threat. In contrast, an executive who
declares: “the terrorists that attacked us are part of a small, inconsequential group that can
be prosecuted using available law enforcement methods,” minimizes the magnitude of the
terror threat.
•

Conflict Framing—these statements specifically frame the conflict with the terrorists and
what it entails. They define who the country is fighting and why. For example,
executives can frame the conflict as a war with jihadists over who should rule the Middle
East. When threat magnitudes are minimized, however, conflict framing is less
important.

The next five themes have to do with how the populace should respond to the threat and how it
should feel about the government. These threats are touched on in some cases but are not as
central to the study.
•

Call to Arms/Rally ‘Round the Flag—these statements are meant to conjure feelings of
patriotism in the population and also rally it for the coming fight.

•

Liberty-Security Tradeoffs—these proclamations refer to the concessions that need to be
made in light of the terrorist attacks.

•

Tolerance—these are statements made about tolerating minority populations in the
country, specifically those who share the same heritage or background as recent terrorist
attackers.

•

Government Protection—these executive pronouncements refer to the government as the
people’s protector and either has or will make them safer.
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•

Government Successes—these statements refer to government successes made against
terrorists.

Before turning to the next variables, it is important to note why I chose to use themes for this
subject. Alternative methods could have been used, such as coding statements by looking for
particular words like “terror” and “fear” or looking at executive actions rather than statements to
show how threats are shaped. Though executive actions will be taken into account, statements
are important because they express to the public who they are fighting against, what the
government (says it) is doing, and how the government wants the public to feel. I did not choose
to look for specific words within speeches because such a method, though advantaged by the
veneer of quantification, would not produce good results in this case. Words such as “terror,”
“fear,” and “war” could just as easily be used to strike fear in the public (“We are at war with
terrorists”) as they could to assuage the public (“This is not a war against terror, we should not
live in fear”). Threat-shaping themes, to this end, will provide a much better proxy of how the
executive views and seeks to shape the threat.
The following definitions explain the other variables employed in this study:
Role of the Legislature (Intervening Variable): Legislative support or opposition will be
measured by looking at debates and votes regarding domestic counterterror bills. Lawmakers’
statements will be codified using the same themes used to study the executive.
Mass Fear and Public Opinion (Constraint): Public opinion polls will be used to measure mass
fear levels, approval of the executive, and willingness of the public to forgo civil liberties, among
other factors. Though executive’s approval rating is a straightforward concept, mass fear is not.
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Opinion polls will be used here to track how fearful the public is of terrorism and the dynamic
interaction between executive statements and public fear levels.
Defining mass fear, a term rarely qualified and measured in political science, proves to be
a thornier task than it would at first seem. Jeffrey Simon contends that, “Terrorism’s unique
characteristic is that just a single major incident can shatter all perceptions of progress in the
battle against the terrorist threat”xxvi. Terrorism achieves this reality by inducing mass fears.
After all, terrorist attacks seek to make an entire populace feel unsafe by engaging in seemingly
random violent acts. We know that terrorism causes fear, but what is mass fear?
In their article, “Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies,” Huddy,
Feldman, Taber and Lahav find that, “anxiety leads to an overestimation of risk and risk-averse
behavior … whereas external and perceived threat increase support for outwardly focused
retaliatory action”xxvii. The authors see threat and anxiety as being two distinct responses to
terrorism. They use the term anxiety as “an umbrella term for fear, anxiety, worry, and related
states in keeping with the broad definition of anxiety in neuroscience” and psychology xxviii. On
the one hand, social science research has consistently shown that those who feel threatened are
led to feelings of intolerance and support “punitive action against threatening groups” xxix. It is
when people feel they are under threat that they are most willing to cede the civil liberties of the
minority to protect the majorityxxx. Anxiety, on the other hand, leads individuals to view risk
where there is none and to seek to reduce their anxiety by becoming overly risk-averse.
The anxiety side of fear may make the individual averse to certain situations, while the
threat side forces the individual to recognize that the crisis must be addressed if he is ever to feel
safe again. Therefore, individuals who perceive threat will want governments to act against the
threat, while anxious individuals will see action as risky and may want to submit to terrorists’
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demandsxxxi. The authors argue that, “A major function of terrorist violence is to instill anxiety
in a target population,” which then places a great deal of pressure on political leaders “to
negotiate and make concessions with terrorists in order to mollify their frightened citizens” xxxii.
Frank Clemente and Michael Kleiman write that, “the cost of crime goes far beyond the
economic and physical losses imposed by criminals. It extends to the forced alteration of daily
living habits as well as to the negative psychological effects of living in a state of constant
anxiety.” Further, as with other fears, “Most commentators have noted an important element of
irrationality in the public’s fear of crime: fear of crime is far out of proportion to the objective
probability of being victimized” xxxiii. For example, in 1977, a staggering 61% of women in the
United States feared walking within a one-mile radius of their homes at night (compared to 22%
of men) xxxiv. Thus, as WI Thomas noted, “what people define as real is real in its
consequences” xxxv. In sum, the purpose of Clemente and Kleiman’s article was to show that fear
of crime rather than any demonstrable threat was having a deleterious effect on American
society. People thought that they were in danger and behaved accordingly.
As Clemente and Kleiman show, fear can be an irrational emotion that is wholly divorced
from rational calculations of threat. Indeed, a study by Sivak and Flannagan found that 1,000
motorists died in auto accidents between September 11 and December 31, 2001 because they
avoided air travel xxxvi.
Fear will be defined here as a combination of Huddy, et al.’s concepts of both threat and
anxiety, specifically as a feeling that implies that one is in danger. Mass fear, as contrasted with
individual fear, simply means a large public or society’s fears. As will be shown, fear guides the
individual to seek guidance from his leaders. As Clemente and Kleiman argue, fear does not
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need to be based on any real threat – making the mere perception of danger, created by
seemingly random terrorist attacks, extremely detrimental to democracy.
Terrorism touches off mass fear by making large groups feel anxious and under threat
even though they are probably safe xxxvii. Here the concept of mass fear will be measured by
looking at the percentage of people in a given country who say they are afraid of terrorism. So,
it is not simply the presence of mass fear that will be important but its level xxxviii. Since this
study is concerned with domestic policy reactions to terrorism, the anxiety portion of fear is
significant because it yields the desire for increased security. Equally important, the threat
portion of fear directs the government and populace’s response toward minorities.
Political Constellations (Constraint): The three political constellations variables will be
measured in the following manner. The political institutions I focus on are presidential versus
parliamentary governments. Party competition will be measured by looking at election poll
tracking data, which serves as a proxy for the probability that the party in power will be
ousted xxxix. Government partisan composition and party in power are self-explanatory; by
looking at these factors I intend to measure the effects of divided government and the party in
power.
Passage and Enforcement of Legislation (Dependent Variables): These variables, will be
measured by looking at the content of domestic counterterror legislation and its enforcement.
The enforcement variable will focus on deportations and detentions carried out in response to
terror attacks. The passage of legislation variable will examine and compare government
centralization, and the potential erosions of free speech, due process, and privacy rights.
This study is concerned primarily with the rights of citizens. However, after terror
attacks, it is evident that legal permanent residents and other non-citizens frequently face the
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stiffest penalties, such as deportation and detention without charge. Though it will be seen here
as a greater abridgment for the government to curtail the liberties of citizens, the rights of legal
permanent residents will also be covered.
For the British and American cases, it will be obvious who a citizen is and who is a
resident, but the Israeli case presents more complications. On the one hand, Palestinians control
some of their own territory, live in proscribed areas, and see themselves as a distinct people.
Yet, on the other, Israel legally controls the occupied territories. In this study, I have chosen to
focus on the rights of Israelis and Israeli Arabs because their rights are the most directly affected
by the Israeli government’s changes in legislation. The liberties of Palestinians, though under
the purview of the Israeli government, are also in the hands of the Palestinian Authority.
Therefore, reductions in the rights of Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs can be seen as more directly
indicative of any deterioration of Israeli democracy.
As mentioned above, the liberties focused on when discussing enforcement are strictly
related to deportations and detentions. That said, liberties such as habeas corpus, privacy rights,
due process rights, and other general freedoms will be covered in the legislation variable.
Government centralization, though not directly related to civil liberties, will also be reviewed
due to its potential effects on liberties. Since democracy is predicated on the protection of rights
through pluralism and checks-and-balances, the centralization of the government around the
executive presents the loss (or, at least, potential loss) of rights by narrowing democracy.
Terrorism: The final concept that needs to be defined is terrorism, a term frequently used but
without a good, agreed-upon definition. Jeffrey Simon writes that there is no point to forwarding
a formal definition to terrorism. He believes that, “Definitions of terrorism … lend themselves
to contradictions, since they are usually influenced by ideological and political perceptions of the
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terrorist threat” xl. Lori Hocking contends that, “Despite the view that terrorism is an objectively
definable crime, ‘Western nations … have in practice adopted a relativist stance towards it.
Terrorism exists only in the eye of the official Western beholder; it has no independent
reality’” xli. It is true that terrorism is a pejorative term frequently placed on one’s enemies and
never on one’s friends. As Bruce Hoffman puts it, “virtually any especially abhorrent act of
violence perceived as against society … is often labeled ‘terrorism’ ” xlii. The accusations of
“terrorism” and “state terrorism” volleyed between Israelis and Palestinians are a strong example
of this point. Still, I think that terrorists do have certain goals and behave in certain ways that
can be pinned down. Forwarding a definition of who is and is not a terrorist surely will cut out
some people and events that others would deem terrorism, but defining our terms is an essential
component of social science.
Bruce Hoffman goes through an entire chapter of his book seeking a definition for
terrorism. He lists numerous definitions before finally coming up with the following: terrorism
is “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in
the pursuit of political change” xliii. A key component of terrorism, further, is Carlo Pisacane’s
concept of propaganda by deed. Pisacane wrote that, “Ideas result from deeds, not the latter
from the former, and the people will not be free when they are educated, but educated when they
are free” xliv. A second important factor of terrorism is that the exploitation of fear is meant to
affect the opinion of a large group of people. As Brigitte Nacos writes, “terrorists try to exploit
the linkages between the news media, public opinion, and presidential decision making” xlv.
This study requires a narrower definition than Hoffman’s because it does not look at state
terrorism. It is true that the renditions the Bush Administration ordered after 9/11, the house
demolitions the Israeli Defense Forces perpetrated, and the frequent government-sanctioned
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torturings in response to terror all over the world could, and perhaps should, all be considered as
terrorism. I do not deny that states employ tactics that can be labeled “terrorism.” However, I
do not use cases of state terror because this study is specifically concerned with how liberal
democratic states react in the sphere of civil liberties to non-state actors attacking them.
For the purposes of this book, terrorist attacks are those carried out against noncombatantsxlvi by non-state actors that seek to instill mass fear in a state’s population for political
purposes. The attacks are a form of “propaganda by deed,” in that they replace peaceful
propaganda with violence. They are employed to affect the public opinion of the targeted
country, either to bring attention to a given issue, such as an ethno-nationalist struggle, or to
otherwise change or protest the policies of the targeted government xlvii. I define terrorism here as
the intentional creation of mass fear in a given populace through violence or the threat of
violence against non-combatants committed by non-state actors for political purposes.
Main Findings
My primary findings come from comparing the cases contained in this work. But, before
summarizing those findings I would like to highlight how some of them differ from those of
previous works. First, I debunk the popular but mostly groundless contention that a rally ‘round
the president occurs after a crisisxlviii. Rallies of public approval for executives sometimes occur
after terror attacks, and they sometimes do not. The logic behind why they should occuris
dubious to begin with since crises could, in theory, just as easily lead to rallies of public distrust
of the executive. Second, institutional configurations do not affect the passage of counterterror
legislation as much as current political science literature would have us believe. A vast literature
has gone into why certain institutional arrangements should be chosen over others, but it is
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shown here that the differences between parliamentary and presidential forms of government
have no bearing on the passage of counterterror legislation after an attack. . Instead, the simple
occurrence of elections and the number of checks on government have greater influence on
whether liberty-abridging laws will be passed after terror attacks. That said, these institutional
checks only work after terror attacks when presidents’ or prime ministers’ approval ratings are
markedly low and tensions between the executive and legislature are high.
Now let us turn to the main findings of this book. First, the role of the executive is
critical in post-terror attack legislative reactions. How the executive chooses to respond to terror
attacks is the main factor behind legislative reactions to these attacks. Second, the executive’s
plans can be blocked under special circumstances. This will be shown in the Oklahoma City
bombing and London 7/7 bombings cases in chapter six. These cases show that low executive
approval ratings and an emboldened legislature can block executive power even in times of
crisis. In sum, the executive’s mandate is important, but not unstoppable. If his approval ratings
are low, or if the opposition—due to recent electoral victories—has a mandate of its own,
counterterror law will not be passed despite high fear levels. Third, threat-shaping can raise
mass fear levels and overtake institutional checks-and-balances.
Fourth, neither presidential nor parliamentary systems were able to adequately or
consistently hold back executive power in post-terror attack periods of increased mass fear.
Institutional arrangements did not matter in determining legislative responses to terror attacks.
This was a particularly important finding because much of the political science literature posits
that presidential systems, due to the powers they grant the chief executive, should be faster to
pass counterterror legislation and harsher in their treatment of civil libertiesxlix. A much more
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extensive argument for why we should see differences in how presidential and parliamentary
governments act after terror attacks can be found in chapter five.
Fifth, government centralization around the executive and the targeting of minorities with
civil liberty-abridging legislation were the most common outcomes of terror attacks. Typically
the minorities targeted had the same ethnicity or backgrounds as the perpetrators of the attack, as
were other minorities deemed “dangerous” by the attacked government. Finally, temporary
emergency laws, despite sunset provisions, frequently became permanent. Therefore, the danger
to civil liberties of post-terror attack responses is not as fleeting as some might contend.
Many important findings were also derived on how public opinion dynamics work after
terror attacks through comparisons of public opinion data made in chapter three. In general,
public opinion polls show that after terrorist attacks, a window of opportunity for executive
action is created by a public demand for action, the public’s willingness to cede liberties, and
heightened mass fear levels. Most notably, this research found that the public does not
necessarily rally ‘round the executive after attacks as is posited by Mueller l, and the chief
executive does not always get a boost in approval ratings after terror attacks. This is supported
by Richard A. Brody’s conclusion that, “the rally phenomenon is far from automatic” and that
“the fact of different responses to similar international crises makes it unsatisfying to
hypothesize that the rally is caused by an upwelling of patriotism in the face of some
international threat” li. The following chart shows Tony Blair’s approval ratings. It shows that
after 9/11 Blair saw a rise in his approval rating, but the 7/7 bombing did not provide a similar
bump.
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<Insert Figure 1.3 here>
Second, the public is generally willing to trade civil liberties of the minority group that
they believed perpetrated the attack for the general public’s (i.e., the majority’s) security. Yet,
the general public is typically not willing to sacrifice its own liberties. This public opinion
finding can be seen in the way legislation is enforced. Third, mass fear dynamics are hard to
quantify. Fear levels jump up after terror attacks but in different and unpredictable ways. Also,
though post-attack fear levels recede over time, new attacks can bring fear levels right back up to
where they were before. Also, there is no linear relationship between presidential approval
ratings and mass fear levels. Finally, it is hard to tell how casualty rates effect mass fear levels.
There is some evidence from the Israeli case showing that society adapts to higher casualty rates,
though there is not enough evidence to prove this largely because of the small sample size of
terror cases.
Map of the Book
The book is organized in the following manner. Chapter two looks at the role of fear in
politics and serves to show the general logic behind the theories proposed here. In this chapter,
the question of whether the post-terror attack dynamic is driven by mass fear or by the
machinations of government elites will be looked at extensively. Chapter three analyzes the
dynamics of public opinion after terror attacks. Chapter four reviews the US 9/11 case and
focuses strongly on threat-shaping. It also extensively examines the dynamic post-terror attack
relationship between the executive and legislature as well as the enforcement of legislationdependent variable. Chapter five compares the reactions of Israel during the second intifada, the
UK dealing with the IRA from 1969- 1974, and the US after 9/11 to try to decipher whether
presidential or parliamentary institutions have any important effects on legislative reactions to
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terror attacks. Chapter six looks at how Tony Blair and Bill Clinton dealt with the London and
Oklahoma City bombings, respectively. This chapter will show why the legislature sometimes
blocks the executive from passing civil liberty-abridging legislation and it will also show that not
all reactions to terror attacks follow the reactionary arc that followed 9/11. Chapter seven will
tie up all of the findings and look at the roles of Bill Clinton after the first World Trade Center
bombing and Yitzchak Rabin during the first intifada. This final chapter will also touch on other
cases—such as those of India, France, Canada, and Japan—that support the overarching theory.
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Chapter Two
To Conquer Fear, You Must Become Fear
“To conquer fear, you must become fear.”
-Ras al-Ghul, Batman Begins
Terrorism works because it inspires mass fear. This chapter delves into what mass fear
is and how political elites can and do manipulate that fear. Along the way, it will survey how
fear has been operationalized in the social science literature. The chapter will conclude with the
conceptualization of a theoretical model for how fear permeates a society leading to reductions in
civil liberties based upon the findings of this chapter.

Defining Fear
The conception of fear forwarded here includes both threat and anxiety. In their article,
“Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies,” Huddy, Feldman, Taber and Lahav
break down fear into the concepts of anxiety and threat. The authors find that, “anxiety leads to
an overestimation of risk and risk-averse behavior … whereas external and perceived threat
increase support for outwardly focused retaliatory action” lii.

Fear as defined here, is

characterized by an aversion to the activity or object of fear, a desire to defer to those one sees
as experts or authority figures be they adults or elites, and a desire to address the object of fear
through action that will make the individual feel safe again.
Roger Petersen writes that, “Fear prepares the individual to satisfy safety concerns” liii.
By fear I mean a feeling that implies that one is not safe, that one is under threat. Fear guides the
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individual, as will be seen, to seek guidance from his leaders. The anxiety portion of fear may
make the individual averse to certain situations, however the threat portion forces the individual
to recognize that the crisis must be addressed if he is ever to feel safe again.
Social Science Definitions of Fear: Rationality, Heuristics, and Fear of the Other
This section will look at three types of fear. The first looks at fear from a rational-choice
perspective, the second looks at fear from the perspective of norms, or heuristics, and the third
looks at fear from the perspective of one aspect of human psychology. These social science
definitions of fear will provide a backdrop for the discussion of terrorism-inspired mass fears.
Fear and (Bounded) Rationality
Today’s psychologists and decision analysts link fear to the perception of risk. This field
of knowledge is critical to understanding how the mass public and government officials react
after terrorist attacks. The main thinkers in this medium are Paul Slovic and Cass Sunstein.
First, Paul Slovic’s findings in The Perception of Risk, a compendium of studies he and his
colleagues have administered on fear, will be examined. This will be followed by a look at
Sunstein’s work. Other authors will be treated along the way.
Slovic, along with co-writers Howard Kunreuther and Gilbert White, lays out the
cognitive processes behind risk assessment in an article entitled, “Decision Processes,
Rationality and Adjustment to Natural Hazards.” The first theory he outlines for how people
make decisions under risk is that they, “try to choose according to the ‘best bet.’” They do this
by trying to maximize their expected utility of a given decision. The expected utility of a given
event is measured using Bernoulli’s equation, which follows:
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n

EU (A) = Σ P(Ei)U(Xi)
i=1

Here EU (A) stands for the “expected utility of a course of action which has consequences X1,
X2, ….Xn depending on events E1, E2, …En, P(Ei) represents the probability of the ith outcome of
that action, and U(Xi) represents the subjective value or utility of that outcome” liv.
HA Simon, in criticizing utility maximization theory, observed that:
“The classical theory is a theory of a man choosing among fixed and known alternatives,
to each of which is attached known consequences. But when perception and cognition
intervene between the decision-maker and his objective environment, this model no
longer proves adequate. We need a description of the choice process that recognizes that
alternatives are not given but must be sought; and a description that takes into account the
arduous task of determining what consequences will follow on each alternative”lv.
Thus Simon introduced the theory of bounded rationality, “which asserts that the cognitive
limitations of the decision-maker force him to construct a simplified model of the world to deal
with it. The key principle of bounded rationality is the notion of ‘satisficing’, whereby an
organism strives to attain some satisfactory, though not necessarily, maximal level of
achievement”lvi. Slovic summarizes the differences between the two theories, stating that,
“Utility theory is concerned with probabilities, payoffs and the merger of these factors—
expectation.” Whereas, “the theory of bounded rationality … postulates that decision-makers do
not think probabilistically and that they try to avoid the necessity of facing uncertainty directly.”
Next, Slovic notes that misfortune has typically been a “stimulus to action” lvii. To this
end, he quotes GF White (one of his co-authors), who wrote that, “National catastrophes have led
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to insistent demands for national action, and the timing of the legislative process has been set by
the tempo of destructive floods” lviii. This statement dovetails with Slovic’s conclusion that
decision-makers from business firms to political policy-makers all “exhibit a short-run crisisoriented approach to adaptation”lix.
Supporting the bounded rationality thesis, Slovic reports that, “Perhaps the most
widespread conclusion [in studies on the matter] is that people do not follow the principles of
probability theory in judging the likelihood of uncertain events. Indeed, the distortions of
subjective probabilities are often, large, consistent and difficult to eliminate”lx. An important
finding from a 1969 study by Chapman and Chapman, which studied “illusory correlation,”
found that, “one’s prior expectations of probabilistic relationships can lead an individual to
perceive relationships in data where they do not really exist” lxi.
There are also cultural factors that affect risk perception. Slovic highlights a study by
Englander et al., which found drastically different risk perceptions between American and
Hungarian students. Not only did the Hungarians perceive much lower risks from 84 of the 90
activities they were polled on, but they ordered the risks differently as well. “Hungarians saw
relatively greater risks from common hazards such as railroads, boating, home appliances and
mushroom hunting, whereas the Americans were relatively more concerned with technological
hazards pertaining to radiation and chemical technologies” lxii. Further, risk assessment differs
between the genders and races. The majority of studies have found that males “seem to be less
concerned about hazards than are women.” White males in particular shrug in the face of most
risks lxiii.
One strong finding of Slovic’s is that laypeople and experts differ in their perceptions of
risk. “When experts judged risk, their responses correlated highly with technical estimates of
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annual fatalities,” Slovic writes. Though laypeople could assess these technical estimates if
asked, “their judgments of ‘risk’ were sensitive to other factors as well (e.g., catastrophic
potential, controllability, threat to future generations) and, as a result, differed considerably from
their own (and experts’) estimates of annual fatalities”lxiv. Indeed, Slovic highlights that, “the
public seems willing to accept voluntary risks roughly 1000 times greater than involuntary risks
at a given level of benefit” lxv.
In a chapter entitled “Perceived Risk, Trust and Democracy,” Slovic laments the fact that
despite our society becoming healthier and safer on average over the past twenty years, the
American public has actually become increasingly risk averse lxvi. He believes that the reason for
this lack of risk-taking in society is that negative (trust-destroying) events are both more visible
and carry greater weight in our decision-making than corresponding positive (trust-building)
events lxvii. One bad experience, after all, has the potential to drastically change behavior. For
example, imagine seeing a mouse at your favorite restaurant—would you go there again? Slovic
further cites distrust in government and the media’s relentless coverage of “bad news” as
underlying factors lxviii.
Fear and Heuristics
Bolstering the Chapman and Chapman study, Tversky and Kahneman hold that people
estimate risk by using heuristics, or mental strategies or shortcuts, “which allow them to reduce
these difficult tasks to simpler judgmentslxix. One such heuristic is described by Cass Sunstein:
the availability heuristic comes into play when a salient and familiar incident leads people to
exaggerate a threat lxx. Slovic describes the availability heuristic as one that causes a person to
judge “the probability of an event (e.g., snow in November) by the ease with which relevant
instances are imagined or by the number of such instances that are readily retrieved by
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memory” lxxi. Though it is true that we can more readily access events that occur with greater
frequency, other factors—such as recency and emotional saliency—affect our ability to retrieve
memorieslxxii.
Cass Sunstein draws from and builds on Slovic’s work in his books Laws of Fear and
Risk and Reason. In the latter, Sunstein, like Slovic, emphasizes that, “salient, vivid examples
can make people overreact to small risks.” Further, after a fear-inducing incident occurs, people
relay their emotions to one another “creating a kind of cascade of concern” regarding the
incident lxxiii. Sunstein echoes Slovic in stating that, “people’s intuitions about risks are highly
unreliable”lxxiv. The author cites the availability heuristic in making his caselxxv. He also
discerns that “many people believe that risk is an ‘all or nothing’ matter,” in other words, an
activity is either risky or it isn’t. Further, people “are committed to a belief in the benevolence of
nature,” believing that man-made, “artificial” activities and processes are more dangerous than
natural oneslxxvi. Sunstein additionally notes that typically, “a judgment of low risk accompanies
a judgment of high benefits” and vice versa lxxvii. This is due to the fact that typically either an
activities’ risks or the activities’ benefits are salient in people’s mindslxxviii. Further, Sunstein
asserts that, “People tend to be loss averse, which means that a loss from the status quo is seen as
more undesirable than a gain is seen as desirable”lxxix.
Next, Sunstein, citing Slovic, introduces the role of the affect heuristic, “by which people
have an emotional, all-things-considered reaction to certain processes and products, and that
heuristic operates as a mental shortcut for a more careful evaluation” lxxx. The affect heuristic is a
method of decision-making that uses one’s emotional attitude towards a given risk. Sunstein
writes that, “When presented with a risk people have a general emotional attitude to it—hence an
‘affect’—and this general attitude operates as a heuristic, much affecting people’s judgments
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about both benefits and dangers.” Interestingly, if one likes a product she will see high benefits
and low risks associated with it, whereas disliking a product produces the opposite effect. For
those who take issue with emotion and cognition being elided in this way, Sunstein, citing Jon
Elster’s Alchemies of the Mind and Martha Nussbaum’s Upheavals of Thought, proposes that,
“Emotions are generally the products of beliefs, and hence an emotional reaction to risk—terror,
for example—is generally mediated by judgments” lxxxi.
Sunstein further argues that perhaps our mental heuristics are not products of cognitive
error, but rather judgments of value. For example, we particularly value avoiding risks
associated with terrorism because they “seem new, unfamiliar, and apparently hard to
control”lxxxii. Populists, such as James Surowiecki, tout the wisdom of the masses’
characterization of riskslxxxiii. Slovic, for one, writes that, “people’s ‘basic conceptualization of
risk is much richer than that of experts and reflects legitimate concerns that are typically omitted
from expert risk assessments’” lxxxiv. The issue of whether technical assessments alone can
account for the risks involved in a given scenario will be discussed further below. It will be
argued here that risk evaluations based on fatality likelihoods are valuable, but that they do not
tell the whole story.
Tipping and Cascade Models
Tipping, or cascade, models of fear are built on conceptions of norms and perceptions of
others’ fears. These models have been used extensively in the social science literature to explain
how fears build in a society, particularly fears that lead to ethnic strife. This section explains
tipping models, but it is important to note at the outset that these models do not do a good job of
explaining how mass fears build after terror attacks. The goal of the section here is to explain
tipping models sufficiently and offer an explanation for how they might work in a post-terror
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attack context. In the end, however, I find the internal logic of cascade models to be insufficient
in explaining how fears evolve in societies after terrorist attacks.
Tipping and cascade models for explaining mass political behavior have been forwarded
by authors such as Timur Kuran, Murat Somer and Roger Petersen. In this section, I will go over
some of the major works on these models. The basic argument of tipping models is that a given
action’s utility is suddenly changed when a certain amount of people take that action. That is,
once a certain mass of people react in a given way, a tipping point or threshold will have been
reached in society after which an ever-increasing number of people will take on the same
reaction producing a snowball effect.
All tipping models turn on reference points or thresholds that determine when the model
“tips.” For instance, imagine a situation where the people of a city in state X can either
cooperate with the state or defect from it and join an insurgent group. At low levels of defection,
most people will cooperate with the state. But, if a reference point is reached, and a certain
amount of people begin to defect, then defection will become the optimal strategy and most
people will choose to defect. An individual can, thus, decide whether to join the insurgency and
defect or to cooperate with the state based on how many people in the city are following each
strategy. Looking at figure one below, an individual could find himself in a situation where
more people choose option C (cooperate) and, thus, he will most likely do the same. However,
as the percentage of people moves up the solid D (defect) line, the defect strategy becomes more
and more appealing to him, until it becomes the far better strategy to select. The below graph
charts how an individual can determine whether or not to cooperate with the government based
upon the percentage of people pursuing the C and D strategies.
<Insert Figure 2.1 here>
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For purposes of this study, one can imagine a similar tipping model relating mass fear to
government action. At certain levels of public fear, the government pays little heed and, thus,
does not act. But, as fear levels reach the reference point and eventually pass it, the
government’s optimal strategy is to act. In figure two below, as fear levels (signified by the fear
curve F) rise, the government’s incentive becomes increasingly greater to act by, say, passing
legislation or detaining illegal immigrants. Further, as fears recede, government’s incentive to
act recedes with them. However, the government action line A has a slight negative slope to
signify that once government gets involved it takes fear levels going down to below previous
levels to give it an incentive to stop acting.
<Insert Figure 2.2 here>
The remainder of this section will review tipping models before evaluating whether they
will be useful for this study. Russell Hardin and Roger Petersen both employ tipping models in
their work. Hardin contends that “violence is commonly a tipping phenomenon.” By this he
means that, once violence reaches a certain level, “mechanisms for maintaining order may break
down enough that violence can flare out of control and fuel itself.” He notes that this could
occur through an accumulation of violent incidents or through a random shock lxxxv. Petersen
employs a tipping model in “Rationality, Ethnicity, and Military Enlistment” to surmise what
level of military participation is needed for members from a particular ethnic group, for example
the Druze in Israel, to all rationally participate in the militarylxxxvi. He contends that when the
number of people from your group reaches a certain tipping point of military participation, it, all
at once, becomes rational for all group members to participate.
In a nod to the work of Timur Kuran (Sunstein coauthors a chapter with Kuran), Sunstein
highlights the role of cascade effects in group polarization. Group polarization explains why
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people in some communities are very fearful of certain risks, while those in other communities
pay those risks no heed. The author gives the following example: “People who tend to think that
global warming is a nonexistent problem, fabricated by environmentalists to promote their own
parochial ends, are likely to think, after discussion with one another, that this is entirely
true”lxxxvii.
In the chapter by Kuran and Sunstein, the authors highlight the role of availability
cascades in risk assessment. Availability cascades “occur when people’s expressions of fear
trigger chains of individual responses, which make these perceptions appear increasingly
plausible through their rising availability in public discourse.” The authors believe that these
cascades are to blame for the “risk of the month” syndrome that “afflicts the laws in many
nations” lxxxviii. Next, they note that informational cascades occur “when people with little
personal information about a particular matter base their own beliefs on the apparent beliefs of
others” lxxxix. These informational cascades can further be exacerbated by reputation cascades,
which describe what happens when individuals silence their opposing viewpoints due to the fact
that they believe others know better or because they seek to avoid social disapproval xc. The
informational and reputation cascades combine, leading to group polarizationxci. Breaking these
cascades is tough: the only solution Kuran and Sunstein proffer is the effect of learning xcii.
Particularly interesting to this study is the role of public officials in availability cascades.
Sunstein and Kuran note that, “the public pronouncements of public officials are especially
important, partly because those pronouncements are made to many people at the same time.”
Further, “Public officials know that they might be severely punished for downplaying a risk that
is perceived as serious. … To avoid charges of insensitivity, even to avoid having to justify an
unpopular position, [an official] may make speeches and promote policies that convey deep
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concern about the very waste spill that he actually considers harmless” xciii. Further, interest
groups act as availability entrepreneurs “by fixing people’s attention on specific problems” xciv.
Interest groups—and I would add politicians as well—“seize on selected incidents and publicize
them to make them generally salient to the public. They play on people’s emotions, activating
the affect heuristic” xcv.
Kuran and Sunstein’s use of a tipping/cascade model helps explain why government
officials follow the will of the masses after events that cause mass fear. Tipping models also
show how fear can come to grip an entire society. These models, like Sunstein and Slovic’s
assessments of heuristics above, place a lot of agency at the level of the masses. It is the masses’
quick-and-dirty assessments of events that build and eventually reach a critical apex, forcing
change upon society. I think that this conclusion puts too little agency on the government. The
Sunstein and Kuran chapter alludes to the fact that government has a role in drawing people’s
attention to certain aspects of a crisis. Government, indeed, can frame or shape an event as it
sees fit. The power of government will be dealt with further in the sections below.
Problems with Tipping Models
Tipping models involve cascades that rely on individual and local-level beliefs and
interactions, but terrorism fears do not work in this way. Rather, these fears are transmitted
nationally via the media and reach a large portion of the population very quickly. Fear of
terrorism in modern societies are not likely to follow tipping models, contagion models (wherein
people “infect” one another with fear) or individual agent-based models (which are “simulations
based on the global consequences of local interactions of members of a population”)xcvi, because
terrorism represents a salient event that is covered heavily by the media. Whereas Walter
Lippmann contended that, “what people know about the world around them is mostly the result

35

of second-hand knowledge acquired by reading newspapers,” today’s mass media reaches
millions of people with an immediacy and level of saturation never before seen xcvii. We hear
about terrorist attacks not from neighbors, but from news anchors. Not only that, terrorist attacks
are reported widely and with great frequency. Indeed, according to Shanto Iyengar, “Between
1981 and 1986, more news stories were broadcast [by the three TV networks ABC, CBS, and
NBC] on terrorism than on poverty, unemployment, racial inequality, and crime combined”xcviii.
Terrorism fears, thus, do not originate locally, but are transmitted globally and reach the
population via public pronouncements from public officials that reach the people through the
news. Terrorist attacks, unlike local crime stories, are treated as national events by the news
media and by politicians. A large portion of the national populace can quickly become fearful of
terrorism for this reason. Since these events are disseminated to the public so quickly, there need
not be an interim step in the model between crises and executive response and threat-shaping.
Public pronouncements about terrorism are forwarded through the media almost immediately,
thus tipping points or thresholds of fear are not necessary to spur reactions to terrorist events.
Though a tipping point of fear may exist that forces the government into action and
determines the level of agency the chief executive has to shape the threat, there are problems
with both measuring and including such a concept. The first and foremost is the endogeneity
involved in measuring this concept through public opinion polls. After all, once polls are taken,
the media has already had a chance to frame an event. Indeed, the poll itself may frame an event
in the public’s mind. Being asked whether the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 was
“the worst attack in American history” clearly would have an effect on how the public perceives
the event. Further, if opinion charges the dynamic that leads to threat-shaping, then it would
stand as the independent variable not simply a constraint. This is because the executive’s agency
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would be determined from the outset by public opinion—and, then, as the model above goes, still
remain an important constraint on the executive. As will be seen later in this chapter, as well as
in chapters 4, 6 and the conclusion, executives frequently act independently of mass fear levels
and can actually manipulate these fear levels. Thus, for reasons further elaborated in the section
on fear and public opinion, this study employs public opinion as a constraint on the executive,
but does not employ a tipping model.

Fear of the Other
In the previous section, Sunstein and Kuran’s account of how group polarization occurs
was touched on. Group polarization describes what happens when people choose sides, form
groups, and come to hate and/or fear one another. This concept underlies a common thread in
the social science literature: fear of the other. This type of fear is important to my study because
it explains why mass-level fears end up yielding reductions in the rights of minority or alien
groups. The common human tendency it seems is to scapegoat a group we dub “other” in times
of crisis. This section recounts studies that have been done on fear of the other and group
polarization.
In “The Psychology of Group Conflict and the Dynamics of Oppression: A Social
Dominance Perspective,” James Sidanius builds on Henri Tajfel’s theories of group conflict to
construct his theory of social dominance. Henri Tajfel found that discrimination occurred
between groups that had just been composed and the same result occurred even when the groups
were composed randomlyxcix. Indeed, the most disturbing finding of Tajfel’s study was that, “the
very cognition of ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ was a sufficient condition in and of itself to
generate ethnocentric and discriminative behaviors” c. Tajfel explained this behavior by, like
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Slovic and Sunstein, pointing to heuristics that simplify a complex world. He believed that
people organize the world into categories such as social groups in order to make sense of their
environment. He also believed that people need to feel a positive social identity, which is hard to
argue with, and that they will feel good about themselves when their in-group is viewed
favorablyci. They can also, and here is the rub, feel good about themselves by comparing their
group to other groups. In other words, discriminating against out-groups is one way that people
derive a positive social identitycii.
Sidanius draws on Tajfel’s theory to create what he terms social dominance theory.
Sidanius holds that, “Social dominance theory begins with the observation that all human
societies are inherently group-based hierarchies and inherently oppressive” ciii. Further, in their
book, Social Dominance, James Sidanius and Felicia Pratto contend that, “Most forms of group
conflict and oppression … can be regarded as different manifestations of the same basic human
predisposition to form group-based social hierarchies.” They go on to state that, “Human social
systems are subject to the counterbalancing influences of hierarchy-enhancing forces, producing
and maintaining ever higher levels of group-based social inequality, and hierarchy-attenuating
forces, producing greater levels of group-based social equality” civ. In sum, Sidanius’ answer to
group conflict and discrimination is that both are rooted in natural human predispositions. Fear
or hatred of the other, thus, is a natural human response.
Johan van der Dennen echoes much of what Sidanius captured in a literature review
entitled, “Ethnocentrism and In-group/Out-group Differentiation.” He writes that studies by
Konrad Lorenz, included in his seminal work On Aggression, found that “bonds between
members of the same group are intensified by aggression directed towards individuals outside
the group” cv. William Graham Sumner, who coined the term ethnocentrism, bolsters these
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conclusions. Sumner contends that people are good to those in their group and hostile to those
outside it, “because any group, in order to be strong against an outside enemy, must be well
disciplined, harmonious, and peaceful inside; in other words, because discords inside would
cause defeat in battle with another group. Therefore the same conditions which made men
warlike against outsiders made them yield to the control of chiefs, submit to discipline, obey law,
cultivate peace, and create institutions inside” cvi. On ethnocentrism, Robert Bigelow writes in
The Dawn Warriors, “Each group requires something intimate, unique to itself, around which its
members can cohere”cvii. These suppositions are bolstered by Darren Davis who found that,
when “people experience a heightened sense of threat, they are likely to gravitate toward
members of their in-group” cviii.
Next, van der Dennen goes over some of the theories of ethnocentrism. He begins with
realistic group conflict theory, a theory also touched on by Sidanius, which holds that “groups
have incompatible goals and are in competition over scarce resources” cix. He then touches on
evolutionary theories, which hold that group conflict can be explained by adaptive mechanisms.
Frustration-Aggression-Displacement theory comes next. This theory, which has Freudian ties,
holds that males in “matrilocal societies” must hold in their aggressions in order to maintain
societal stability and calm. They, thus, displace their aggression “onto a more remote target”: the
Other cx.
Van der Dennen moves on to dealing with xenophobia, which he notes “is a widespread
trait throughout the animal kingdom” cxi. He writes that xenophobia involves “an aggressive
response towards a complete social stranger.” Paraphrasing the work of CH Southwick, et al. he
notes that:
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“When it occurs in natural settings, xenophobia is a functional and adaptive trait in that it
maintains the integrity of the social group. It ensures that group members will be socially
familiar. … Xenophobia has apparently arisen in the course of natural selection and
social evolution in those species and populations where discrete social groups are
adaptively favoured” cxii.
The brunt of van der Dennen’s literature review points to the conclusion that “All the
field experiments verify the hypothesis that conflict between two groups tend to produce an
increase in solidarity within groups” cxiii. In sum, the external conflict/internal cohesion
hypothesis is bolstered by much of the social science literature including the works of Georg
Simmel, AA Stein, and Muzafer Sherif. Donald Horowitz adds the role of the colonizer to this
conclusion about group polarization. The colonizer can reify group divisions by dividing ethnic
groups into “backward” and “advanced” categoriescxiv.
In-group/out-group hatred and differentiation has certainly been touched on at length at
this point, but what of fear of out-groups? Van der Dennen writes that, “From his protohominid
past, early man must have inherited a great susceptibility to fear, which must have been
amplified by his primordial intellectual and symbolizing capacities.” He notes that fear of the
stranger has always been common among men, this fear encompassed what the stranger
represents: “the strange, the unknown, the out-of-control, the potential chaos, the potential evil,
the potential impurity, contamination and pollution, the potential threat and danger” cxv.
Fear or hatred of the other is central to group cohesion during crisis. Demonizing the
outsider reinforces in-group bonds, making it easier to mobilize one’s group to action. Fear of
the other is a common human emotion and when, during a crisis, it is combined with the natural
tendency to desire action (action bias) and to look for simple solutions via heuristics, it can
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manifest itself into discrimination and violence against a target group. As will be seen in the
case studies, fear of the other is crucial to the reduction of rights that is disproportionately
exacted against minorities and non-citizens.

Defining Terrorism-Inspired Mass Fears
We have now examined the concept of fear from a number of different perspectives. We
have looked at definitions of fear that rely on risk assessment and rationality, definitions that are
based on norms (tipping models), and definitions that are rooted in human psychology (fear of
the other). Now it is time to proffer a definition of how mass fears expand after terror attacks.
This section will touch on the following aspects of post-terror attack fears: bounded rationality,
dreaded risks and action bias. It will then use these concepts to construct a model for the microfoudnations of societal fear. After this model is proposed, three very important components of
terrorism-inspired fear will be examined: the political manipulation of fear, elite-mass dynamics,
and media dynamics. The latter two concepts are interrelated.
In Laws of Fear, Sunstein aims to discredit the Precautionary Principle. In arguing
against the Precautionary Principle, which states “that regulators should take steps to protect
against potential harms, even if causal chains are unclear and even if we do not know that those
harms will come to fruition,” Sunstein aims to show that people’s fears are subjective. To
Sunstein, such a Principle “is literally incoherent, and for one reason: There are risks on all sides
of social situations. [The Principle] is therefore paralyzing … [b]ecause risks are on all sides, the
Precautionary Principle forbids action, inaction, and everything in between” cxvi. Providing a
window into how terrorist fears can engulf societies, Sunstein notes that people “do not like to
run a small risk of a large loss” cxvii. Sunstein notes that, “news sources do a great deal to trigger
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fear, simply by offering examples in which the ‘worst case’ has actually come to fruition”cxviii.
Terrorists exploit both the news media and basic human fears by “using high-visibility attacks to
convince people that ‘they cannot be safe anywhere’” cxix.
Moreover, Sunstein notes that, “Simply because of fear, the public and its leaders will
favor precautionary measures that do little to protect security but that compromise important
forms of freedom” cxx. This is because, “In democratic nations, the law responds to people’s
fears. As a result the law can be led in unfortunate and even dangerous directions” cxxi. This is an
important statement for my theory. In democracies, governments are not the only actors that
control reactions to events, the people also play a role in government reactions by protesting,
writing to their senators, voting, and making their opinions known through polls. Fear can
quickly engulf a society because of the availability heuristic and probability neglect. As
mentioned above, the availability heuristic comes into play when a salient and familiar incident
leads people to exaggerate a threatcxxii. Probability neglect occurs when people ignore the
probability of events occurring and instead rely solely on emotions. When fear overtakes a
society, people will neglect the probability of a terrorist attack actually affecting them personally
and instead focus on the worst-case scenario even when it is highly improbablecxxiii.
This leads us to Jessica Stern’s discussion of dreaded risks. Stern emphasizes that
terrorist attacks, such as 9/11, fall into the category of “dreaded risks” for most people. She
writes that psychologists and risk analysts have found that “fear is disproportionately evoked by
certain characteristics of risks, including: involuntary exposure, unfamiliarity, and invisibility” as
well as “when long-term effects or the number of people likely to be effected is difficult to
predict” cxxiv. Further, as Diego Gambetta rightly underlines, it is nearly impossible to accurately
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assess what level of terrorist threat we are under at any given moment, especially given human
nature’s tendency to overblow one-time, outlier occurrencescxxv.
Stern defines dreaded risks as risks that “evoke disproportionate fears and are likely to be
maximally” salientcxxvi. She notes that though 100 Americans a day die in auto accidents, people
view driving as voluntary and thus do not “dread” itcxxvii. Yet terrorism and biological terror,
both exceedingly unlikely events, evoke feelings of dread. Since biological agents are
“mysterious, unfamiliar, indiscriminate, uncontrollable, inequitable, and invisible” people view
them as dreaded risks cxxviii. Sunstein takes issue with Stern’s terminology, however, stating that,
“to say that a risk is dreaded seems to say that people fear it, which suggests the idea of dread is
just a synonym for perception of risk, not an explanation for it.” Though, he does admit that,
“there is a kind of ‘pain and suffering premium’” associated with some riskscxxix. Though
Sunstein’s point is valid, here I side with Stern in holding that terrorist acts in particular inspire
mass fear because of the dreaded risks, or aggravating factors, associated with terrorism.
In addition to her discussion of dreaded risks, Stern adds one more human bias to the
mix: action bias. She notes that there is a tendency on the part of policymakers to respond
quickly to crises cxxx. Stern, then, defines action bias, a term coined by Anthony Patt and Richard
Zeckhauser cxxxi, as “decisionmakers’ penchant for taking action without necessarily considering
its long-term effects, coupled with the tendency to choose those actions for which they are likely
to receive the most credit” cxxxii. The existence of action bias is corroborated by Thomas
Downes-Le Guin and Bruce Hoffman who conducted a survey of the American public’s views
on terrorism from 1988-89. They found that a strong majority supported government acting in
response to terrorism “even if it is not very effective.” Interestingly, the public generally
preferred diplomatic to military solutions cxxxiii.
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It seems that due to the many mental shortcuts, or heuristics, we laypeople use in our
everyday lives, we are not very good at assessing the risks borne from acts such as terrorism.
Diego Gambetta summarizes why we should not fear terrorism as much as we do. He believes
that we should not become alarmists, even after 9/11, because, for one, 9/11 was “a wild outlier
among terrorist acts” cxxxiv. Gambetta very quickly admits, however, that it is difficult to actually
assess “how threatening the terrorists really are.” Still, establishing the size of the threat is of the
utmost importance in deciding how to deal with that threat and in “avoiding overreactions” cxxxv.
Our cognitive biases, outlined by the authors above, make us particularly susceptible to
overblowing the threat from high-casualty, low-probability events cxxxvi. Gambetta believes that
the cognitive dissonance that reigned after 9/11 led the public to attribute special powers to our
enemies and to over-aggressively seek out culprits, a point echoed by John Mueller cxxxvii.
Former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s talk of “unknown unknowns” and the Bush
Doctrine’s focus on preemptive war have led to a war plan based on no “clear cassus belli” cxxxviii.
Gambetta would probably agree with Sunstein’s promotion of cost-benefit analysis and emphasis
on tradeoffs “in thinking about risks” cxxxix.
Still, looking at costs and benefits should not be mistaken for minimizing or ignoring
risks. John Mueller, exaggerating a point made by Gambetta, writes that, “it is worth
remembering that the total number of people killed since 9/11 by al Qaeda or al Qaeda-like
operatives outside of Afghanistan and Iraq is not much higher than the number who drown in
bathtubs in the United States in a single year, and that the lifetime chance of an American being
killed by international terrorism is about one in 80,000—about the same chance of being killed
by a comet or a meteor. Even if there were a 9/11-scale attack every three months for the next
five years, the likelihood that an individual American would number among the dead would be
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two hundredths of a percent (or one in 5,000)” cxl. This point skips over cost-benefit analysis and
simply asks people to look at cold probability. But, there are attendant risks to terrorism that
such a point ignores. For one, this formulation completely ignores the economic ramifications of
an attack on property and on families of the victims. Further, if thousands died of terrorist
attacks in America every season, there would be widespread panic—and rightfully so. Though it
may be “irrational” to fear a threat that probability says is unlikely, people in this instance are
right to follow their common sense and emotions. If one were told that 1 in 5,000 people at a
football game would be randomly murdered (ten people in a stadium of 50,000), I doubt that
many would brave the odds. It is one thing to ask of us to weigh risks, it is another to ask people
to replace their emotions and common sense heuristics with the cold comfort of a series of
calculated odds. Indeed, teenagers may view risk through too rational a prism. According to
Maia Szalavitz, “Brain-scan research shows that when teens contemplate things like playing
Russian roulette or drinking and driving, they primarily use rational regions of the brain—certain
regions of the cortex—while adults use emotional regions like the insula. When risky decisions
are weighed in a rational calculus, benefits like fitting in and feeling good now can outweigh real
risks.” To this end, psychologist Valerie Reyna suggests that teenagers—whose abilities to
accurately assess risks are generally poor—be taught to rule out risks based on emotional
responses cxli. Since humans suffer from bounded rationality and lean heavily on mental
heuristics, selecting risks by weighing either rationality or emotion alone may prove foolish.
The general findings of Slovic and Sunstein hold that most people approach fear with
bounded rationality. Bounded rationality entails having a limited view of all of the costs and
benefits of a given situation, and of the available options. Due to our bounded rationality, we
employ mental heuristics, such as the availability and affect heuristics, as shortcuts to measure
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risk in our everyday lives. Further, due to our common sense approach to measuring risk, we
particularly fear activities or events that we view as new, uncontrollable, involuntary,
irreversible, manmade and low-probability, high casualty cxlii. When fear overtakes a society, the
public will rely on heuristics such as the affect heuristic and fall prey to probability neglect, and
decisionmakers will fall into the trap of action bias. Though Sunstein and Gambetta call for a
more sober assessment of risks and rewards on the part of decisionmakers and the public,
Gambetta himself admits that it is hard to decipher the level of threat after an event such as 9/11.
Were more terrorists on the way? This sounds like a naïve question given the history of the past
seven years, but it was a legitimate concern of people after the attacks in 2001. Indeed, the
arrests in London on August 10, 2006 speak to the continued desire of jihadists to carry out
mass-casualty terrorist events. Further, a sober approach to risk is easier proposed than
implemented given the information asymmetries regarding the terrorist threat that divide the
government and the public. In addition, though terrorist events are, particularly in the West, few
and far in between, the aggravating factors inherent in terrorism make it a hard phenomenon to
ignore. That said, the government must guard itself from taking action without carefully
assessing the ramifications. The main lesson of the rational choice scholars of risk and fear is
that all actions have consequences, all benefits have costs.
It is important to note here that fear is not necessarily a rational response to a situation.
Driving on America’s highways is far and away more dangerous and potentially fatal than flying
on a US commercial airlinecxliii, yet more people fear air travel than driving on the highway cxliv.
There are myriad qualitative explanations for this phenomenon: people fly less than they drive,
you’re 30,000 feet up in the air in a plane but “safe” on the ground in a car, and so on. But, these
responses all may be deemed “irrational” because the fearful reaction does not fit the facts. This
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is because rationality involves fitting responses to quantitative facts whereas emotional responses
appeal to more qualitative factors such as pride, love, comfort, and anger cxlv. Fear can be
rational, but many times it is not.
Combining the above biological and rational action approaches to fear, a model of how
people and governments react to crises can now be constructed. First, due to their bounded
rationality, people understand crises via mental heuristics such as the availability heuristic.
These heuristics do not take into account all of the costs-and-benefits of a given response.
Second, there are aggravating circumstances, including unfamiliarity, involuntariness and
newness that make people more fearful of certain events. Terrorism falls within the category of
these so-called “dreaded risks.” Third, fear of the other is crucial in the reaction of populaces
after terrorist attacks, especially when ethnic minorities or foreigners commit these attacks. Fear
of the other is a natural human reaction and one that is triggered during crises in order to create
greater internal cohesion. Fourth, fear of terrorism is projected to mass publics via the media.
Fifth, action bias dictates that people will desire that actions be taken to quell the crisis quickly
even when these actions may not solve the problem. Finally, the role of politicians is crucial in
expressing people’s fears. Decision makers, particularly government executives, can have very
large effects on how crises will be dealt with and how people react especially due to their access
to media sources and status as leaders.
In this study, it will be shown that government executives can either tamp down or
ratchet up fears through their public pronouncements. Here it is contended that executives do not
simply need to echo how the masses are feeling. Thus, the central focus of this book is on the
agency that executives have in shaping fears, which eventually leads to abridgements of civil
liberties. Below, I map a choice model of how crises lead to government action. It is important
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here to note which parts of this chain of reaction are variables and which are simply given
heuristics that are part of the causal chain, to this end, the variables have been placed in bold.

<Insert Figure 2.3 here>
Political Fear and Government Threat-shaping
After reviewing the social science literature’s take on fear, we have finally arrived at a
point where the role of government can be further scrutinized. Corey Robin contends that
government frequently uses fear as a political tool and calls this employment “political fear.” In
this section, I introduce the concept of political fear and look at how other scholars have
conceived of the government’s role in fomenting fear.
Robin defines political fear as “a political tool, an instrument of elite rule or insurgent
advance, created and sustained by political leaders or activists who stand to gain something from
it, either because fear helps them pursue a specific policy goal, or because it reflects or lends
support to their moral and political beliefs—or both.” Robin describes a type of fear whereby
“leaders or militants define what is or ought to be the public’s chief object of fear.” He goes on
to state that, “Political fear of this sort almost always preys upon some real threat—it seldom, if
ever, is created out of nothing—but since the harms of life are as various as its pleasures,
politicians and other leaders have much leeway in deciding which threats are worthy of political
attention and which are not”cxlvi. He emphasizes that, “It is no accident that this mode of fear is
common during wartime, for its primary constituency is the nation or some other presumably
cohesive community, and its primary object a foreign enemy or some other approximation of the
alien” cxlvii.
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So, how might we incorporate political fear into the model of how individuals react to
crises/fear? First of all, the government has the ability to push the public to take on the
government’s perspective by making certain information available. Since people use the
availability heuristic widely in determining risk, the government, by making images or
arguments of certain things available, can adjust how people view a threat. Further, the
government could use emotional pleas to manipulate the use of the affect heuristic. Also, by
highlighting the aggravating factors of an event—invisibility, newness, uncontrollability, etc.—
the government can ratchet up the public’s fear levelscxlviii. Finally, the government could easily
induce fear of the other by drawing the populace’s attention to the specific group that it says is at
fault for the terrorist attack. The government would, thus, both create internal cohesion and
external hostility: perfect conditions for a war effort.
The general political science literature holds that government has a strong role in shaping
threats and a wide agency to shape those threats. In Understanding Ethnic Violence, Roger
Petersen posits that a society could be overtaken by fear when, “Structural changes such as the
collapse or weakening of the political center eliminate institutional constraints and guarantees to
produce a situation characterized as anarchy or emerging anarchy. Fear heightens the desire for
security” cxlix. He next reviews a number of security dilemma accounts of how fear pervades
society. For example, Russell Hardin in One For All: The Logic of Group Conflict argues that,
“the perception of threat motivates individual action.” To Hardin, however, political elites are
necessary to overcome the collective action problem and mobilize the massescl. Petersen
categorizes three dynamics for how fear dictates the elite-mass dynamic:
“In one, the fears of the mass and the political elites are similar and both respond to an
existing anarchic structure that has unfolded through processes outside the agency of actors.
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In a second, the fears of the population are manipulated and artificially heightened by a
political elite for their own ends. A third version, a modification of the second, primarily
focuses on a political struggle between elite factions. One faction creates fear, and possibly a
security dilemma as an effective mobilization strategy against the other”cli.
The competition between elite factions strand is further taken up by VP Gagnon. Gagnon
writes that, “violent conflict along ethnic cleavages is provoked by elites in order to create a
domestic political context where ethnicity is the only politically relevant identity.” This is how
“endangered elites can fend off domestic challengers who seek to mobilize the population
against the status quo, and can better position themselves for future challenges” clii. Gagnon
holds a starkly elite-driven view of conflict, writing that, “The challenge for elites is … to define
the interest of the collective in a way that coincides with their power interests”cliii.
Petersen’s rubric provides a good starting point for discussing whether the masses or the
government drive societal fear. As will be established in a later section, the major Western
political philosophers have generally stated that the government pushes fear. The risk analysis
literature, since it is based upon the actions of individuals, places the foundations of fearful
behavior in the individual and then the masses. However, that literature certainly leaves ample
room for the role of governments driving fear. Finally, Robin’s conception of political fear and
Petersen’s review of how fear drives conflict both provide a large role for government. Petersen,
for instance, does not include in his discussion a model wherein the masses drive elites to actions
that they may otherwise not want to take, such as the model composed by Kuran and Sunstein.
Petersen’s narrative with the most mass agency has the masses working with the government
hand-in-hand. Since I aim to measure mass fears via public opinion, the next section will look at
the theories on how mass opinion shapes government and vice versa.
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Fear and Public Opinion
What remains, then, is a discussion of what public opinion’s effect on government is in
the literature. Public opinion is important to the study of fear’s effect on politics because it is the
metric that will be used in this study to approximate mass fears. In The Impact of Public
Opinion on US Foreign Policy Since Vietnam, Richard Sobel provides a strong case for studying
public opinion’s effect on democratic governments:
“A fundamental premise in our democracy is that government policy reflects the will of the
people. In an ideal sense, what the government does should derive from citizen opinion. In
actuality, what the government does derives only imperfectly from citizen preferences. Yet
the public’s beliefs and attitudes do guide and constrain public policy, in foreign as well as
domestic affairs” cliv.
He finds that, “public opinion constrains, but does not set, American foreign intervention policy.
In other words, the public’s attitudes set the limits within which policymakers may operate” clv.
This follows from VO Key’s theory that public opinion works as a “system of dikes that channel
the flow of public policy. Public opinion, in this model, does not set policy but instead is
capable of setting the range or limits of policy.”
Sobel, however, notes that whereas the term public opinion “implies a predominance …
of sentiment among the entire population as revealed in polls,” “the public is stratified and
differing publics express their views through various forums.” Further, in a point Gagnon and
Petersen also emphasize, Sobel stresses that elites are just as divided as the public, with political
appointees being much more responsive to public opinion than non-politically appointed career
officialsclvi. Sobel notes that a view such as Gagnon’s of simple elite manipulation of the public
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and of an elite that can draw public support for just about anything does not hold, at least in the
foreign policy realm—and at least in democracies. Rather, it is important to note “climates of
public opinion” and the “system of dikes” theory clvii.
Here let us pause for a moment to consider the subject matter of most of the studies on public
opinion presented in this section. These studies mainly focus on foreign policy. If elites are
constrained in their agency regarding foreign policy: an arena in which they have vast
information advantages and strong powers to change public attitudes due at least in part to lack
of public knowledge, then I believe that these findings should be even more powerful with a
study such as mine that looks at domestic policy. After all, the public is more knowledgeable of
policies that affect it directly, such as those that affect civil liberties, and has many more
opportunities, especially in America, to voice its views in the voting booth where domestic
policy is concerned (i.e., with mayoral, state legislative elections, etc.).
Back to Sobel. Sobel next outlines two normative models of representation for how public
opinion should affect the government. The first, the trustee model, “suggests that representatives
should use their best judgment of issues and then vote in the interest of their constituents, not
necessarily as the constituents prefer.” The second, the delegate model holds that representatives
“vote, and should vote, in response to constituents’ wishes.” Though the public’s interests “are
generally expected to prevail in a democracy,” Sobel writes that, “What distinguishes democracy
is not that every member of the public has equal influence in the formulation of policy, but that
every member has potential access to power and that the political leadership is periodically
subject to election” clviii. In a study of how House members perceived their relationship to public
opinion, Serafino and Storrs found that 28 percent saw themselves as “trustees” in the above
sense, 23 percent “delegates” in the above sense, and 46 percent said they were “politicos,”
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which meant they “could shift between personal judgment and constituency opinion depending
upon the circumstances”clix. In Sobel’s conclusion, he finds that actual government officials
“saw themselves more typically as trustees of government than as delegates of the people”clx.
Presidential popularity also plays an important role in influencing policymakers.
“Presidential popularity as political capital undergirds congressional support,” Sobel writes.
Further, support of the president colors the entire “climate of opinion that generally constrains
policy” clxi. Still, Sobel notes that climates of opinion come in cycles. During some periods, for
instance, Americans have been generally interventionist, in others they have been largely
isolationist clxii.
The President has enormous powers to shape opinion. As Theodore Roosevelt put it, “the
presidency is a ‘bully pulpit’ for influencing opinion” clxiii. The executive branch can influence
opinion indirectly via the media and interest groups or it can directly speak to the public. As
Page and Shapiro have found, “A popular president who makes repeated speeches may achieve a
5 to 10 percentage point change in popular opinion over several monthsclxiv. Further, as John
Mueller and others have found, the “rally ‘round the flag” effect typically provides an increase in
support of the government after important international events, “although this sometimes does
not happen or is short-lived” clxv. Further, Page and Shapiro and others have found that public
opinion, long thought to be fickle and easily manipulable, is, at least in America, relatively
stable clxvi. Sobel writes that whereas public opinion in the past was “considered, at maximum, to
constrain policy,” “today public opinion, at minimum constrains policy and, at maximum, sets
policy” clxvii.
Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi build on Sobel’s view of public opinion in Choosing
Your Battles. They write that:
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“Civilian policymakers are most attuned to elite public opinion, since this represents by
definition the views of the people most active in public debates over policy and since the
policymakers are themselves a part of the elite. But decision makers are also sensitive to
what the mass voter thinks since that may determine whether they hold on to their positions
of power. At the same time, policymakers seek to shape the opinion of elites who themselves
seek to shape mass opinion so as to influence policymakers” clxviii.
Thus, the government is constrained both by the masses and by elite opinion leaders.
Policymakers can affect public opinion, but are also limited by it. The purpose of Feaver and
Gelpi’s book is to show how civilian and military leaders view the military and conflict
differently, and to break down some myths about the public’s perception of military power (such
as, that it is “casualty phobic”) clxix. Their work stresses that neither the elite nor the masses
represent monoliths. Rather, both are segmented into different factions, such as veteran and nonveteran and politically informed and uninformed.
Their findings are further bolstered by John Zaller’s seminal work, The Nature and
Origins of Mass Opinion. Zaller writes that the aim of his book “is to show how variations in the
elite discourse affect both the direction and organization of mass opinion”clxx. Zaller notes that
the information the public receives about world developments represents “a highly selective and
stereotyped view of what has taken place”clxxi. This is because the public is reliant on political
elites, which include not only politicians and government officials but also journalists and
activists, for its informationclxxii. Zaller repeatedly finds that people who are more heavily
exposed to elite discourse—that is, the more highly educated and politically literate—are more
likely to agree with elite views clxxiii. However, the author, like Feaver and Gelpi, does not view
the elite as a monolith. He writes that, “Public opinion is sometimes formed by streams of a
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monolithically one-sided elite discourse, but, more often, it is shaped by multiple and typically
conflicting information flows, some which are more intense, or easier to learn about, than
others” clxxiv.
After delving into many of the problems with measuring public opinion, Zaller asserts
that with an indecisive and fragmented public, “someone has got to play the role of crystallizing
issues in a way that can lead to action.” Thus, he uses the term “issue entrepreneurs” to describe
officials that frame issues for public consumption. Zaller states that:
“Political leaders are seldom the passive instruments of majority opinion. Nor, as it seems to
me, do they often attempt openly to challenge public opinion. But they do regularly attempt
to play on the contradictory ideas that are always present in people’s minds, elevating the
salience of some and harnessing them to new initiatives while downplaying or ignoring other
ideas—all of which is just another way of talking about issue framing” clxxv.
Thus, “a popular president backed by a unified Washington community can have a powerful
effect on public opinion, especially that part of the public that is most attentive to politics”clxxvi.
It is at this point that Zaller returns to the premise that the more politically aware a person is,
the more mainstream messages she receives and internalizes, and, therefore, “the greater the
person’s level of expressed support for mainstream policy” clxxvii. Further, the more aware a
person is, the more likely they are to fill their head with ideas that fit with their political
ideology. Hence, aware conservatives seek out conservative arguments and aware liberals do the
same clxxviii. Zaller shows that whereas politically aware liberals and conservatives both
supported the Vietnam War in 1964, by 1970 the two sides were polarized clxxix. Further, while
Republicans and Democrats both supported the first George Bush’s Gulf War policies before
members of Congress criticized them, after congressional criticism occurred the public’s
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opinions of the policy diverged along partisan linesclxxx. This speaks to a strong role for elites in
shaping the opinions of their partisan supporters.
This leads Zaller to draw up a model showing how information flows “consist of both a
dominant message pushing much of public opinion in one direction, and a less intense,
countervalent message that partly counteracts the effects of the dominant message” clxxxi. He
concludes that, “public attitudes toward major issues are a response to the relative intensity of
competing political communications of those issues.” Thus when elites are united behind an
issue, “the public’s response is relatively nonideological, with the most aware members of the
public reflecting the elite consensus most strongly.” However, “When elites come to disagree
along partisan or ideological lines, the public’s response will become ideological as well, with
the most politically aware members of the public responding most ideologically” clxxxii. Opinion
polls on the War in Iraq, which exhibit an American public more divergent than ever before,
further bolster Zaller’s findings clxxxiii.
We began this chapter by considering which way the flow of fear goes: from mass to
government or government to masses. The purpose of the chapter has been to construct a theory
of how mass fears interact with the legislative process resulting in civil liberties abridgments
after terrorist attacks. Zaller’s working assumption was “that elite communications shape mass
opinion rather than vice versa” clxxxiv. He supports this claim with numerous examples including
the fact that while in August 1990 only a small portion of Americans knew that Kuwait existed,
within two weeks over 80 percent of Americans supported a prevention of further Iraqi
aggression against Kuwait clxxxv. Zaller writes that, “The general point here is that, however
difficult it may be to resolve the direction of elite-mass influence in the abstract, it is often
possible to make plausible judgments in particular cases” clxxxvi.
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Zaller writes that, “elites act

autonomously to shape public opinion, but only after they calculate that it is safe to do so” clxxxvii.
Zaller finally reiterates that the masses will go with the elites when elite unity exists, but when it
does not, the masses will split along ideological linesclxxxviii. Looking at particular cases, this
book will show that government executives do indeed control post-terror attack responses. It
will also be shown that strong elite divisions can lead to counterterror legislation being blocked.
Finally, Robert Entman in Projections of Power adds to the discussion by supplying a model
of how information cascades downward from the presidential administration. He writes that,
“The president and top advisors enjoy the most independent ability to decide which mental
associations to activate and the highest probability of having their thoughts become part of the
general circulation of ideas, and congressional leaders enjoy more autonomy and influence than
backbenchers” clxxxix. Entman forwards a model wherein the administration frames ideas and
these ideas in turn cascade down to other elites and the media and reach the public via media
news frames. Along the way, lesser elites affect the administration, news frames affect the lesser
elites, and the public affects the media cxc. Entman writes that, “presidential control over the
framing of foreign affairs can indeed look a lot like hegemonic domination—but only when there
is clear congruence or obvious incongruence between the foreign event or issue and prominent
cultural schemas.” Thus, even after 9/11, the Bush Administration had to engage in strategic
framing to get the public to support the War in Iraq since this was not an obvious response to the
al-Qaeda terrorism cxci.
Entman, building on Zaller, contends that when leaders respond to public opinion they can
undermine their competitors; but when public opinion is split, elites will compete over how the
issues should be framedcxcii. However, he, again like Zaller, finds problems with how public
opinion is measured cxciii. Hence, he writes that, “Washington politicians are … exquisitely

57

sensitive to the imagined public, to their perceptions of public opinion” cxciv. To Entman, it is
how government perceives public opinion that matters. This finding is substantiated by Feaver
and Gelpi, who write extensively on government’s perceptions of what the public wants cxcv.
Entman leaves us with a messy picture. Though he concedes that the public is not as easily
manipulable as previously thought, he still holds that due to citizens’ “underdeveloped
ideologies, uncertain motivations …, and tenuous command of important facts,” the public is
highly susceptible to government appealscxcvi. This further follows because the government
controls information flowscxcvii.

Public Opinion Findings and Theory Generation
The main goal of this chapter was to discover where the flow of fear stems from: does it
come from the government or the masses? Just like the thinkers in the philosophical foundations
section, public opinion scholars generally argue that the government holds the reins of public
opinion. The government, thus, can foment fear generally as it sees fit. But, this statement
comes with a few caveats. First, the masses, as Sobel shows, constrain government action.
Democratic governments usually pay attention to mass opinion out of, in the least, a desire to
stay in power. Therefore, the narrative of a monolithic government imposing its views on a
simple-minded public does not pass muster. There is some interplay between the government
and the masses. Second, as Feaver and Gelpi and others exhibit, neither elites nor the masses are
monolithic. They are both divided into factions. This leads to the third point: Zaller’s
supposition that when elite consensus exists, the masses will follow. But, when elites are
polarized, the masses will divide along ideological lines. Finally, though these scholars show
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that the government does care, sometimes deeply, about what the public thinks, the public’s
views are plagued by limited information and perhaps even disinformation.
So, what is the effect of these experts’ views on the theory proposed in chapter one?
First, as Zaller emphasizes, the causal arrows normally go from elite-to-mass. The public
opinion and risk analysis literatures show fairly clearly that government shaping happens almost
immediately after an event occurs. Thus, government shaping, particularly by the executive,
drives the post-terror attack dynamic. However, the government is constrained by the level of
mass fear and by other public opinion factors, which include both approval of the government
and mass fears. This is why I write below: “Executive Shaping x Mass Fear/ Public Opinion.”
This formulation is meant to show that mass fear levels and public opinion both constrain and
fuel government action due to the government’s desire to follow public opinion and its need to
have public support. Though public opinion can act as a fuel for government action, the
executive is firmly in control of shaping where that fear is directed. Thus, threat-shaping stands
as the independent variable.
Further, political constellations, meaning the party in power and democratic institutional
structure (presidential or parliamentary), help determine how the threat will be shaped by the
executive. The constellation variables will be studied more closely in the case-study chapters.
Mass fear/public opinion and political constellations act as constraints, which help determine
how executives will shape the threat. Next, ideological opponents chime in as an intervening
variable, trying to put brakes on the executive’s framing scheme.
Ideological opponents can create counter-currents of information that serve to divide
mass fears and public opinion generally, breaking down the “rally ‘round the flag” effect that
initially transpires. Their criticism of the executive leads him to adjust his threat shaping, push
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his claims more strongly, or appeal differently to the masses. I focus on the ideological
opponents that exist within government and thus dub this variable “Legislative Opposition.”
Finally, legislation is passed and laws are enforced that abridge civil liberties. Absent legislative
opposition, as we saw in the period immediately proceeding 9/11, these laws will be enacted
much more easily.

Conclusion
In this chapter, fear was looked at philosophically and logically, as rooted in the
government and as rooted in the masses. The political philosophy and public opinion literatures
generally point to fear as being a top-down phenomenon. The power of the government to
invade people’s lives and shape their fears is generally seen to be much greater than the power of
the masses to drive societal fear. Since the rational choice literature bases its explanations upon
the behavior of individual actors, it provides a good window into the micro-foundations of fear.
However, this literature does not do a good job of explaining how terrorism-inspired fears
envelope the masses. That said, though this study will be focused on fear at the macro-level, the
insights of rational choice theorists will certainly prove helpful in explaining the roots of mass
fear. Second, neither the government/elite nor the public/mass are monoliths. Both can be
divided in various ways. For this reason, I present my model with the executive and legislature
divided. I also argue that though the masses may be more or less unified immediately after
terrorist attacks, they will split, as Zaller establishes, along partisan lines when elites do.
Consequently, the third point is that political constellations—particularly, the composition of the
legislature and the level of party competition cxcviii—are very important to explaining the behavior
of both elites and the masses. They are important not only because partisan divides frequently
map neatly over ideological ones, but also because different parties have different reputations
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and, I hypothesize, will react differently to threatscxcix. Finally, fear of the other and group
polarization help explain why minorities are frequently targeted after terrorist attacks and during
wartime in general. In a study that seeks to find the roots of reductions in the civil liberties, fear
of the other is an important psychological concept to bear in mind.
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Chapter Three
Shaping Fear: The Role of Mass Fear in Civil Liberties Reductions after Terrorist Attacks

How is the public affected by terrorist attacks? Some scholars believe that the public
typically overreacts to threatscc, while others contend that the public is rational in its opinionscci.
The prevailing wisdom coming from both camps is that after terror attacks executive approval
ratings spike, mass fear levels rise, and public willingness to trade liberties-for-security grows.
All of these assumptions will be tested through an analysis of public opinion trends in this
chapter.
The findings will show that public fear levels jump up after terrorist attacks and that this
jump is concomitant with a demand for action. The public is also more willing to cede liberties
after attacks. These factors create an opportunity for the executive to act. However, public fears
and the willingness to trade liberties-for-security fade, or decay, over time, thus eventually
constraining executive action. In general, public opinion polls aggregated in this chapter will
show that after terrorist attacks, a window of opportunity for executive action is created by a
public demand for action, the public’s willingness to cede liberties, and heightened mass fear
levels. That said, as the charts below exhibit, rallies ‘round the leader are not automatic, mass
fear levels are hard to operationalize, and public willingness to trade liberties for security largely
amounts to a willingness to curtail the rights of minorities. Further, spikes in all of these factors
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are short-lived, even in cases where legislation is not passed, thus making rapid executive action
after terror attacks troubling.
Public Opinion’s Role in the General Theory
This chapter focuses on the masses’ role in the process that leads to civil liberty curtailments.
Here the concept of mass fear will be measured by looking at the percentage of people in a given
country fearful of terrorism. Thus, it is not the presence of mass fear that will be important but
what the level of mass fear is, that is the percentage of people fearful of terrorism, in a given
society. More specifically, fear trends will be looked at, so that the change in mass fear levels
after terrorist attacks will be of utmost importance. Specific polls will get at mass fear in
different ways, some look at individuals’ fears of becoming terror victims while other polls
examine the salience of terrorism in the public’s mind by measuring individuals’ perceptions of
the likelihood of future terror attacks.
During a crisis or emergency, public fear rises to extremely high levels. People become
afraid to engage in their normal daily activities. When anxiety and terror reach a peak, the public
looks to a leader to unite behind, thus creating an opportunity for executive action ccii. Indeed, as
John Mueller has found, the “rally ‘round the flag” effect typically provides an increase in
support of the chief executive after important international eventscciii. Further, as Timur Kuran
and Cass Sunstein write, “Public officials know that they might be severely punished for
downplaying a risk that is perceived as serious. … To avoid charges of insensitivity, even to
avoid having to justify an unpopular position, [an official] may make speeches and promote
policies that convey deep concern about the very waste spill that he actually considers
harmless”cciv.
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Though mass fear is an important component of this theory, the masses cannot actually
forward policy. Thus, threat-shaping is the independent variable in this study for executives
have the opportunity to explicate policy directions after emergency events. However, just as
executives are given an opportunity by public fears, they are also constrained by the feelings of
the public. If the public does not feel that a given threat still exists, then over time it will lose
faith in an executive that continues to prosecute that threat. Without public approval, the
executive’s power will be limited and the potential for legislative opposition will increase.
Recall that the executive is constrained by two broad factors: political constellations
(which will be examined in future chapters) and public opinion. Once the executive gets
involved in threat-shaping, public fear levels and opinions both constrain and fuel the executive’s
actions. The term public opinion is used here rather than mass fear because public opinion
contains more aspects than simply mass fear. Specifically, it includes willingness to cede
liberties and approval of the executive, both of which are essential to the executive passing curbs
on liberties. The executive can be constrained by both the public’s approval level of the job he is
doing and by the public’s feelings of threat. If the public does not feel threatened by terrorism
and/or does not view the executive’s counterterrorism practices as successful, then the
executive’s agency will be constrained. Why is this so? First of all, the public could vote out the
executive’s party or vote out the president. If elections are far away, then public support and fear
levels are still important because public support provides a mandate for executive action.
Further, the public’s opposition to the executive could manifest itself in legislative opposition to
the executive. In proportional-representation systems, votes of no-confidence and the holding of
new elections are likely when the ruling party loses the public’s favor. For these reasons, public
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opinion is an important constraint on executive action. Public opinion theory will be further
discussed in a later section.
The chief executive is also fueled by positive opinions of his job performance and his
government ccv. High fear levels, a willingness to trade liberties for security and high approval
ratings after terrorist attacks grant the executive a great opportunity to act with wider agency
than he is regularly afforded. Of course, as argued above, opinion is a two-way street, it can
create opportunity but it also can act as a constraint.
The Value of Public Opinion Polling
The hypotheses proposed below will be tested using public opinion trend analysis. For
all their warts, public opinion polls provide our best window into the feelings of mass publics.
Since this study looks at the reactions of national governments to terrorist attacks, more microlevel or fine-grained methods would not suffice as metrics. In this section, I will go over the
theory behind public opinion polls. What can they measure? How can they capture the fear of a
given populace?
Why opinion polls? Opinion is essential to terrorism specifically because terrorists’
modus operandi is to draw attention to their cause via spectacular attacksccvi. Typically,
terrorists seek to gain favorable world opinion by drawing attention to the plight of their national
or religious group. Conversely, they try to drain approval from democratic governments in order
to either affect democratic electionsccvii or gain concessions from the democratic country ccviii.
Opinion, thus, is a crucial component of the interaction between democracies and terror groups.
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The Value of Public Opinion
Ole Holsti divides the political science literature’s views on the capacities of the public into
two camps: liberals and realists. Liberals, such as Jeremy Bentham, believe that public opinion
should strongly inform “legitimate and effective public policy” ccix. Immanuel Kant held that
public opinion could act as a great restraint against unnecessary war-making, as a result making
the republic form of government more peacefulccx. Realists, with their pessimistic view on
human nature, “usually describe public opinion as a barrier to any thoughtful and coherent
foreign policy, hindering efforts to promote national interests that may transcend the moods and
passions of the moment”ccxi. To this end, the authors of The Federalist Papers believed that the
Senate would be better suited to handling foreign affairs than the House of Representativesccxii.
For his part, Alexis de Tocqueville contended that public opinion hindered effective
policymaking in democracies because it led “‘democracies to obey impulse rather than
prudence’” ccxiii.
Initial social science research on public opinion in the twentieth century sided strongly with
the realists. As Ole Holsti writes, the consensus in the two decades after World War II described
public opinion “not only as ignorant about international realities but also as volatile, reflecting
unstable moods of the moment rather than an understanding of international realities as well as
lacking structure of coherence” ccxiv. Indeed, Walter Lippmann asserted in Public Opinion that,
“the common interests very largely elude public opinion entirely, and can be managed only by a
specialized class whose personal interests reach beyond the locality” ccxv. Lippmann would later
write that, “When mass opinion dominates government, there is a morbid derangement of the
true functions of power. The derangement brings about the enfeeblement, verging on paralysis,
of the capacity to govern” ccxvi. Moreover, the American founders themselves in The Federalist
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Papers worried about that the “passions and ‘temporary errors and delusions’” of the publicccxvii.
Philip Converse, in his 1964 article “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics” further
found that only about 17 percent of the people he polled had “an accurate understanding of
liberal-conservative distinctions”ccxviii.
More recently, however, modern liberals have sought to reclaim the importance and
coherence of mass opinion. Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro’s The Rational Public exhibits
that public views are stable over time and that the public’s opinions are rational and eventsdriven ccxix. Page and Shapiro, through an analysis of decades of US public opinion research on
myriad topics, show that the collective public is rational, its opinions are stable and that it
responds sensibly to events. The authors wrote their book in an attempt to salvage democratic
theory from scholars who have traditionally looked down on the public as irrational and
uninformed. After all, if such accusations are to be taken seriously, then the public is not fit to
govern. James Madison proposed the formation of the US Senate in Federalist 63 because,
“there are particular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular
passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men,
may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and
condemn”ccxx.
Page and Shapiro show that public opinion, far from being irrational and useless, is
largely stable when taken as a collective. That is, though individuals may be misinformed about
certain issues when surveyed and may in fact change their opinions frequently, the public as a
whole exhibits stable and rational opinions that are not random. This is an important point since
this study largely looks at the collective public. One way that the authors show the stability of
public opinion is simply by using graphs that chart opinion changes on a y-axis that ranges from
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0-100, rather than the truncated y-axis used by many polling agencies and studies that
exaggerates public opinion changes.
Page and Shapiro find that the one group of publics that typically show divergent changes
in opinion are Democrats, Republicans and Independents. Bolstering my theory, Page and
Shapiro believe that, “Such divergent partisan trends are undoubtedly related to party leadership
of public opinion”ccxxi. Divergent opinion change means opinion change between two publics
diverges over time, as one group sours on an issue the other continues to find it favorable.
Divergent opinion change is strongly exhibited in studies on support for the Vietnam and Iraq
Wars ccxxii.
Liberals public opinion scholars hold that public opinion shifts have been due to situational
changes that actually speak to an aware public. John Mueller supported the liberal position when
he induced that, “increasing public opposition to [the Vietnam and Korean Wars] followed a
pattern that matched a curve of rising battle deaths, suggesting that public used an
understandable, if simple, heuristic to assess American policy” ccxxiii. Further, as Brigitte Nacos
argues, though “polls reveal frequent opinion changes with respect to American anti- and
counterterrorist policies,” “apparent fluctuations and reversals in Americans’ collective opinions
are rational responses to changing developments and information”ccxxiv. Here I side with the
revisionists liberals: I feel that public opinion does change with changing circumstances and that
it is a valuable tool.

The Role of Opinion in Government
So what is the importance of public opinion in this study? Richard Sobel finds that,
“public opinion constrains, but does not set, American foreign intervention policy. In other
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words, the public’s attitudes set the limits within which policymakers may operate”ccxxv. This
follows from VO Key’s theory that public opinion works as a “system of dikes that channel the
flow of public policy. Public opinion, in this model, does not set policy but instead is capable of
setting the range or limits of policy” ccxxvi.
Further, presidential popularity also plays an important role in influencing policymakers.
“Presidential popularity as political capital undergirds congressional support,” Sobel writes.
Further, support of the president colors the entire “climate of opinion that generally constrains
policy” ccxxvii. Zaller agrees that, “a popular president backed by a unified Washington
community can have a powerful effect on public opinion, especially that part of the public that is
most attentive to politics” ccxxviii.
Zaller concludes that, “public attitudes toward major issues are a response to the relative
intensity of competing political communications of those issues.” Thus when elites are united
behind an issue, “the public’s response is relatively nonideological, with the most aware
members of the public reflecting the elite consensus most strongly.” However, “When elites
come to disagree along partisan or ideological lines, the public’s response will become
ideological as well, with the most politically aware members of the public responding most
ideologically” ccxxix.
How Public Opinion Will Be Measured
The main method employed here for measuring public opinion dynamics is a more
permissive version of trend analysis. Trend analysis seeks to make opinion comparisons over
time, thus looking at opinion trends, by comparing responses to the same question asked at
various time periods. Trend analysis “can work because, whatever problems there may be in the
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way a question is worded, these remain constant and, usually, one can reasonably discuss any
changes over time in the response percentages” ccxxx.
Such a method is necessary because survey respondents are “very sensitive” to question
wording and context ccxxxi. For example, “a question about political policy is more likely to get
polarized reactions from Democrats and Republicans if a reference to a particular political
personality or party is included in its wording” ccxxxii. Further, a 1941 poll found that “46 percent
of the population were in favor of ‘forbidding’ public speeches against democracy while 62
percent were in favor of ‘not allowing’ such speeches” ccxxxiii. There are two conclusions to draw
from this: one, that it is nearly impossible to say with a great degree of certainty that one knows
what the public’s opinion on a subject really is ccxxxiv, and, two, that analyzing repeated questions
that contain the exact wording is the best method for making substantive public opinion
comparisonsccxxxv.
There are still problems with trend analysis. Polling agencies tend to flock to the hottest
topic of the day, making good trend data rare ccxxxvi. Agencies change and drop questions
frequently, many times in an effort to “improve” question wording ccxxxvii. Mueller also warns
that one must be careful to check whether any of the words in the survey question have
substantially changed in meaning, and I would add significance ccxxxviii.
Given the problems of finding sufficient trend data, I will deviate from the ideal of using
only studies that employ the same, exact-wording. Where possible, I will employ trend analysis
strictly, but I will also use data from surveys with similar question wordings to fill in gaps in data
where possible so as to create a fuller picture of public opinion trends. This practice is common
among public opinion practitioners given the issues with trend analysis ccxxxix.
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How the Chief Executive and Public Opinion Interact
The chief executive has wide agency in determining what the public fears. That said, the
public could be fearful of an issue that the executive has not yet considered, and the executive
can push the public to fear things that it does not yet deem harmful. For example, the executive
can foment fears about a given topic through speeches. The executive may believe that topic X
is of great threat to the people. For sake of clarity, let’s say that X is a fatal disease that could
affect America soon but has not yet. The executive believes that X is an important issue, but it
does not resonate with the public for whatever reason. The various publics that compose the
electorate are concerned about their own pet fears be they global warming, nuclear arms, or
frankenfoods. In order to raise awareness of X, the executive makes speeches to underline the
importance of combating the new disease. In essence, he foments fear. He describes the disease
to the public, introducing it to a horrible and terrifying new way to die. He tells the public that X
may not be in America now, but it’s arrival could be imminent. He announces that funding is
needed to combat X.
Mass fear and executive-threat shaping, thus, work together. The executive needs the
masses to fear a threatening issue sufficiently for them to demand action. When the masses fear
X, they will demand that their legislators’ vote for the funding that will purportedly eradicate X,
or at least sufficiently reduce the risk involved with it.
A terrorist attack, however, works differently than an as-yet-unheard-of disease. The
attack is meant to terrorize the public and, if it succeeds, the demands for action from the
government will be immediate. No one in government needs to tell the public that terrorism is to
be feared: they already know about the attack from the media, word-of-mouth or personal
experience. In turn, I hypothesize that the public will demand action for the crime committed,
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and thus provide the executive with a window of opportunity to make sometimes drastic change
in the country through new legislation and enforcement of laws. The question that will be dealt
with below is whether all attacks yield the same opportunity for the executive.
In sum, the executive draws power from the public while the public’s opinions are
informed by the chief executive. That is, when the public approves of the executive, he has
greater latitude to act as he sees fit and thus greater agency to shape threats accordingly. Figure
3.1 graphs how the executive draws power to shape threats from the public. The executive gains
power to shape threats and execute his strategies as willingness to cede liberties, public fear
levels, trust in government and approval of the executive rise.

<Insert Figure 3.1>

On the flip side, the chief executive has the power to move opinion through “threat-shaping,”
that is through making statements regarding the threat. These statements could include
nightmare scenarios, statements about the magnitude of the threat, conflict framing, and even
statements of what groups to tolerate. The executive’s statements are filtered through the media
so that the public only receives mass-mediated snippets from them. The public also receives
competing statements from the terrorists themselves and from opposition forces in the
legislature. All of these statements combine to affect the public’s fear levels, trust in and
approval of government, and willingness to cede liberties. However, the executive’s statements
have the most power in this dynamic. In this study, though I look closely at opposing legislative
statements, I do not look at statements from the terrorists themselves for two reasons. First,
typically the executive or his opposition in government will cite these statements in making their
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appeals for action and so tracking these statements would be redundant. Second, this study seeks
to decipher how the government reacts to terror and terrorist threats are cut out to maintain focus
on the government’s response, though as just stated they are frequently touched on by members
of the government.
<Insert Figure 3.2 here>
Mass Fear: Its Dynamics and the Levels of Agency it Grants the Executive
The following section models how mass fear levels should behave after terror attacks.
Figure 3.3 below displays three curves representing public fear. The first represents high fear,
the second medium, and the bottom curve represents low fear. These curves could represent
reactions to iterated terrorist attacks, thus showing the decay, or decline, of mass fear levels over
time. The first attack yields high fears, but every subsequent attack yields diminishing returns in
terms of fear. Though, these attacks could take place within a campaign, they could also
represent attacks that are years apart.
<Insert Figure 3.3 here>
The higher the fear curve, that is the higher percentage of the population that is fearful
after a given attack, the greater agency the government and the executive have to shape fear.
However, the higher the curve, the more demands on the government for action. Figure 3.4
below displays the level of agency the government acquires from low, medium and high fear
curves.

<Insert Figure 3.4 here>
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Hypotheses
When a terrorist attack occurs, public fears can be pushed in a variety of directions.
Normally, when fear levels are high individuals will look to leaders or experts for guidance.
Obviously there are many experts with divergent opinions, but some are respected and listened to
more than others. In government, no one has more power to shape public perceptions than the
chief executive. I theorize that the executive is spurred by rallies of opinion in his favor and a
demand for action. A main hypothesis of this study is that the greater the opinion in his favor
(along the four opinion dimensions graphed in Figure 3.1 above), the greater agency the
executive has to shape threats as he sees fit. One of the main purposes of this chapter is to show
that a window of opportunity opens via a rise in mass fear levels and public support for the
executive that grants him greater agency after terror attacks. Though public opinion data show
which threats spurred greater fear responses, case studies will be necessary to prove this first
hypothesis.
Public responses to terror attacks are not uniform. The public may adapt to attacks over
time. For these reasons, I hypothesize that fear levels decay over time not just within each case
but also from case-to-case (H8 below). In other words, not only should fear levels drop from
month-to-month after a given terrorist attack, but they should also drop faster after the next
terrorist attack than they did after the first one. For terror campaigns, the same should happen.
Fear levels should jump up between attacks within a campaign, but they should never jump as
high as they did when the campaign began. Moreover, a second campaign should see lower fear
levels even in the face of greater casualties. In other words, societies should be able to adapt to
terror attacks and, thus, fear levels will decay over time. This decay of fear is similar to Roger
Petersen’s concept of an emotion’s half-life. In a discussion of anger, Roger Petersen writes that,
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“As an event-based emotion it is likely to have a half-life, that is, it is likely to fade over time.”
He suggests that, “the emotional intensity of anger remains high for many years and then
declines at an accelerating rate”ccxl. By studying mass fears over time, I will be able to determine
whether fear too has a half-life.
Can an increased casualty-rate from an attack yield higher fear levels, thus reversing the
inevitable decay of public fear levels? I hypothesize that the answer is mixed; a precipitous
increase in the casualty-level derived by the attacks can stead the decay of fear levels, even
yielding a jump above previously recorded mass fear levels, but fear’s decay cannot be wholly
reversed. The general trend will hold: fear levels will go down over time from attack to attack.
An especially large attack may yield a significant jump in fear levels, but the decay of fear levels
will continue afterward unabated as society adapts to terrorism.
The discussion has now evolved to the point that some hypotheses can be proffered about
how mass fear levels and public opinion will behave and threat-shaping will occur after terror
attacks. These hypotheses will be tested empirically using public opinion data in this chapter.
Again, the goal of this chapter is to operationalize public opinion dynamics after terror attacks.
The hypotheses below help organize the discussion, which will proceed in the following section
in three parts: the chief executive, civil liberties, and the dynamics of fear.

Hypotheses:
The first two hypotheses, on the chief executive and government, seek to show that the public
increases its support for the executive and demands action from him after terror attacks:
H1. After a terrorist attack, the public will demand that the government take responsive action.
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H2. After a terrorist attack, the public will rally ‘round the chief executive. Trust in government
and approval of the president or prime minister should jump up.
The next two hypotheses, on civil liberties, seek to show two things. First, that public
willingness to trade liberties-for-security rises after terror attacks. Second, that, in reality, the
public wishes to trade the liberties of a chosen few for the security of the majority:
H3. After a terrorist attack, the public will be willing to cede civil liberties for increased
security.
H4. When fear levels are high after terrorist attacks the people will say that they are willing to
forego civil liberties in exchange for greater security in general. However, when the question is
broken down into actual liberties given up, it will be shown that the masses would like to retain
their own liberties while curbing the liberties of the minority group that shares the same ethnicity
and/or ideology as the attacker(s).
The final five hypotheses seek to operationalize how mass fear levels behave after terror attacks.
They seek to show that a spike in fear levels occurs after terror attacks. They also try to get at
whether terrorism fears decay over time and whether societies can becoming inured to terrorism:
H5. After a terrorist attack, the public’s fear levels will rise to high levels. In other words, there
will be a jump in the level to which people feel threatened by terrorism and in how highly the
public rates terrorism as an important threat.
H6. The more casualties a terror attack yields, the longer the public’s fear levels will stay high
and the longer it will approve of government and be willing to cede liberties.
H7. Terror attacks raise fear levels, but they don’t all do so in the same manner.
H8. Fear decreases over time both within a terror campaign and from one campaign to the next
as the public adapts to the threat level.
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H9. However, a marked increase in the magnitude of attacks, measured by casualty-rates, can
stead or temporarily reverse the decay of fear levels, but the general trend that fear levels
decrease over time and between attacks will hold.

Testing the Hypotheses: The Role of Mass Fear in Responses to Terrorism
Now we will test the hypotheses laid out above using polling data mainly from the US,
UK and Israel. The tests will be divided into three categories: the chief executive, civil liberties,
and the dynamics of fear. As stated above, a more permissive version of trend analysis will be
used to derive findings.
A note on data organization. So as not to break up the text too much and to make
accessing charts easy, I include public opinion trend charts at the close of each section. Each
chart will be preceded by a short explanation of its contents. Citations appear below each chart
along with references to the data they are drawn from, which appears in the appendix. There are
three data appendices which include a wealth of polling data on the subjects below and that
bolster the findings herein. They are organized into the following categories: the executive and
government, civil liberties, and fear and threat.
The Executive
This section tests H1 and H2, which predict that after a terrorist attack the public will
demand action from the government (H1) and that it will rally ‘round the president (H2). These
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tests will be conducted using opinion surveys that track demand for action, trust in government,
and approval ratings.
John Mueller in War, Presidents and Public Opinion finds that presidential popularity
ratings decline from year-to-year, yet rallies-‘round-the-flag/president do happen “whenever an
international crisis or similar event occurs.” His study proves the rally-‘round-the-flag variable
to be “a sturdy one and suggest[s] a popular decline of about 5 or 6 percentage points for every
year since the last ‘rally point’” ccxli.
It is clear from multiple data sources that George W. Bush saw a huge bump in his
popularity after 9/11, but Bill Clinton’s approval rating did not jump after the Oklahoma City
bombing ccxlii. In fact, Clinton’s approval ratings were mired in the 40-percent range after the
1993 World Trade Center bombing as well as after Oklahoma Cityccxliii. Tony Blair also saw no
great jump in his popularity after the London attacks of 2005 (see Figure 3.7) ccxliv. Further, mass
fear levels may have helped Bush’s approval ratings more than Clinton’s as seen by the charts
below.
When we look at government confidence ratings (Figures 3.5 and 3.6), a similar pattern
emerges. There is a jump in Americans who feel a great deal of confidence in government after
9/11, but after the ’93 and ’95 terror events confidence was at no great high. Israelis did not
view government as performing any better during the Al-Aqsa intifada either.
A demand for action seems to occur after terror attacks, and this demand will be further
bolstered by the civil liberties data in the next section.

The existence of action bias is

corroborated by Thomas Downes-Le Guin and Bruce Hoffman who conducted a survey of the
public’s views on terrorism from 1988-89. They found that a strong majority supported the
government acting in response to terrorism “even if it is not very effective” ccxlv.
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The findings for the first two hypotheses are mixed. Previous works seem to prove a
rally ‘round the president and an increase in government trust after major crises, but perhaps
terrorist crises are different in that they can undermine the public’s confidence in government. It
seems that a large event like 9/11 gives a boost to authority figures, but that smaller terrorism
incidents do not. The charts below show that approval of government performance does not rise
after all terror incidences, thus weakening the claim made in H1, but the charts in the civil
liberties section bolster hypothesis 1 by showing that the public is willing to trade liberties for
security after terror attacks. While the charts in this section show that the public provides the
executive with an opportunity to act through (sometimes) increased approval or confidence
ratings, the figures in the next section showing public willingness to cede liberties for security
support the claim that the public demands executive action after terror attacks. Further, the
findings in chapter two and in future chapters, as well as Downes-Le Guin and Hoffman data,
supports this claim. My conclusions are that the public demands executive action after terror
attacks happen (H1- true), which will be proven further in the next section, but that there is not
necessarily a rally ‘round the executive after attacks nor a jump in trust in government (H2false). Other factors seem to be more determinative in whether or not the public trusts the
government and approves of the executive.

<Insert Figure 3.5 here>
<Insert Figure 3.6 here>
<Insert Figure 3.7 here>
<Insert Figure 3.8 here>
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<Insert Figure 3.9 here>

Civil Liberties
This section tests the third and fourth hypotheses enumerated above. H3 predicts that
after a terrorist attack, the public will be willing to trade liberties for increased security. H4
states that though the public may be willing to make this trade in the abstract, the public will be
less willing to make this trade when the liberties given up are made more concrete. Further, it
states that when liberties ceded are specified, it will be shown that it is truly the liberties of
minority groups that the majority is willing to trade for its own security.
The first factor that the charts make evident is the public’s willingness to cede liberties
after terrorist attacks. Figures 3.10 and 3.12 below show that public willingness to sacrifice
liberties spikes after terror attacks. A full 88% of Britons wanted to give the police extra powers
to deport and/or detain terrorists after the July 7 London Bombings.
However, when civil liberties are broken down, the public is much more willing to forego
some of these rights than others (see Figure 3.10 and data appendix on civil liberties).
Americans’ and Britons’ polled after 9/11 were very much in favor of instating a national ID
card system. Britons were also largely in favor of detaining immigrants. Nonetheless, neither
population supported eavesdropping and other measures that would erode privacy. The amount
of Britons’ willing to detain and/or deport those “posing a terror threat” makes up a large
majority as well (Figure 3.10). These findings point to a desire to curb minority liberties while
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maintaining those of the majority. The majority seems to want to maintain its privacy (not the
most important of rights in a time of calamity) while allowing the police to deport and detain the
threatening minority. Identity cards, it could be argued, are an intrusion for some but not for
others. Throughout history such documentation has been used to weed out and harass minority
groups (Jews in Germany, blacks in South Africa, Palestinians in Israel), while not affecting the
majority. Identity cards have traditionally been used as the ultimate selective enforcement
device. This conclusion is bolstered by Darren Davis who writes that, “Abstract support for
democracy and civil liberties usually garner overwhelming support, but in applied contexts
where citizens have to practice what they preach, democracy … suffers” ccxlvi. His data show that
while 45% of Americans’ abstractly supported security over civil liberties after 9/11, when the
question was made more specific about the actual liberty being traded the numbers varied
greatly. For instance, 72% of Americans supported guilt by association, 49% supported
detaining non-citizens while only 18% backed racial profiling ccxlvii.
David Cole notes that a National Public Radio poll taken a year after the 9/11 attacks,
“found that only 7 percent of Americans felt that they had personally had sacrificed any
important rights or liberties in the war on terrorism.” Cole asserts that this is because, “For the
most part, the government’s measures have been targeted not at Americans, but at foreign
nationals both here and abroad” ccxlviii. Further, the American public supported this ethnic
profiling: 60 percent of Americans polled soon after 9/11 supported ethnic profiling as long as it
targeted Arabs and Muslims ccxlix.
After terror attacks, fear of the minority group that perpetrated the attacks leads to
discrimination against that group. Brigitte Nacos and Oscar Torres-Reyna show that fear of
Muslims jumped after 9/11 ccl. These high fear levels led to desires to curb the liberties of

81

Muslims in America. The authors point to polls that show a solid majority of Americans
favoring reducing the rights of Muslim or Arab foreign nationals in America and that 20% of
Americans favored reduced rights for Muslim or Arab-American citizens ccli. Further, those
Americans who were more fearful of terror supported more restrictive and invasive measures
against Muslims cclii. Interestingly, Nacos and Torres-Reyna’s data demonstrate that views of
Muslims grew increasingly negative in post-9/11 America after an initial period of increased
tolerance of Muslims, which was spurred by executive speeches preaching tolerance ccliii. This
increased criticism of Muslims was due in part to the fact that after a year of relatively positive
stories about Muslims post-9/11, the news media began to negatively portray Muslim and Arab
communities in 2002ccliv. The liberties of Muslims were not the only things targeted after terror
attacks. Anti-Muslim crimes spiked in the UK after the London bombings and in the US after
9/11 cclv. Indeed, one in five British Muslims stated in an ICM/Guardian poll that “they or a
family member have faced abuse or hostility since” the 2005 London Bombings cclvi.
It appears that H3 and H4 are correct: the public is willing to cede liberties after terror
attacks, but the majority desires to preserve its liberties at the expense of the minority. Figure 3
plainly shows jumps in Americans’ willingness to trade liberties for security after both the
Oklahoma City bombing of 1995 and 9/11/2001. Moreover, as Huddy, et al. found, those survey
respondents who perceived a high future terrorism threat “not only supported aggressive action
against the enemy, they were also more likely to negatively stereotype Arabs and support
restrictive immigration and intensified surveillance policies directed at Arabs and ArabAmericans.” Eighty-five percent of the respondents favored tougher restrictions on visas for
students and other foreigners and almost half of Americans (48%) thought that Arabs “should
undergo more intensive security checks than people form other countries” cclvii. These data also
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bolster H1 since a willingness to trade liberties and make change supports the hypothesis that a
public demand for action exists after terrorist incidents.
<Insert Figure 3.10>
<Insert Figure 3.11>
<Insert Figure 3.12>

Dynamics of Mass Fear
Here we test the final five hypotheses. H5 simply looks for a jump in fear levels and
importance of terrorism as rated by the public after terrorist attacks. H6 predicts that the more
casualties a terror attack yields the higher fear levels will go and the longer the public will
approve of civil liberties-security tradeoffs. H7, which will be proven by looking at H5, simply
states that not all attacks will yield the same rise in mass fear levels. H8 asserts that mass fear
levels will decrease over time both within a terror campaign and from one campaign to the next.
Finally, H9 predicts that a significant increase in the magnitude of attacks—measured by
casualty rates—can temporarily reverse the decay of mass fear levels, but that the general trend
of decay should hold.
It is clear from the outset that H5 is correct. There is a spike in mass fear levels after
terrorist attacks (see Figures 3.13, 3.14, 3.17, 3.18, and 3.19). There is an evident bump in fear
figures in Israel during the second intifada, in the US after 9/11 and, less so, in the US after the
Oklahoma City Bombing. It is also clear that H7 is correct. Different attacks clearly yield
different mass fear levels as the movement in the charts indicates. Indeed, in April 1995, after
the Oklahoma City bombing, 89% of Americans viewed terrorism as a very or somewhat
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important issue. Only 63% of Americans fell in the same category in March 1993 after the first
World Trade Center bombing cclviii.
The trickier hypotheses have to do with fear’s decay and the magnitude of attacks.
Figure 3.16 clearly shows that Israeli society adapted to terrorism deaths to the point that
increased terror deaths yielded diminishing returns in the number of Israelis’ fearful of terrorism.
Still, in Israel and the US mass fear levels rose higher after more recent attacks/campaigns than
they did previously. Admittedly, this is also because terrorist attacks have yielded greater
casualties of late. Figure 3.19 shows that in 1991 and 1995 Americans viewed a terrorist attack
on the US as about as likely as they did in 2001. On fear’s decay, Figure 3.20 demonstrates that
George W. Bush’s approval rating for his dealing of the war on terrorism gradually declined after
9/11.
Carol Lewis finds that terrorism and crime follow similar public fear patterns in that,
despite news accounts to the contrary, fears of both are relatively stable cclix. John Mueller notes
that, “Consistently since the end of 2001 some 40 percent [of Americans] say they are very
worried or somewhat worried about becoming a victim of terrorism. Moreover, well over 50
percent hold the likelihood of a terrorist attack in the US over ‘the next few months’ to be very
or somewhat likely while less than 10 percent have chosen the option that has [so far] proved to
be correct, ‘not at all likely’” cclx. Yet terror fears do decline. Figure 3.17 shows that fear levels
went down after 9/11, but there were bumps along the waycclxi. Huddy, et al. found “a slight
decline in perceived threat and anxiety over time, but the effect [was] nonlinear. Perceived
threat and anxiety declined more rapidly after 9/11 but showed little further decline after the
New Year” cclxii.
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Terrorism fears seem to recede over time, but there is no evidence that they go down
from case-to-case. Clearly, Israeli society adapted to terrorism fatalities but terrorism is,
thankfully, so rare that systematically comparing fatality figures versus mass fear levels is
difficult. CNN/Gallup/USA Today polls show that 42% of Americans were worried about
themselves or family members becoming terror attack victims after Oklahoma City, while 58%
were worried about the same after 9/11. Does that mean that Americans were inured to terrorism
after 9/11 given the much higher casualties of the 2001 attacks? Clearly, this is not the case.
There is, thus, insufficient data to prove that the more casualties an attack yields, the
longer the public will approve of government and be willing to give up liberties. Even if there
were sufficient data, it is hard to compare attacks. Some attacks yield 200 dead, but many yield
two. While casualty rates can go into the thousands, public opinion percentages can only go up
to 100%. Further, fear seems to decrease over time after terror attacks, but these effects do not
carry over from campaign-to-campaign (H8). Marked increases in casualty levels, as well as
heightened government-issued threat levels, can stop fear’s decay within a campaign. But, there
is insufficient evidence to show that the reason that we do not see a decay in fear levels between
campaigns is due to higher magnitude attacks (H9). Fear levels can only rise so far, and, sadly,
some of the terrorist attacks of the past decade have caused very many casualties—while others,
still following the “many people watching, not many people dying” paradigm, yielded few.
Finally, H6 predicted that higher casualty attacks would yield longer spikes in mass fear
levels, longer rallies of government approval, and more sustained rates of willingness to cede
liberties. Figure 3.12 showed that Americans were willing to cede liberties for longer after 9/11
than after previous attacks, though, importantly, data for previous attacks was not as extensive.
Figures 3.15 and 3.17 show that fear levels were sustained for longer after the second intifada
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than after the first intifada and after 9/11 than after the Oklahoma City bombing. Figures 3.6 and
3.7 show that spikes in government approval ratings occurred after 9/11, but not after other
attacks. These data support H6, but the evidence is insufficient because data regarding 9/11 is
much more exhaustive than data on previous cases. The Israeli data on fear levels remaining
high well after the second intifada is most telling. In sum, the data here points to H6 being true,
but more research needs to be done on this phenomenon. Higher casualty terror attacks or
campaigns seem to yield larger windows of opportunity for executive action, but, as will be seen
in Chapter Six, this is not always the case.

<Insert Figures 3.13, 3.14, 3.15, 3.16, 3.17, 3.18, 3.19, and 3.20 here>

Conclusion
The findings on executive action showed that a window of opportunity for executive
action opens after terror attacks (H1), but that rallies ‘round the chief executive do not always
occur (H2). The stronger claim in H1 that a demand for executive action occurs after terror
attacks is proven by the analysis in chapter two as well as in the civil liberties section here. The
civil liberties section showed that the public is willing to cede liberties for increased security
after terror attacks (H3), but that it mainly desires to trade the liberties of the group whose coethnics perpetrated the attack for the security of the majoritycclxiii (H4). Further, when liberties
are broken down, public support for trading liberties for security is mixed. Finally, the mass fear
section clearly showed that mass fear levels jump after terror attacks (H5) and that they do not do
so in predictable, uniform ways (H7). Fears did decay over time after terror attacks, but not
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between terror attacks or campaigns (H8 and H9). Further, the Israeli case showed that increased
terror fatalities can yield reduced terrorism fears per fatality, but this finding is flawed due to the
rudimentary comparison between public opinion percentages (which only go up to 100%) and
fatality figures. Finally, there was some evidence that higher casualty attacks or campaigns
yielded more sustained levels of mass fear, approval for government, and willingness to trade
liberty-for-security (H6). But, that evidence is based on especially high casualty terror events
(the second intifada and 9/11), and does not travel to other high casualty attacks like the
Oklahoma City Bombing or the 2005 London Bombings. Why this is so will be explored in
chapter six.
In sum, this chapter proves that a window of opportunity for executive action is created
by high mass fear levels, a willingness to cede liberties of the minority for majority security, and
public demand for action after terror attacks. Sometimes, rallies of executive approval can be
added to this mix. Generally, higher casualty terror attacks or campaigns yielded greater mass
fear levels, but all of the terror attacks examined in this study presented executives with windows
of opportunity of varying size. Interestingly, terror fears recede rather quickly to stable, but only
moderately high levels after terror attacks (see Figures 3.15 and 3.19).
Darren Davis contends that, “Sustained perceptions of threat were not so much a response
to the terrorist attacks themselves as to the vents and policies intended to make people safe.” As
a study by Landau, et al. shows, and as I will show in great deal in the next chapter, simply
reminding people of the threat of terrorism increased support for the Bush administration cclxiv.
Yet, Americans do not tolerate restrictions on their liberties, over time they “became more
protective of civil liberties than concerned about their security” cclxv.
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There is a demand for action after terrorist attacks, but not necessarily a rally ‘round the
executive. Fear jumps up, but not in predictable ways that can be neatly linked to casualty rates
or the intensity of the attack. Mass fear levels go down over time after attacks, but societies do
not necessarily adapt to terror in the same ways—though, Israeli society was able to adapt. The
public generally is willing to forego liberties after attacks, but not all liberties and not the type of
liberties that are more likely to affect the majority.
Ole Holsti writes that, “debates about the proper role of public opinion on … policy
ought not be framed in terms that posit, on the one hand, a bottom-up, direct democracy model in
which public officials are merely the agents for carrying out whatever public preferences emerge
from the latest Gallup poll and, on the other hand, a vision of skilled and knowledgeable elites,
shielded from the television-aroused passions of an ill-informed public, carefully deliberating the
great … issues of the day” cclxvi. In this study, public opinion will be shown to be an important
constraint on executive action, but not the driver of the post-terror attack legislative dynamic.
Indeed, as John Mueller contends the first President Bush was able to lead the country to war in
the Gulf in 1990 not because he was able to swing public opinion polls toward war, but rather
because “as President, … he could unilaterally commit the country to a path that dramatically
increased a sense of fatalism about war[,] … he could promise a short, beneficial and relatively
painless war[,] … [and] because he and his top aides enjoyed a fair amount of trust in matters of
foreign policy at the time” cclxvii.
Whereas opinion polls can show that the public grants, or does not grant, the executive a
window of opportunity to act after terror attacks, they cannot show what the chief executive does
with that opportunity. Indeed, high mass fear levels seem to exist uniformly after terror attacks,
but domestic, legislative responses to these attacks are varied. Thus, I turn to case studies in the
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next few chapters to further explicate democracies’ domestic, legislative reactions to terror
attacks.
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Chapter Four
The United States after 9/11: Tracing the Process of how the Patriot Act Was Passed

This chapter explores Congress’ reaction to the September 11, 2001 attacks and the
President’s role in affecting congressional decisions after the attacks. It will cover three time
periods marking three separate cases, which each work to test the theory from chapter one. The
three time periods are: the immediate response to the attacks ranging from the day of the attack
to one year afterward, executive action in the run-up to the 2004 elections, and the battle over the
renewal of portions of the PATRIOT Act. The first time period will mainly explore how the
President shaped the terror threat after 9/11 and how the PATRIOT Act legislation was initially
passed. The second time period will show how the President acted when inter-party competition
was high during a crucial election season and also examine the effect of presidential threats and
government-released threat alerts on public fear levels. Finally, the third case surveys what
happens when mass fear levels have receded years after a major terror attack and civil libertyabridging, counterterror legislation is about to partially expire. For each time period, legislative
debate, executive statements and the opinion environment will be covered.
This chapter provides empirical evidence and testing for the variables explored in this
study. The executive response and threat-shaping variable, the independent variable, is looked at
most closely. Further, the government composition and party competition variable, both folded
into the political constellations constraint variable, will be substantially tested. Recall that the
government composition variable looks at the partisan division of power in the government and
that the party competition variable looks at temporal proximity to an election. Opinion variables,
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most prominently mass fear levels and executive approval ratings will also be covered. Finally,
both dependent variables will be examined extensively here, the one dependent variable looking
at passage of counterterror legislation and the other looking at enforcement of counterterror
legislation. This case will be recapped for the purpose of studying more closely inter-country
institutional comparisons in chapter five. Thus, the institutional portion of the political
constellations variable will not be covered here.
In addition to looking at these three time periods and exploring a multitude of variables,
two hypotheses that can be gleaned from the book’s theory will be tested here. They are:
H1. When partisan competition is high, that is when an election is near, the incumbent executive
will employ fear as a strategy
H2. Executive-legislative antagonism will be more likely when the government is closely
divided along partisan lines.
A modern history of the United States’ curtailment of civil liberties will first be
recounted. Then, the three time periods of the 9/11 case study will be examined and the
enforcement of counterterror legislation after 9/11 will be surveyed before the chapter concludes.
The US Case: History of Civil Liberties
As Eric Foner writes, “The growth of civil liberties in [the U.S.] is not a story of linear
progress or simply a series of Supreme Court decisions, but a highly uneven and bitterly
contested part of the story of American freedom”cclxviii. Foner notes that previous to the
twentieth century, “Free speech claims rarely came to court, and when they did, judges generally
allowed authorities wide latitude in determining which speech had a ‘bad tendency’ and
therefore could be suppressed” cclxix. Indeed, it was not until the twentieth century that the
Supreme Court required the states to abide by the provisions set forth by the Bill of Rights cclxx.
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It wasn’t until World War I, when America employed “democracy” and “freedom” as
“ideological war weapons” that civil liberties began to be demanded. The American government
mobilized the public to join the war effort, through actions such as the purchase liberty bonds, by
impressing upon citizens that America was a land of freedom and liberty cclxxi. This energized the
women’s suffrage and civil rights movements, as well as the labor movementcclxxii.
Yet, this was also a time where dissent was suppressed by the government in the form of
the Espionage Act of 1917, which “prohibited not only spying and interfering with the draft but
also ‘false statements’ that might impede military success.” President Woodrow Wilson desired
that the law also allow him to censor the press, but Congress instead gave the Postmaster General
broad powers “to bar antiwar publications form the mails.” The next year, the Sedition Act was
passed, which “criminalized spoken or printed statements intended to cast ‘contempt, scorn,
contumely, or disrepute’ on the ‘form of government’ or that advocated interference with the war
effort.” Next, Congress passed a bill authorizing the deportation of aliens deemed to be
anarchists. Foner notes that, “More than two thousand persons were charged with violating these
statutes and over one thousand were convicted”cclxxiii.
The arrest of antiwar dissenter under the Espionage and Sedition Acts led to the creation
in 1917 of the Civil Liberties Bureau, which in 1920 became the American Civil Liberties
Bureau (ACLU). The ACLU, over the next few decades, “would take part in most of the
landmark cases that precipitated a ‘rights revolution’ that gave substantive meaning to traditional
civil liberties, such as freedom of speech and the press, and invented new ones, like the right to
privacy” cclxxiv. It was in the judgment of cases in the post-war period that Oliver Wendell
Holmes employed the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor in his 1919 dissent in Abrams v. United
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States. He stated in the dissent that, “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market” cclxxv.
Geoffrey Stone writes that, “the United States has a long and unfortunate history of
overreacting to the perceived dangers of wartime.” He contends that, “Time and again,
Americans have allowed fear and fury to get the better of them. Time and again, Americans
have suppressed dissent, imprisoned and deported dissenters and then—later—regretted their
actions”cclxxvi. Even though the notion of civil liberties was not yet established as law, Geoffrey
Stone counts, rightfully so, the Sedition Acts of 1798 and Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of
habeas corpus during the Civil War as the first two major reductions of rights in American
history. In addition, to the World War I Espionage and Sedition Acts, Stone also covers the
internment of 120,000 Japanese during World War II and the Cold War period, which was
colored by Senator Joseph McCarthy and the House Un-American Activities Committeecclxxvii.
Most recently, the FBI’s COINTELPRO (counter-intelligence programs) sought “to ‘expose,
disrupt and otherwise neutralize’ dissident political activities” during the Vietnam War cclxxviii.
In his book, Enemy Aliens David Cole shows that when liberty and security have been
exchanged for one another, it is typically the security of Americans that is purportedly gained at
the expense of the liberty of foreign nationals. Cole writes that, “we all too often strike the
balance between liberty and security by trading their liberty for our security, by treating some—
foreign nationals, and especially in the present crisis, Arabs and Muslims—as less deserving of
liberty, less human, than the rest of us” cclxxix. Cole finds that, “the United States government has
responded to virtually every security crisis by adopting measures that selectively target
noncitizens’ rights” cclxxx. Cole comes to this conclusion by studying the cases of the Japanese
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internment during World War II, The Palmer Raids of 1919-20, the McCarthy-era Red Scare,
and the FBI’s COINTELPRO.
The most egregious restriction of civil liberties in the modern era was the Japanese
internment during the Second World War. The roots of the Japanese internment stemmed from
the Alien and Sedition Acts passed in 1798. The Alien Act allowed the president “to deport any
noncitizen he deemed dangerous without judicial review.” The Sedition Act made criticizing
government officials a crime cclxxxi. At the same time, the less well-known, Enemy Alien Act was
passed, which allowed the president “during a declared war to detain, expel or otherwise restrict
the freedom of any citizen fourteen years or older of the country with which we are at war”cclxxxii.
Immediately after the Pearl Harbor bombing, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, using powers
bestowed upon him by the Enemy Alien Act, declared that all Japanese, German and Italian
citizens “were required to register and carry an alien registration certificate at all times. In
addition, they were prohibited from traveling more than five miles from their homes without
permission [and] subjected to a dusk-to-dawn curfew” among other restrictionscclxxxiii. In the
1944 case, Korematsu v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the imposition of both a
curfew and internment of the Japanese “based on racial identity alone” cclxxxiv. David Cole
believes that the US government has learned from its mistakes: Congress renounced preventive
detentions in 1971 and reparations were paid to Japanese detainees in 1988 cclxxxv. Still, it is
troubling that former Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that the only thing illegal about the
Japanese internment was that it targeted citizens cclxxxvi.
In other periods, citizens have largely been left alone when civil liberties were restricted.
The Palmer Raids of 1919-20 were spurred by a series of bombings that began with mail bombs
targeting government officials and culminated in the coordinated bombing of eight different
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cities. One of the targets was Attorney-General A. Mitchell Palmer’s house. The Palmer raids
that proceeded targeted non-citizens not because they were suspected of the crimes, but rather
because “the law made it easier to round them up”cclxxxvii. The first set of raids in November
1919, led to the deportation of 249 individuals dubbed Communists and anarchistscclxxxviii. In
January 1920, “federal agents obtained arrest warrants for nearly 3,000 noncitizens in
preparation for the January raids, but in the end, most people were arrested without warrants …
Two-thirds of the warrants were never executed at all, yet officials arrested between 4,000 and
10,000 persons” cclxxxix. During the Red Scare of the 1940s and 1950s, citizen and non-citizen
alike were targeted by the Alien Registration Act, otherwise known as the Smith Act, which
“made it a federal crime for anyone to advocate the overthrow of the government by force and
violence, to organize a group to so advocate, or to belong to such a group with knowledge of its
ends” ccxc. Still, aliens felt the brunt of civil liberty abridgements once again via immigration
laws. For instance, “From December 1948 to July 1952 alone, approximately 2,000 foreigners
were temporarily excluded from the United States based on secret evidence that they never had a
chance to confront or rebut, and roughly 500 were permanently excluded” ccxci.
Cole makes the point that immigration law has repeatedly been used to compromise the
civil liberties of aliens while maintaining those of citizens. In the US case that follows, the same
pattern follows. The civil liberties of a particular group, in this case Arabs and Muslims, and of
non-citizens are curtailed to a much larger extent than are the liberties of anyone else. For all of
the heat about liberties being eroded to preserve security, it is really the liberty of some that is
being traded for the supposed security of others. This state of affairs is troubling from both civil
libertarian and egalitarian perspectives.

95

September 11

After 9/11, American fear levels were incredibly high for three main reasons. First, the
attack was much larger in terms of casualty and property damage than any previous terrorist
attack in the world. Second, the United States has rarely been attacked by foreign forces on its
own soil. The last major attack by foreigners on the US had been the bombing of Pearl Harbor in
1941, nearly a full sixty years earlier. Third, Americans, at least the American public, to a large
extent were not aware that they were being targeted by a terrorist organization based in
Afghanistan that was capable of hitting the US. It is true that al-Qaeda had almost a year earlier
bombed the USS Cole, and in 1998 bombed US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, but the
feeling of being at war or being targeted by terrorists was not felt by the public until 9/11.
Opinion data provided here bears out this fact. These reasons contributed to make this attack
extremely unexpected.
Consequently, 9/11 caused a groundswell of fear that makes this case a critical one for
theory-testing. Stating that a case is a critical one, of course, implies that if the theory does not
work in this case, then it probably won’t work in others. The September 11 case is critical not
only because fear levels were very high, but also because the office of the president allows for
fast action against threats. As Harold Laski states, in a crisis situation, “the President’s position
is so overwhelming that it is, broadly, imperative for Congress to follow where he chooses to
lead.” Laski goes on to state that, “In a crisis [in America]… public opinion compels the
abrogation of the separation of powers” ccxcii.
Further, scholarship that bolsters my theory has already been done on this case. Brigitte
Nacos, Yaeli Boch-Elkon and Robert Shapiro find that, “announced threat alerts and threat
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assessments by US administration officials had a significant impact on the American public’s
perceptions of threat in the post-9/11 era” ccxciii. Nacos, Bloch-Elkon and Shapiro continue, “The
president, in particular, is in the best position to influence the public’s perceptions of terrorist
threats”ccxciv. Nacos, et al. track the effect of public pronouncements on the public’s fears in the
US post-9/11 environment. They find that a peak in public opinion signifying that 27% of the
public thought a terrorist attack was “very likely” in October-November 2002, “coincided with
two actual statements by officials in October followed by six such pronouncements in
November” ccxcv. Nacos, et al.’s data show that, “as long as the administration appeared to plant
fear in the public, the President’s approval ratings benefited” ccxcvi. Moreover, Darren Davis and
Brian Silver write that, “The higher the level of concern about another terrorist attack on the
United States, the more people prefer order and security over civil liberties”ccxcvii.
As a report by the Transitional Records Access Clearinghouse of Syracuse University
states:
“The impact of the events of 9/11/01 on the United States is hard to exaggerate. Within
months, for example, the largest single re-organization of the federal government in more
than forty years was underway as the Bush Administration and Congress began shaping
the Department of Homeland Security. In the same period, the government and the airline
industry agreed to a new program where federal agents would begin screening all
passengers for weapons and certain kinds of explosives before they boarded their planes.
And under then-secret orders from President Bush, the administration initiated or
expanded new surveillance programs by the National Security Agency and the Treasury
Department. Meanwhile, Congress began a long struggle to adopt a new body of law
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intended to profoundly alter the flow of legal and illegal migrants into the U.S. That
struggle continues today” ccxcviii.
This case will proceed in the following manner. First, I will recount what happened on
September 11, 2001. Then, three time periods will be tracked. First, the period immediately
after the attack tracks the initial signing of the PATRIOT Act into law on October 26, 2001.
This period will run until the one-year anniversary of September 11th. Second, the run-up to the
2004 presidential and congressional elections, beginning in February 2004 when electoral polling
began and ending on November 2, 2004 the day the elections were held. Third, the period
involving the re-passage of the PATRIOT Act, which began with debates in July 2005 and ends
with the signing of the renewed bill into law on March 9, 2006. Within each case, I will look at
executive statements, the legislative debate, the opinion environment, and the legislation passed.
I leave a discussion of terror alerts for the second period and a look at enforcement of civil
liberty-abridging law for the end.
What happened in terms of attack?
On the morning of September 11, 2001, four teams of al-Qaeda operatives hijacked four
American commercial airplanes, all originating on the East Coast and en route to California.
Two of the planes hit the World Trade Center in New York City destroying both towers, one
crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, DC, and the last crash-landed into a field in
Shanksville, Pennsylvania ccxcix. Over 2,500 people were killed in the attacks, including 343
firefighters and paramedics who fought to save those trapped in the World Trade Center
towers ccc. The nation suffered billions of dollars worth of damage ccci.
Though al-Qaeda had previously attacked US interests, most recently with the USS Cole
attack on October 12, 2000, these attacks were an absolute shock to Americans for two main
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reasons. First, this was the first foreign attack on US soil since the Japanese bombing of Pearl
Harbor in World War II. Americans had grown accustomed to political violence occurring
elsewhere due to the oceans separating the United States from Europe, Asia, and Africa. As
such, when Osama bin-Laden declared war on America in 1998, stating in an ABC-TV interview
that “it was more important for Muslims to kill Americans than to kill other infidels,” it was hard
to know how seriously to take his declaration given the paucity of foreign attacks on US soil cccii.
The second reason that Americans were shocked is that they viewed the attacks as largely
unprovoked. The attacks seemed to come out of nowhere and Americans, including the
President, were left asking, “Why do they hate us?” ccciii The President surmised that they “hate
our freedoms,” but due to the fear that pervaded American society he had already begun
curtailing these very freedoms ccciv. For “[a]fraid that September 11 brought merely the first of a
wave of terrorist attacks, Americans expected and, indeed, demanded that their government take
immediate and decisive steps to protect the nation” cccv.
Finally, it was not just the economic damage and lives lost that shook the American
public after September 11th, but also the powerful symbolism of the attack. The two tallest
buildings in New York City had been ground to dust. These buildings had housed some of the
world’s most successful corporations. They thus symbolized American economic prosperity and
might. The Pentagon, a symbol of US military strength, was left smoldering. The symbolic
weight of an attack on these targets is missed by looking at numbers alone. Had no one died in
the attacks, the destruction of these structures alone would still have shaken Americans to their
core.
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SECTION ONE: THE IMMEDIATE POST-9/11 PERIOD
Government Composition and Party Competition
In the immediate post-9/11 period, President Bush presided over a nearly evenly divided
House and Senate. He had also come off of one of the most contentious and closest presidential
elections in American history. The Senate was evenly divided between Democrats and
Republicans and the House held 221 Republicans, 212 Democrats, and 2 independents. The
Republicans had just lost 4 Senate seats and 2 House seats in the 2000 electioncccvi. Though the
country was divided nearly half red-half blue, the stakes in the 2000 election were not as high as
they would be in the coming years when the war on terrorism and Iraq war would be in full
swing. It is interesting to note, still, that President George W. Bush in the immediate post-9/11
period headed a country and a government that before the attacks was split down the middle
along partisan lines.
Executive Statements
On September 11th, 2001 at 8:30 PM, President George W. Bush made an initial, brief
statement addressing the nation. He stated outright that, “Today, our fellow citizens, our way of
life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist attacks.”
Two sentences later, he conjured the government protection theme stating that, “These acts of
mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed;
our country is strong.” He then made a call to arms saying that, “A great people has been moved
to defend a great nation,” already putting the mobilization of America and the run to war in the
past tense. He also framed the conflict for the first time, threatening that, “We will make no
distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them” cccvii. A
few days later, in a radio address, President Bush further framed the conflict again, saying that,
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“This is a conflict without battlefields or beachheads, a conflict with opponents who believe they
are invisible.”cccviii Tellingly, he declared that, “We are planning a broad and sustained campaign
to secure our country and eradicate the evil of terrorism.” cccix Eradicating the evil of terrorism is
a very broad goal since terrorism is a tactic used by many groups around the world for many
different reasons. Bush could have stated that the country would bring the criminal organization
behind the attack, and perhaps its allies, to their knees. Instead, he took on a tactic whose
definition is highly contestable and malleable cccx. Thus, he framed the threat and the coming
conflict as generally and ambiguously as he possibly could.
The secrecy of the Bush Administration was evident in the first days after the attack. On
September 16, 2001 on NBC’s Meet the Press, Vice President Dick Cheney stated that, in
response to the terrorist threat “We have to work the dark side, if you will. Spend time in the
shadows of the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here will have to be done
quietly, without any discussion.” cccxi The reductions on liberties that would follow the
September 11th attacks certainly run in line with Cheney’s comments.
On September 17, 2001, less than one week after the attacks, President Bush made a
major tolerance-themed speech in which he declared that, “Islam is peace.” He announced that
the world’s Muslims were just as “appalled” by the 9/11 attacks as were Americans. He then
quoted a Koranic verse, which states, “In the long run, evil in the extreme will be the end of
those who do evil. For that they rejected the signs of Allah and held them up to ridicule.” He
said that Islam “is a faith that brings comfort to a billion people around the world” and that
“Muslims make an incredibly valuable contribution to our country.” President Bush ended with
a cautionary note: “Those who feel like they can intimidate our fellow citizens to take out their
anger don’t represent the best of America, they represent the worst of humankind, and they
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should be ashamed of that kind of behavior” cccxii. Though, as will be seen at the end of this case,
the Bush Administration was at the same time detaining and deporting Muslims en masse, Bush
deserves credit for making this extensive tolerance-themed statement. In previous crisis periods
in American history, executives have not restrained the public in their fervor for getting revenge
on “enemies within”: be they Germans, Japanese, Frenchmen, or Communistscccxiii. That Bush, a
president much maligned for his antagonism to Muslims, would call on Americans to restrain
themselves and to respect Islam as a religion of peace in the first week after 9/11 is significant.
That said, actions speak louder than words, and as will be seen below with the enforcement and
passage of legislation dependent variables, the Bush Administration’s actions against Arabs and
Muslims largely superceded positive statements made about Islam.
In his first major speech to the nation after 9/11, an “Address to a Joint Session of
Congress and the American People” delivered on September 20, 2001, President George W.
Bush focused on the following five themes. First, he underlined the nation’s unity (rally ‘round
the flag). Second, he named the enemy and stated what they had done (conflict framing and
threat magnitude). Third, he demanded that the Taliban deliver the leaders of al Qaeda to the
United States. Fourth, he promoted Islam as an honorable religion (tolerance). And finally, he
framed the coming fight (call to arms and conflict framing). Generally, he tried to assuage the
public’s fears and gear it up for the war effort.
The President first underlined America’s unity as a nation, a clear call to rally ‘round the
flag. He said that, “We have seen the unfurling of flags, the lighting of candles, the giving of
blood, the saying of prayers—in English, Hebrew and Arabic.” He emphasized the diversity of
the victims of the 9/11 attacks: “dozens of Pakistanis; more than 130 Israelis; more than 250
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citizens of India; men and women from El Salvador, Iran, Mexico, and Japan; and hundreds of
British citizens.” Then, he touted Great Britain, saying that, “America has no truer friend.”
Next, he named the enemy, thus framing the conflict. Bush declared that, “On September
the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country.” He emphasized that
a new normal existed in the nation, asserting that, “night fell on a different world [that day], a
world where freedom itself is under attack.” He then named “loosely affiliated terrorist
organizations known as al Qaeda” as the perpetrators of the attacks. Bush stated that al Qaeda’s
“goal is remaking the world—and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere.” This was
a much more specific statement of the threat than Bush had made in previous statements, and he
would be loath to name alQaeda in future statements.
He then made a clear statement of tolerance separating al Qaeda from other Muslims.
Bush called al Qaeda, “a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam.” After
demanding that the Taliban deliver all al Qaeda leaders to the US, he returned to this pro-Islam
theme. He said: “I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We
respect your faith.” He called the terrorists “traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack
Islam itself.” Bush also made clear that, “The enemy of America is not our many Muslim
friends, it is not our many Arab friends.” Bush also emphasized that, “We are in a fight for our
principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them. No one should be singled out for unfair
treatment or unkind words because of their ethnic background or religious faith.”
He next framed the coming fight as one of global reach that could last for years on end.
He said that our enemy is not only “a radical network of terrorists,” but also “every government
that supports them.” Bush announced that, “our war on terror … will not end until every terrorist
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group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” This fight, thus, would not be one
of al Qaeda versus the United States, but rather “civilization’s fight … the fight of all who
believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.” The magnitude of the threat could
not have been greater.
He ended by framing the battle as one of freedom versus fear, thus making a call to arms.
Bush said that, “freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know
that God is not neutral between them.” He concluded that, “we’ll meet violence with patient
justice—assured of the rightness of our cause, and confident of the victories to come” cccxiv. As
will be shown below, after September 11, there existed a great disconnect between the
government’s words and deedscccxv.
On October 7, 2001, the US military began its war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda
forces in Afghanistan. The President’s address that day reiterated previously established themes.
Bush stated the action against Afghanistan was foisted against Americans. He said that
“America is a peaceful nation,” but that “there can be no peace in a world of sudden terror.” He
also made sure to highlight that the war in Afghanistan was just one node in a war on terror that
had already affected 38 countriescccxvi. Once again, the conflict was framed as broadly as
possible and it was stressed that the threat was global and far-reaching.
One month later, on November 8, 2001, President Bush addressed the nation at length,
and this time described the threat faced in the starkest terms yet. The speech had two conflicting
goals: hammering home to the public that the nation was at threat and assuaging the public’s
fears. These statements mixed the government protection and statement of threat themes, a
strategy that Bush would frequently use in the proceeding years. Bush declared that, “we are a
nation awake to danger.” He uttered that our enemies want to “kill all Americans, kill all Jews,
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and kill all Christians” and the that the threat to Americans’ freedoms that international terrorists
posed “could not be higher.” After two sentences of tolerance on how the terrorists “hide behind
a peaceful faith” and in actuality “have no religion,” Bush continued to frame the threat. The
President declared that a new normal existed in the world, saying that, “This is a different war
from any our nation has ever faced, a war on many fronts, against terrorists who operate in more
than 60 countries.” Speaking directly to the issue of liberty-security tradeoffs, he asserted that,
“we will always value freedom—yet we will not allow those who plot against our country to
abuse our freedoms and our protections.”
Bush next spoke about terror alerts. He framed them within the government protection
theme, but also emphasized that they signified the existence of a threat. He said that, “A
terrorism alert is not a signal to stop your life. It is a call to be vigilant—to know that your
government is on high alert, and to add your eyes and ears to our efforts.” Bush, thus, sounded
as if he were assuaging fears while simultaneously signaling to the public that serious threats are
out there and that they should be fearful of them. He went on to demand of the public that they
not be fearful, saying that “we have refused to live in a state of panic” and that, “We will not
give in to exaggerated fears.” He also declared that, “We will not judge fellow Americans by
appearance, ethnic background, or religious faith”cccxvii. Six months later, in a speech about the
new Department of Homeland Security, President Bush was drumming on the same themes. He
spoke again on the threat assessments and warnings he received daily, saying, “These warnings
are a new reality in American life.” He reiterated that, “The first and best way to secure the
homeland is to attack the enemy where he hides and plans.” Finally, he stated that the purpose of
the new department was to make government more focused and effective cccxviii.
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President Bush culminated these themes in a speech on the day after the first anniversary
of the September 11th attacks. He had reiterated time and again that the enemy had to be
attacked in his home, rather than in America. He had said that America was a nation under
imminent threat and that the war on terrorism was a global campaign. He also had emphasized
that regimes that harbored terrorists would be targeted. He thus framed the conflict as a global
war that pitted civilization against terror, which both ushered in a new normal in the world and
stressed that the magnitude of the threat could not be higher. On September 12, 2002, in a
speech to the United Nations, George W. Bush said, “In the attacks on America a year ago, we
saw the destructive intentions of our enemies. … [O]ur greatest fear is that terrorists will find a
shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to
kill on a massive scale.” Bush then attempted to link the war on terror and the UN’s mission to
the overthrow of a regime that he described as a lethal and aggressive threat: Saddam Hussein’s
government in Iraq. Bush laid out a list of accusations he held against the Hussein regime:
invading Kuwait, repressing minorities, violating human rights, attempted assassinations of
world leaders, and harboring and supporting terrorists. He said that assuming that Saddam
Hussein’s government was not pursuing weapons of mass destruction was “to hope against the
evidence.” He then warned that “lives of millions and the peace of the world” were at stake if
the United Nations did not act against Hussein soon cccxix. A year of post-terrorism speeches had
culminated in a speech that would be the beginning of a mobilization to war against Iraq. Bush’s
conflict framing and his hammering on the theme that a new normal existed in the world led him
to push for imminent action against Iraq.
This section captured the themes that the President forwarded in the first year after
September 11, 2001. Notably, President Bush made broad statements of tolerance, promoting
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Islam as a religion of peace and even devoting a full speech to the subject within the first week
after the attacks. Generally Bush stuck to three messages. The first types of messages involved
calls to arms and rally ‘round the flag type statements meant to mobilize the nation for war. He
emphasized Americans’ unity, that America represented freedom while the terrorists embodied
fear, and that justice would be brought to the terrorists behind the attacks. The second category
of messages framed the conflict and what the coming war would look like. Bush tellingly said
that he would not make a distinction between the terrorists being fought and those that harbored
them. He emphasized repeatedly that international terrorists posed a grave threat. He finally
framed the war as one against all terrorism, not just al-Qaeda, Islamists, or any particular group.
These messages allowed the President to shape the threat, and he framed it about as widely as he
could. Finally, the President tried to assuage the public’s fears, while also emphasizing that
America was under threat. He repeatedly stated that Americans should not live their lives in
fear, while also constantly harping on the fact that serious threats to Americans’ lives existed.
These statements mixed the government protection and statement of threat themes, a strategy that
the President would continually employ. On the one hand, one could argue that the President
was simply relaying the truth to the public: there was a threat, but there was no use in panicking.
But, one could also argue that Bush sought to keep the semblance of threat high and define the
war on terror as widely as possible in order to grant himself as much freedom of action as
possible. This latter theory is bolstered by Bush’s choice to attack Iraq first presented one year
after the attacks.
Going theme-by-theme, Bush did emphasize repeatedly that a new normal existed in the
country, one in which a high threat magnitude existed, and categorized the threat specificity as
broad and nebulous. He framed the conflict as one between America and all terrorists and

107

terrorist sympathizers in the world. In this period, nightmare scenarios were not employed with
very much frequency. Bush made numerous calls to arms and leaned on the government
protection theme. He also tellingly preached tolerance. However, liberty-security tradeoffs and
government successes were as yet not a big part of the President’s statements.

Legislative debate
The USA PATRIOT Act passed the Senate with a 98-1 vote on October 25, 2001 with
little debate. Russ Feingold cast the lone dissenting vote cccxx. The House vote of the previous
day was more divided: 357-66 cccxxi. Obviously, only a month and a half had elapsed after the
September 11 attacks when this legislation passed. This allowed little time for debate. But,
though there was little debate, there were dissenting voices.
Feingold spoke at length on the day the Senate passed the PATRIOT Act. He invoked
Benjamin Franklin, who said that, “a nation that would trade its liberties for security deserves
neither.” He said that we must “respect our Constitution” by preserving checks and balances.
Feingold then emphasized what he found wrong with the bill, stating, “it is one thing to shortcut
the legislative process in order to get Federal financial aid to the cities hit by terrorism. We did
that, and no one complained that we moved too quickly. It is quite another to press for the
enactment of sweeping new powers for law enforcement that directly affect the civil liberties of
the American people without due deliberation by the peoples' elected representatives.” The lack
of deliberation has been particularly worrisome to opponents of the PATRIOT Act cccxxii.
Feingold next pointed out that he did not have a problem with the whole act. Feingold
concluded, however, that provisions that expanded search-and-seizure powers and increased
surveillance powers, particularly those enumerated in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
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were particularly troublesome to himcccxxiii. No other Senator expressed disagreement with the
Act.
In the House, there was more dissent probably because House seats are less contested.
The comparatively greater dissent in the House of Representatives was due to relative safety of
most House seats. That is, the majority of congressmen and women hold seats in districts that
are non-competitive because of gerrymandered districts. Due to the lack of competition,
congressmen and women are able to play more to the extremes than their colleagues in the
Senatecccxxiv.
In the House, Earl Blumenauer of Oregon made the following statement: “I voted against
H.R. 3162 because there are still problems regarding freedom of speech; four years is too long a
period before mandatory Congressional review, and because there was no opportunity for the
House to offer reasonable amendments to further refine the legislation. When we are dealing
with the fundamental freedoms of every American there is no excuse not to take the appropriate
time to do the best we can” cccxxv. Others, like Rep. Patsy Mink of Hawaii plainly stated that,
“The measures included in the USA PATRIOT Act go too far”. A major concern of legislators
was that, in the words of Rep. Mink, “We tossed away the bipartisan compromise painstakingly
passed unanimously by the House Judiciary Committee. We were denied legislative due process.
The Committee decision was trashed” cccxxvi. Representative Diana DeGette of Colorado, echoing
Mink’s statements, summarized the concerns of many of her fellow representatives in the
following speech on October 12, 2001:
“After careful deliberation, House Judiciary Committee on October 11, 2001 passed H.R.
2975, the ‘Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Implement and Obstruct Terrorism
(PATRIOT) Act.’ In fact, the committee recognized the importance of the subject matter
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and the potential consequences of the bill and passed H.R. 2975 unanimously. This bill
enjoyed broad bipartisan support from the Judiciary Committee and members of the full
House.
However, in an end run around bipartisanship and the committee process, the
House majority leadership brought a different and controversial bill to the floor without
allowing time for committee consideration and without even giving Members time to
figure out what the bill does. Actually, this new bill was being written at the same time
that the House was supposed to be debating the bipartisan PATRIOT Act.
The new 187-page bill contained some very distressing provisions. Under current
law, search warrants must include very specific information including what is to be
searched, who must cooperate, and who is the target of the search. A provision in the new
bill would allow federal investigators to obtain search warrants without specifically
naming each person who is involved. Another provision would allow federal authorities
to obtain information like credit card numbers and bank account numbers with a
subpoena, not a court order, as is the case under current law. Also, many of the provisions
that expand the government's search and surveillance powers would not allow Congress
to review the new powers until 2006.
Yet, instead of bringing up a bipartisan bill that has worked its way through the
committee process, the House Majority hastily brought a very large and complicated bill
to the floor that could have serious consequences for the liberties of the American public.
Congress must update its anti-terrorism laws for the 21st century, however, we must not
sacrifice our civil liberties in a rush to vote on potentially dangerous legislation that has
not been adequately reviewed by lawmakers” cccxxvii.
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Reps. Martin Meehan of Massachussetts and Carolyn Maloney of New York shared
Degette’s reservationscccxxviii. However, Meehan maintained that, “Nonetheless, I rise in support
of the antiterrorism legislation before us. While the bill is not perfect, it does maintain an
acceptable balance between bolstering law enforcement powers and protecting our civil liberties.
In fact, when I read the Senate bill, I see much of the House Judiciary Committee's work
reflected in that product” cccxxix. Meehan voted for the bill.
It is important to note that Congresspeople who supported the bill were cognizant of the
security-liberty tradeoffs. As Rep. John McHugh of New York stated: “The horrific events of
September 11th have demonstrated that more needs to be done to protect Americans from
terrorism. At the same time, my colleagues and I are quite cognizant of our responsibilities in
safeguarding the fundamental constitutional rights of the American people. The PATRIOT Act
recognizes these concerns and strikes a balance between security enhancements and tools for law
enforcement and civil liberties” cccxxx.
In sum, the PATRIOT Act passed easily due to the threat felt by congress members and,
as will be elaborated below, due to the high fear levels of the public. The Congress felt that it
needed to act. Finally, due to the high fear and threat levels, hypothesis two from above, which
stated that legislative antagonism will be more likely when the government is divided, did not
bear out in this case.

The Opinion environment: An Overview
Before going into the details of the USA PATRIOT Act, it is important to touch on the
opinion environment in the post-9/11 period. The immediate aftermath of 9/11 saw a dramatic
uptick in mass fear and a general willingness to sacrifice civil liberties for security among the
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public. Gallup/CNN/USA Today polls found that those worried or somewhat worried about
terrorism more than doubled from the previous time the question was asked, and were
significantly higher than the level of those fearful after the Oklahoma City bombing in April
1995. Indeed, 23% of people were very worried about terrorism after 9/11, whereas the highest
previous figure, after Oklahoma City, was 14%. Further, 30-35% of people were somewhat
worried about terrorism after 9/11 in polls taken up to October 21, 2001cccxxxi. The highest
“somewhat worried” figure previous to this, in recent history, was in April 1995 when 28% of
Americans were “somewhat worried” of future terrorist attacks after the Oklahoma City
bombing cccxxxii. The Pew Research Council for the People & The Press found that over half of
Americans were willing to trade liberties for security after 9/11, nearly doubling the total from
April 1997 cccxxxiii. However, the number of Americans willing to swap liberty for security was
similarly high after Oklahoma City cccxxxiv.
The Gallup/CNN/USA Today cccxxxv question wording noticeably changes. On all of the
polls before 9/11, Gallup asked, “How worried are you that you or someone in your family will
become a victim of a terrorist attack similar to the bombing in Oklahoma City—very worried,
somewhat worried, not too worried, or not worried at all?” Post-September 11, the question
wording drops the reference to Oklahoma City, asking the public, “How worried are you that you
or someone in your family will become a victim of a terrorist attack—very worried, somewhat
worried, not too worried, or not worried at all?” cccxxxvi Clearly, the reference to the Oklahoma
City bombing could have had a strong effect on how people responded to the pre-9/11 questions
on terrorism. It could have made people less worried as memories of the Oklahoma City
bombing receded, or it could have made people respond that they were more worried since it
linked terrorism to a salient event that could be quickly conjured.
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When we turn to the likelihood of attacks, Americans’ perceptions that another terrorist
attack in the near future was likely jumped substantially after 9/11, then tapered off as time went
on. The fears of a future attack after the 2001 attacks are similar to the fears to a future attack
after the Oklahoma City bombings. Note the bumps in survey respondents claiming that a
terrorist attack was likely in June and November of 2002, July 2004 and then in August 2006—
all around election seasons. Here, again, it is important to note differences in question wording.
In 1991, the CBS/New York Times poll asked, “In your opinion, how likely is a major terrorist
attack in the United States itself in the near future?” In 1995, the Yankelovich/Time/CNN poll
asked, “How likely do you think it is that an act of terrorism will occur somewhere in the United
States in the next 12 months?” After 9/11, CBS/New York Times polls asked respondents their
opinions about the likelihood of an attack occurring “within the next few months”cccxxxvii.
To summarize, fear levels were extremely high after 9/11. As the graphs below indicate,
58% of Americans were worried for the safety of themselves or family members due to terrorist
attacks, 55% were willing to trade liberties for security, and 78% believed that another attack
was likely. However, while, in the initial period after the attack, the latter two figures remained
relatively stable, the number of Americans worried about themselves or family members
becoming terror victims dropped precipitously. By Thanksgiving time, a mere three-and-a-half
months after the attacks, 35% of Americans feared that they or their family members would
become terror victims. In other words, according to this one metric, in three-and-a-half months,
fear levels had dropped almost 40%. For a global perspective of the public fear environment in
America, see chapter three.
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What Was Passed: PATRIOT ACT
The centerpiece of the Bush Administration’s domestic legislative response to 9/11 was the
USA PATRIOT Act cccxxxviii. This section tracks the legislation passed in 2001. David Cole and
James Dempsey write that the Act allowed the Bush Administration to “cast a cloak of secrecy
over the exercise of government power.” It did so by “removing limitations and judicial controls
on investigative authorities,” “rendering immigrants deportable for their political association and
excludable for pure speech,” and “authorized the government to freeze property on the basis of
secret evidence cccxxxix. The PATRIOT Act made aliens deportable for any material support to
terrorist groups cccxl. Cole and Dempsey note that such groups could engage in both violent and
nonviolent activities, but all donations to these groups were banned cccxli. The Act gave the
attorney general the ability to arrest a foreign national suspected of terrorism for seven days
without charge cccxlii. The new law “allows the government to detain foreign nationals
indefinitely, even where they have prevailed in their removal hearings” even when these aliens
have never been convicted of any crime cccxliii. Cole and Dempsey do note, however, that this
provision has yet to be invoked cccxliv.
The PATRIOT Act expanded the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act allowing the
government to secretly conduct surveillance on any individuals dubbed “agents of a foreign
power” cccxlv. These government searches require no probable cause and subjects of these
searches and wiretaps may only discover that they were searched if they are prosecuted cccxlvi. As
has been widely reported, the Bush Administration apparently did not think that FISA was
enough and authorized the National Security Agency to conduct its own secret, warrantless
wiretapping investigations that circumvented the FISA courts cccxlvii. The PATRIOT Act gave the
FBI the power to conduct “sneak and peek searches” in which “FBI agents can secretly enter an
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apartment or home while the owner is asleep or away, take, alter, or copy things, and not tell the
owner that they were there for a ‘reasonable period thereafter.’” The Justice Department has
asserted that a “reasonable period” consists of ninety days cccxlviii.
Section 203 of the PATRIOT Act allows grand jury-obtained information to be used by
intelligence agencies without a judge’s approval. Dempsey and Cole aver that, “In effect, CIA
agents working with law enforcement officers can now jointly draw up subpoenas, obtain the
fruits of the grand jury’s power, and never have to appear in open court or explain how they used
the information” cccxlix. Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act gives the government the power to
“secretly seize ‘any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other
items)’ where those items are sought for an investigation” that relates to international terrorism
or “clandestine intelligence activities”cccl. The PATRIOT Act permits the government to
employ “roving wiretaps” against terrorism targets. Thus, wiretaps can be used against any
phone an individual uses rather than against specific numberscccli.
Perhaps the strongest power the government granted itself after September 11 was the
power to declare individuals “enemy combatants.” As Cole asserts, “Attaching that label takes
an individual out of the civilian justice system altogether and places him in military custody,
potentially for the duration of the ‘war on terrorism’”ccclii. The standards used for determining
who is an enemy combatant, according to Attorney-General Alberto Gonzales, changes from
case-to-case. Therefore, only executive officials know who will be determined an enemy
combatant and who will be charged as a common criminal cccliii. The prosecution of major
terrorism cases has followed varied courses. For example, John Walker Lindh, an American
who fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan, Richard Reid, the British shoe bomber, and
Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen who co-conspired with the 9/11 hijackers, were all tried in

115

federal court and convicted of terrorism-related crimes. Reid and Moussaoui were given life
sentencescccliv. However, Jose Padilla, the alleged dirty bomber, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, and
Yaser Esam Hamdi were designated enemy combatants. Charges were dismissed for the latter
two and Jose Padilla was convicted of terrorism conspiracy charged in the summer of 2007 and
later sentenced to 17 years in prison ccclv. The power to detain was also expanded to immigration
cases. The PATRIOT Act makes it so that the attorney general “need only certify that he has
‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that a person is ‘described in’ the antiterrorism provisions of the
immigration law, and the individual is then subject to potentially indefinite detention” ccclvi.
Included in the voluminous 342-page bill, were increased government abilities to search
citizens’ transactional recordsccclvii. These new powers have yielded a hundredfold increase in
the amount of national security letters over historical norms. These letters have allowed the FBI
to track a person’s spending habits, where they live, what they buy online, where they travel,
what they read on the Web, and who telephones and e-mails them. Remarkably, the 30,000
national security letters the FBI issues a year can be collected “about people who are not
suspected of any wrongdoing.” As former congressman Robert L. Barr put it, “The beef with the
NSLs is that they don’t have even a pretense of judicial or impartial scrutiny … There’s no
checks and balances whatever on them. It is simply some bureaucrat’s decision that they want
information, and they can basically just go and get it. … The abuse is in the power itself” ccclviii.
Indeed, as Cole and Dempsey write, “Previously, the FBI could get the credit card records of
anyone suspected of being an international terrorist or other foreign agent. Under the Patriot
Act, the FBI can get the entire database of the credit card company” ccclix. Further, both Section
215 and NSLs are “subject to a gag order barring the recipient from disclosing the existence of
the letter or letter in public.” A federal court deemed the gag order unconstitutional in

116

September 2004, however this provision remained part of the law until the PATRIOT Act was
revisited in 2006 ccclx. It is important to note that the PATRIOT Act was created with a sunset
requirement for sixteen of its provisions, which expired at the end of 2005ccclxi. The debate
around the renewal of these provisions will be dealt with at length below. In summary, The
PATRIOT Act makes “it easier to search property as well as detain individuals” ccclxii.
In January of 2003, the Justice Department revealed plans for the Domestic Security
Enhancement Act, popularly known as PATRIOT Act II. The legislation, which was stamped
“Confidential” and dated January 9, 2003, was leaked by the Center for Public Integrity in
February 2003. The DSEA would have given the executive the ability to strip anyone “who
supports even the lawful activities of an organization the executive branch deems terrorist” of
their citizenshipccclxiii. It would have revived the powers of the 1798 Alien Act, which gave the
executive the power to deport any non-citizen without having to show that the individual had
done anything illegal. It even would have allowed for secret arrestsccclxiv. In sum, the DSEA
“would have reduced judicial oversight over surveillance, created a DNA database resting on
unchecked executive ‘suspicion,’ lifted existing judicial restraints on local police spying on
religious and political organizations, authorized the federal government to obtain library and
credit card records without a judicial warrant, and permitted the federal government to keep
secret the identity of anyone detained in a terror investigation.” The proposed legislation was so
badly received, that “the administration buried the proposal”ccclxv.
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SECTION TWO: THE LEAD UP TO 2004 ELECTIONS
Government Composition and Party Competition
In the 2002 elections, Republicans gained eight House seats and two Senate seats. Thus,
previous to the 2004 election, Republicans held a 51-48 majority in the Senate and a 229-204
majority in the House of Representatives. The 2004 elections would be fiercely contested with
the war in Iraq and homeland security emerging as prominent issues. In the end, the Republicans
would win once again. George W. Bush would earn a second term as president after defeating
John Kerry and the Republicans would gain three additional House seats and four new Senate
seatsccclxvi. Since no new civil liberty-abridging legislation was passed in this period and since
law enforcement will be left to the end of this case, the study of the 2004 election period will
focus on executive statements, terror threat alerts and the general environment of fear. In this
section, hypothesis one above—which states that when party competition is high, the incumbent
will employ fear as a strategy—will be bolstered.

Key Points in the Election
Executive statements in this time period were part of an ongoing presidential election,
thus I hypothesize that these statements were affected by where the president stood in the
polling. First, the pre-election polling will be covered to find key points where George W. Bush
lagged. Then, after isolating the periods where President Bush was most vulnerable, I review
executive statements during these key periods in the next section.
To track polling, I looked at two major polling surveys: the CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll and
the Fox News/Opinion Dynamics poll ccclxvii. I chose the Fox News poll in particular because it is
probably the one that the Bush Administration looked at most closely and, thus, would affect

118

Bush’s campaign strategy. After all, Dick Cheney requests that Fox News be turned on in his
hotel rooms when he arrives and Fox News is the news channel of choice on Air Force
One ccclxviii. The polling trends appear below:
<Insert Figure 4.1 here>
<Insert Figure 4.2 here>
Both polls show three main periods where Kerry seriously threatened Bush. The
CNN/USA Today/Gallup showed Kerry having a wide lead over Bush in the mid-February to
March polls, then Kerry made a jump over Bush in July, and finally Kerry ran neck-and-neck
with Bush in October. The Fox News/Opinion Dynamics poll showed similar results. Bear in
mind that the Fox News polls were taken on different dates than the CNN polls so that exact
results are not possible. The Fox News poll showed Kerry running even with Bush in midFebruary to March and then in June, Kerry then took the lead from Bush in July and August, and
though Bush held a decent lead for most of October, the Fox poll shows Kerry overtaking him in
the very end of the election cycle. In sum, both polls show Bush vulnerable in the beginning of
the race (February to March), in the middle of the summer (July to August), and at the end of the
race (October). Thus, I will review executive statements in these periods looking particularly for
how Bush and Cheney shaped threats.
Important external events also may have affected how Bush perceived his candidacy. For
instance, on March 11, a series of train bombings left 191 dead and over 1,500 wounded in
Madrid, Spain. On July 22, the 9/11 Commission Report was released, which detailed instances
where the Bush Administration failed to “connect the dots.” Finally, on October 29, 2004,
Osama bin-Laden released a videotape in which he threatened the United States. President Bush
admitted that the bin-Laden tape issued the Friday before the election helped him in his victory,
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stating that, “I thought it would help remind people that if bin Laden doesn’t want Bush to be the
president, something must be right with Bush.” ccclxix Campaign events also contributed to Kerry
gaining over Bush. For instance, Kerry won the Democratic nomination on March 2, 2004 and
announced John Edwards as his running mate on July 6. Further, the presidential and vice
presidential debates occurred from late September to mid-October. These dates all largely
coincide with the dates of contestation chosen for scrutiny above.
In the next section, I will look at George W. Bush and his running mate Dick Cheney’s
statements in the periods earmarked: mid-February to March, July to August, and late September
to the end of October. Statements made by President Bush and his administration regarding
homeland security, civil liberties and the war on terror will be highlighted. For this section, I
reviewed all of Bush, Cheney and Condoleeza Rice’s statements and campaign speeches
pertaining to homeland security, the war in Iraq, and the war on terror from February 14 to
March 31, July 1- August 31, and September 24 (the date the first presidential debate took
place)- October 31. Since not every speech was only about these issues, I reviewed all of Bush’s
campaign speeches and included those that touched on the war on terror in my study ccclxx.
Obviously, not all speeches will be touched on below, instead I select key speeches that highlight
recurrent or new themes.

Executive statements
Period One: Mid-February and March
On February 28, 2004, National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice made a speech in the
Reagan Library and Museum outlining the history of the Bush Administration’s dealings with
the war on terror. Rice’s statements would shape the threat magnitude as extremely high and
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also touch on a nightmare scenario that would repeated throughout the election cycle. She
connected the terrorist threat to the Cold War, saying that, “The terrorist ideology is the direct
heir to communism, and Nazism, and facism—the murderous ideologies of the 20th century.”
She also plainly stated a fear that President Bush and Vice President Cheney would harp on
repeatedly in the coming months. Rice said, “we … face every day the possibility of our worst
nightmare: the possibility of sudden, secret attack by chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear weapons, the coming together of the terrorist threat with the world’s most dangerous
weapons.” ccclxxi
On the very day that John Kerry won the Democratic nomination, President Bush made a
speech commemorating the Department of Homeland Security’s one-year anniversary. Once
again, he mixed threatening messages with messages meant to rally the public. Bush declared
that, “The goal of the terrorists is to kill our citizens—that’s their goal—and to make Americans
live in fear. This nation refuses to live in fear.” In an apparent dig at his opponent, Bush said
that is was “vital” for our nation to “speak with a clear voice” and that we not be “a nation of
empty words.” Next, Bush moved on to another mixed message that he would repeat with great
frequency over the campaign season: we’re safer, but we’re not safe. This mixed the statement
of threat with the government protection themes. Next, he gave a mixed message about whether
or not a new normal existed in the nation. He said: “Life in America, in many ways has returned
to normal, and that’s positive. … But life will really never return to normal so long as there’s an
enemy that lurks in the shadows, that aims to destroy and kill.” He described America’s enemies
as “wounded, but … not broken” and then emphasized the threat, saying that, “vast oceans no
longer protect us.” He then detailed a laundry list of security measures that his administration
had implemented, but ended the list by saying that, “Even with all these measures, there’s no
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such thing as perfect security in a vast and free country.” ccclxxii This statement mixed
government success and statement of threat themes.
On March 12, 2004, the President, in response to the bombings of commuter trains in
Madrid, stated that the recent attacks served as “a grim reminder that there are evil people in the
world who are willing to kill innocent life” and referred to the United States’ enemies as
“killers.” Bush stated, “Killers try to shake our will, try to shake our confidence in the
future.”ccclxxiii Bush’s statements once again emphasized the threat and framed the conflict as
one between nation-states and an inchoate group of “killers” akin to barbarians. On March 19,
2004, President Bush made a speech in defense of his strategies in the war on terror and the war
in Iraq. Emphasizing on the threat and framing the conflict, he recanted the list of nations that
had recently been attacked by international terrorists. Bush said that, “It is in the interest of
every country, and the duty of every government, to fight and destroy this threat to our people.”
He then emphasized that, “There is no neutral ground—no neutral ground—in the fight between
civilization and terror, because there is no neutral ground between good and evil.” He declared
that diplomacy was not an option with the terrorists because, “No concession will appease their
hatred.”ccclxxiv
In sum, during this period, Bush and his administration laid out tried and tested themes.
The threat specificity, from “terrorists” to “killers,” was shaped as widely as possible. The
conflict was framed as one between states and killers, an ambiguous and broad battle between
good and evil. The threat magnitude, according to the administration, was extremely high. After
all, al-Qaeda was equated to Communism and Nazism. Specific terror groups were rarely
named. Instead, the threat was framed as an evil cabal that “lurks in the shadows.” Condoleeza
Rice in full detail described the “nightmare” of a terrorist wielding a weapon of mass destruction
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against the United States. President Bush made it clear that he had made us safer (government
success/protection), but that we were not yet safe (statement of threat).
Period Two: July and August
In July, President Bush found himself once again trailing John Kerry in the polls. On
July 6, John Kerry announced John Edwards as his running mate. Then, on July 22, the 9/11
Commission Report was released, and George W. Bush made a speech regarding homeland
security. He said once again that, “Our country faces new and unprecedented threats” and that
oceans could not protect us anymore. After harping on the new normal, he underlined the
government’s successes. He said that his administration had killed or captured “about twothirds” of al-Qaeda’s leadership—he would start saying that 75 percent of al-Qaeda’s leaders fell
in this category in the coming months. He explicitly stated that, “the American people are safer.
But this does not mean that our nation is fully secure” ccclxxv.
One week later, on July 30, 2004, a day after the Democratic National Convention had
ended, Vice President Cheney made a speech at a campaign rally in Oregon. Cheney described
the war on terror in stark terms. He said, “This election could not come at a more crucial time in
our history. Today we face an enemy every bit as intent on destroying us as were the Axis
powers in World War II, or the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” Cheney described the
terrorists as people that we could neither “reason with,” nor “negotiate with,” nor “appease.” He
said, “This is, to put it simply, an enemy that we must vanquish. And with President George W.
Bush as Commander-in-Chief, that is exactly what we’re going to do.” He finally repeated a
theme frequently used by the Bush Administration: we’re attacking them there, so we don’t have
to face them here in America ccclxxvi.
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During this period in campaign speeches across the country, Bush repeated the following
five themes. One, our enemies cannot be reasoned (call to arms) with and, two, we live in a new
world defined by terrorism (new normal). Three, our enemies are out to hurt us (threat) and,
four, we are safer but we are not yet safe (government success/protection and threat). Finally, he
emphasized that we must be committed and stay the course with our current terrorism strategies
(government protection)ccclxxvii. It was not until the final period, where the presidential and vice
presidential debates took place and the end of the election was in sight, that the Bush
administration began significantly ratcheting up its rhetoric.

Period Three: September and October
This period began with an explosive statement by the Vice President. Dick Cheney on
September 7, 2004 told a crowd in Des Moines that, “It's absolutely essential that eight weeks
from today, on Nov. 2, we make the right choice because if we make the wrong choice then the
danger is that we'll get hit again and we'll be hit in a way that will be devastating from the
standpoint of the United States.” He explained that this was because John Kerry suffered from a
“pre-9/11 mindset.” ccclxxviii Basically, the vice president in no uncertain terms had just
announced that if John Kerry were to win the election, the United States would be attacked by
terrorists again. This statement basically relayed to the public a highly specific threat of an
attack conditional on a Democratic Presidential victory. Here Cheney was clearly playing with
the public’s fears, stating that a major threat existed and that the only government that could
protect the people was George Bush’s.
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Three days later, President Bush declared that every September 11th would from then on
be known as Patriot Dayccclxxix. The next day, on the three-year anniversary of 9/11, President
Bush delivered a radio address to the nation. Bush stated that the attacks had been a “turning
point” for America (new normal) and that al-Qaeda’s goals were, “to expand the scale of their
murder, and force America to retreat from the world” (conflict framing). He said that the US
was “determined to stay on the offensive” (call to arms). He now claimed that, “More than
three-quarters of al Qaeda's key members and associates have been detained or killed”
(government successes). He ended by emphasizing that, “The war on terror goes on. The
resolve of our nation is still being tested.” ccclxxx
On October 1, 2004, the first presidential debate was held between John Kerry and
George W. Bush. Kerry began the debate by stating that he could, “make America safer than
President Bush has made us.” Bush, in response to a question about whether electing Kerry
would increase the US’ chances of being hit by a terrorist attack, stated that he didn’t think Kerry
would win. He went on to say that America, “has got a solemn duty to defeat this ideology of
hate.” The debate then turned to the Iraq war, which Kerry called a “colossal error of judgment.”
Bush said that the way to win in Iraq was to be, “steadfast and resolved.” He then underlined
that America “has to stay on the offensive,” and that, “We have to be right 100 percent of the
time, and the enemy only has to be right once—to hurt us.” Later, in responding to a Kerry
comment that Osama bin-Laden was using the Iraq war for recruitment, Bush said, “Osama binLaden isn’t going to determine how we defend ourselves. … The American people decide. I
decided.” At the end of the debate, both candidates were asked what they believed was the
single most serious threat to American security. Kerry said loose nuclear materials, Bush said

125

nuclear weapons in the hands of terroristsccclxxxi. In this first debate, Bush made a call to arms,
stated that the threat magnitude was extremely high, and described a nightmare scenario.
Five days later, the only vice presidential debate was held in Cleveland. Dick Cheney
began the debate by laying out the Bush Administration’s overall strategy in the war on terror:
“after 9/11, it became clear that we had to do several things to have a successful strategy to win
the global war on terror, specifically that we had to go after the terrorists wherever we might find
them, that we also had to go after state sponsors of terror -- those who might provide sanctuary
or safe harbor for terror. And we also then, finally, had to stand up democracies in their stead
afterwards because that was the only way to guarantee that these states would not again become
safe harbors for terror, for the development of deadly weapons.” Cheney’s statement assumed
that a “global war on terror” had to be prosecuted after 9/11. He, thus, framed the conflict as
broadly as possible, and did not feel the need to defend such a global framing. Cheney soon after
accused the Kerry-Edwards ticket of not being “prepared to deal with states that sponsor terror.”
Later, Cheney was asked to clarify his comment of a month before in which he stated that it
would be dangerous to elect John Kerry. Cheney responded, “I’m saying specifically that I don’t
believe [Kerry] has the qualities we need in a Commander-in-Chief, because I don’t think, based
on his record, that he would pursue the kind of aggressive policies that need to be pursued if
we’re going to defeat these terrorists. We need to battle them overseas so we don’t have to battle
them here at home.” Cheney ended by once again stoking public fears about voting for the
“wrong” candidate. He did so by evoking a nightmare scenario. He said, “we find ourselves in
the midst of a conflict unlike any we’ve ever known, faced with a possibility that terrorists could
smuggle a deadly biological agent or nuclear weapon into the middle of one of our own cities.
That threat, and the Presidential leadership needed to deal with it, is placing a special
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responsibility on all of you who will decide on November 2nd who will be our next Commanderin-Chief.” ccclxxxii
The second presidential debate took place on October 9, 2004 in St. Louis. In it,
President Bush defined the war on terror as he saw it. He said, “it’s a fundamental
misunderstanding to say that the war on terror is only about Osama bin-Laden. The war on terror
is to make sure that these terrorist organizations do not end up with weapons of mass
destruction.” This comment came in response to numerous previous statements by John Kerry
that the Iraq war had been a mistake, and that it diverted America from the war on al-Qaeda.
Here Bush tried to move the bar from a specific threat: al-Qaeda to a broader threat: terror. He
also emphasized that in doing so, he was attempting to prevent a nightmare scenario. Along the
same lines, Bush later stated that, “This war is a long, long war, and it requires steadfast
determination, and it requires a complete understanding that we not only chase down al Qaeda,
but we disrupt terrorists’ safe havens, as well as people who could provide the terrorists with
support.” Previous to this statement, he said that Kerry did not have the “right view about the
world to make us safe” and that the Patriot Act was “vital.” Bush went on to reiterate a theme
that he’d pushed for years: America had to spread democracy in the world in order to stop
extremist ideologies from proliferating. This strategy would show government success and
protect the American people. On the Patriot Act and liberty-security tradeoffs, Bush said, “I
really don’t think your rights are being watered down … I don’t think the Patriot Act abridges
your rights at all.” He backed this up by saying that, “Every action being taken against terrorists
requires a court order, requires scrutiny.” In light of the treatment of Arabs and Muslims in
America after 9/11 that will be dealt with below and Bush’s secret wiretapping program, this
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statement does not ring true. Bush ended by citing the 9/11 Commission as having found that,
“America is safer, but not yet safe.” ccclxxxiii
The third and final presidential debate took place five days later, on October 14, on the
campus of Arizona State University. Bush began his comments by calling Kerry’s depiction of
terrorism as a law enforcement issue that “could be reduced to a nuisance,” a “dangerous” point
of view. In other words, Kerry, according to Bush, did not understand the magnitude of the
threat and thus was framing the conflict incorrectly. In the end of the debate Bush reiterated his
confidence that the US would win the war on terror against “these ideologies of hate”: a very
broad and amorphous opponent ccclxxxiv.
In the stretch run to the election, Bush continued to push on the war on terror and similar
themes during campaign speeches. On October 18, 2004 in New Jersey he said, “we face an
enemy that is determined to kill the innocent and make our country into a battlefield. In the war
on terror, there is no place for confusion and no substitute for victory.” He went on to describe
the 1990s as a time of seeming peace where under the surface, terrorists were preparing to hit
America. This painted previous American leaders as oblivious to threats, and Bush as an aware
protector of the people. He said that then, “Most Americans still felt that terrorism was
something distant, and something that would not strike on a large scale in America. That is the
time that my opponent wants to go back to.” On liberty-security tradeoffs, Bush went on to
declare that, “The danger to America is not the Patriot Act, or the good people who use it; the
danger to America is the terrorists.” He repeatedly claimed that John Kerry was unchanged by
9/11 and that he did not understand the threat that America now faced. Bush said that Kerry’s
“September the 10th attitude” was dangerous to America. Bush continued that, “In an era of
weapons of mass destruction, waiting for threats to arrive at our doorsteps is to invite disaster.”
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Bush reiterated that, “if violence and fanaticism are not opposed at their source, they will find us
where we live.” He then bluntly stated that, “my opponent’s views would make America less
secure and the world more dangerous.” ccclxxxv In the president’s next two weekly radio
addresses, Bush reiterated the same themes, particularly that he could defend America and that
Kerry’s views were dangerous ccclxxxvi.
Finally, on October 31, Bush stumped in Cincinnati. He said that, “in a time of great
consequence … America will need strong, determined, optimistic leadership.” He said that it
was “crucial” that the President lead with steadfastness in his views and not waver. After
touching on domestic issues, Bush then said that the most essential issue was “the security of
your family” (government protection). After all, he said, “all progress on every other issue
depends on the safety of our citizens.” He said that the president’s duty was to protect the
people, and then bluntly stated that, “If America shows uncertainty or weakness during these
troubled times, this world will drift toward tragedy.” He thus implied that the threat magnitude
was high, that Americans were under threat, and that his administration was the only one that
could protect the people. He ended by saying, “If you believe that America should fight the war
on terror with all our might, and lead with unwavering confidence in our ideals, I ask you to
come stand with me.” ccclxxxvii
During the 2004 campaign President Bush and his administration went from first widely
and ambiguously defining the terrorist threat to underlining that Bush had made the country safer
but that it was not yet safe to finally explicitly stating that a vote for John Kerry would put
America in danger. Thus, the administration was able to mix the government protection and
success themes with the threat magnitude themes. Specifically, they were saying that they had
protected the American people and had made notable successes against the terrorists and that not
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only would a Kerry administration not have the same success, but that such an administration’s
misunderstanding of the threat magnitude would be disastrous. Arguably, Bush and Cheney
framed a Kerry win as a nightmare scenario. Speaking of such scenarios, the nightmare scenario
of terrorists with nuclear weapons attacking America’s cities was emphasized repeatedly and was
treated as a very real threat. Bush’s use of fear during the campaign has also been tracked in a
paper by Sarah Oates and Monica Postelnicu. They found that Bush’s campaign ads used “fear
appeals” in 35 percent of their messages, whereas Kerry’s campaign used these appeals in only 6
percent of theirsccclxxxviii. They also found that Bush spoke about terrorism in 44.4 percent of the
nightly news stories in which he appeared, while Kerry mentioned terrorism in exactly half that
number (22.2 percent) of his appearancesccclxxxix. The authors conclude that in discussing
terrorism there is little discussion of actual policies but “a great deal of rhetoric about strength,
firmness and pursuit of enemies” cccxc. Those findings are reinforced by this study.
Going theme-by-theme, Bush did not preach tolerance in this period. However, he did
push both the government success and government protection themes heavily. He made some
calls to arms, but not as many as in the previous period. He did touch on the liberty-security
tradeoff theme, but only to deny that liberties were abridged and to play up the importance of the
threat. The administration framed the conflict as a large, global battle. It continued to highlight
that a new normal existed in America and that the threat magnitude was extremely high.
Officials even went so far as equating the terrorist threat to the threat of Nazism and
Communism. Bush continuously played up the threat theme and shaped the threat specificity as
ambiguously as he could, even while John Kerry attempted to pin him down on the threat’s
specific origins. Finally, the most important theme that was harped on in this period was the
nightmare scenario. Terrorists wielding weapons of mass destruction against Americans was
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time and again stated to be a real possibility. This nightmare scenario was evoked to defend both
the war on terror broadly and the Iraq war specifically.
The review of executive statements here clearly bolsters hypothesis one above. As the
election competition got fiercer, and as the election neared, the executive branch’s statements
involved increasingly threatening statements. In the end, the opponent was colored not only as
weak, but also as dangerous to the safety of Americans. In the next section, I look at some of the
bills relating to the PATRIOT Act that were forwarded in the legislature in the period leading up
to the election. As will be shown, a number of bills seeking to loosen restrictions on civil
liberties were forwarded, but none became legislation. Though Republicans had gained a greater
share of the Congress, legislative opposition to the PATRIOT Act began in this period.
Legislative Debate
Even though no movement occurred on the PATRIOT Act in this period, both houses of
Congress still introduced legislation regarding the Act. In the run-up to the election, Congress
members attempted to put the PATRIOT Act and counterterrorism back on the agenda. A year
before the election, Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont on October 1, 2003
introduced a bill entitled the PATRIOT Act Oversight Restoration Act of 2003. The Bill would
introduce sunset provisions for sixteen additional sections of the PATRIOT Act including those
that authorized delayed notification searches, gave law enforcement access to citizen records
through National Security Letters, and allowed the Attorney General to “‘certify’ that an alien is
engaged in activity that endangers the national security, and to take such an alien into custody,”
among others. Leahy noted that, “To date, anti-PATRIOT resolutions have been passed by 178
communities in 32 States including Idaho, New Hampshire, and Illinois.” He also noted
Attorney-General John Ashcroft’s negative view of local anti-PATRIOT Act bills. Leahy stated:
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“In one of his rare appearances before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney General
Ashcroft charged that ‘fear mongers’--those who were raising concern about the loss of civil
liberties--were only aiding the terrorists. More recently, a Justice Department official dismissed
the many local government resolutions condemning the PATRIOT Act by saying, ‘half are either
in cities in Vermont, very small population, or in college towns in California’”cccxci.
Similar acts aiming to limit the PATRIOT Act were introduced around the same period.
Independent Representative Bernie Sanders of Vermont introduced the Freedom to Read
Protection Act of 2003, which attempted to exempt libraries and bookstores from a wide range of
foreign intelligence searches. Senator Russell Feingold (Democrat) of Wisconsin introduced a
similar bill in the Senate four months later. Representative Dennis Kucinich (Democrat) of Ohio
introduced The Benjamin Franklin True Patriot Act on September 24, 2003, which sought to
rescind many of the same portions of the PATRIOT Act that Leahy’s bill targeted. Finally, the
day after Leahy introduced his bill, Republican Senator Larry Craig of Idaho introduced the
Security and Freedom Ensured Act of 2003. This act sought to limit the government’s ability to
authorize roving wiretaps and search warrants. Also, like some of the other bills, it sought to
limit the government’s ability to retrieve personal records about individuals from libraries and
bookstores under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 cccxcii.
On May 21, 2004, Republican Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona introduced a bill to repeal the
sunset provisions of the PATRIOT Act that were set to expire in 2005. Kyl made a long speech
in defense of the Act. He quoted Thomas Kean, one of the heads of the 9/11 Commission, as
saying that, “witness after witness tell[s] us that the Patriot Act has been very, very helpful, and
if the Patriot Act, or portions of it, had been in place before 9/11, that would have been very
helpful.” Former Attorney-General Janet Reno also called the bill “helpful” and FBI Director
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Robert Mueller dubbed it, “extraordinarily beneficial in the war on terrorism,” Kyl said. Kyl
emphasized the increased information-sharing between intelligence and law enforcement
officials that the PATRIOT Act allowed. Hedefended the much maligned section 215, which
allows the government access to one’s library records, saying that the section was both necessary
and misunderstood.
Kyl also maintained that the Act “respects important congressional oversight” and “preserves the
historic role of courts by ensuring that the vital role of judicial oversight is not diminished.” cccxciii
Terror Alerts
The power of terror alert changes is difficult to overstate. The Department of Homeland
Security’s Homeland Security Advisory System, which produces terror alerts, was created by
presidential directive and unveiled in March 2002. The purpose of the system, according to the
directive, is “to provide a comprehensive and effective means to disseminate information
regarding the risk of terrorist acts to Federal, State, and local authorities and to the American
people.” The advisory system ranks the likelihood of a terrorist attack on a five-color scale
ranging from low/green to severe/red. The interim stages are guarded/blue, elevated/yellow and
high/orange cccxciv.
Nacos, et al. find that 100% of the time that the terror alert was raised by the Bush
administration, it ran as the lead story on all three of the major evening news broadcasts cccxcv.
Nacos, et al. note that, “In June 2002 the peak in the public’s threat perception followed several
terrorism alerts the previous months, when administration officials initiated a heightened state of
alert for railroads and other transit systems and warned of a special threat against the Statue of
Liberty and the Brooklyn Bridge.” The portion of the public that saw terrorism as a major
problem, thus, rose from 22% in May 2002 to 33% in June 2002 cccxcvi. Interestingly, Ron
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Susskind notes that “the sudden slew of alerts in the spring and summer of 2002” may have been
due to the “brutal” interrogation of the (literally) insane al-Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah cccxcvii.
The summer of 2002 was also a key period for the mid-term elections of that year.
Further, Nacos, et al. found that, “When pollsters mentioned a particular time frame
asking respondents whether they worried that another terrorist attack would occur ‘soon,’ … the
actual statements by US administration officials alerting the public to specific terrorist threats or
speaking in more general terms about the threat had the strongest impact on public opinion
(r=0.49, p<.05; b=1.64 p<=.1)” cccxcviii. Nacos and her colleagues found that “emphasizing the
terrorist threat and official alerts tended to buoy the President’s approval ratings—both his
terrorism-specific rating and his overall approval” cccxcix.
During the 2004 election period, there was only one heightened terror alert. It’s timing
was telling, however. The terror alert was raised from yellow to orange from August 1, 2004 to
November 10, 2004. Thus, it was heightened during a period where President Bush was
vulnerable according to polling and lowered just after his election victory. The threat alert was
focused on the financial service sectors of New York, New Jersey, and Washington, DC cd.
Making the alert even more dubious was the fact that officials said that the intelligence backing
the threat to financial institutions was “three or four years old” cdi. The timing was also
suspicious given that on July 29, just two days earlier, the Democratic National Convention had
ended. In sum, all of the evidence of this particular elevation of the terror alert point to it being
motivated by the executive for political, electoral gain.
Indeed, in May of 2005, former Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge
admitted that the Bush administration raised terror alerts against his wishes. He stated that the
administration raised the alerts on “flimsy” evidence. Ridge stated that, “More often than not we
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[i.e., the Department of Homeland Security] were the least inclined to raise it, sometimes we
disagreed with the intelligence assessment. Sometimes we thought even if the intelligence was
good, you don't necessarily put the country on (alert). ... There were times when some people
were really aggressive about raising it, and we said, ‘For that?’” cdii
Opinion Environment
During this period, the percentage of Americans worried about being a victim of terrorist
attacks, measured by Gallup/CNN/USA Today polling, showed a marked increase as the 2004
election wore on. In January 2004, only 28% of Americans were worried about becoming terror
victims, but in February, a critical period for Bush in the polling, this figure jumped to 40%. By
August, with Bush’s polling numbers down again, relative to Kerry’s, only 34% of Americans
were worried about becoming terror victims. Yet, in the last two months of the election the figure
rose by nearly 40%. In September 2004, 43% of Americans were worried about themselves or
family members dying at the hands of terrorists and by October 2004, as they readied themselves
for the polls a staggering 47% of Americans were now scared of being terrorists’ victims.
Tellingly, this number dropped to 41% in the December 2004 post-election poll. Figures above
40% had not been reached since October 2001, a mere month after the 9/11 attacks. Fear levels,
thus, rose as the date of the election neared.
There was also a jump in this period in the number of Americans willing to trade liberty
for security. The number rose from 50% in August 2003 to 56% according to the Pew Research
Center for the People & the Press. The number of Americans who thought a terrorist attack on
the US was likely in the near future jumped up from a low of 55% in April 2004 to 71% in midJuly 2004, according to polling done by CBS and the New York Times. This number dropped to
61% by September 2004, still a sizeable majority of Americans claiming that terrorist attacks
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were likely or very likely on American soil. Clearly, as the election neared, given the Bush
administration’s threatening statements, the raising of the terror alert and Bush’s admission that
bin-Laden’s October 2004 statement aided his cause, fear was a contributing factor to Bush’s
success. Threatening statements were made, terror alerts were raised, and the people responded
with heightened fear levels. By the end of the election, if these polls are to be believed, the
American public was as fearful about terrorist attacks as it had been a mere month after 9/11.

SECTION THREE: THE RENEWAL OF THE PATRIOT ACT

Legislative opposition began to take hold even though Republicans won the 2004 elections.
The government composition was the same in this period, as it was at the end of the previous
one. Republicans held 55 Senate seats to 44 for Democrats and they held 232 seats in the House
to 202 held by Democrats. There was one independent in each branch of Congress. George W.
Bush was president.
Legislative Debate and a renewed PATRIOT Act
The PATRIOT Act provisions set to sunset were sent to Congress for renewal in the summer
of 2005. The renewed legislation was introduced in the House on July 11, 2005. In late July,
congressmen and women were already fighting to make the PATRIOT Act into more civil
liberty-friendly legislation. Congressman Michael Capuano of Massachusetts and
Congresswoman Janice Schakowsky of Illinois (both Democrats) made speeches expressing their
concern about the civil liberty reductions that the PATRIOT Act allowed. Though both had
voted against the PATRIOT Act in 2001, this time they stood on firmer ground in their
opposition—even though the president’s party still held a majority in the House cdiii.
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Schakowsky, for one, noted that according to a recent CBS poll, “52 percent of Americans were
either ‘very concerned’ or ‘somewhat concerned’ about losing civil liberties as a result of the
PATRIOT Act. According to a CNN/Gallup poll, 64 percent believe the government should take
steps to protect additional acts of terrorism but not if those steps would violate our civil
liberties.”cdiv Indeed, as early as October 2002, 62% of Americans stated in the
CNN/Gallup/USA Today poll that they would not trade liberty for securitycdv. Democrat Brian
Higgins of New York summed up what the PATRIOT Act had come to represent: “a muchdebated issue, symbolizing a Federal Government abusing its power and violating civil liberties
for some, and a necessary bulwark against the barbarity of terrorists for others.” He, however,
made sure to note that everyone agreed that the government needed to combat terrorism, even
making mention of the attacks in London of two weeks earlier. He thus called that the bill be
amended, not “ended.”cdvi
Republican Congresswoman Thelma Drake of Virginia tried to assuage the public’s concerns
about civil liberties. She defended the Act by saying that, “What Americans are not being told is
that the same provisions that exist in this act have been in place for many years in regards to
criminal cases.” Her speech showed that she had clearly internalized the framing that the
PATRIOT Act was a drag on liberties, rather than the framing of the Act when it first passed as:
a necessary act to combat terrorism cdvii.
In September the same arguments were going back and forth. In the House of
Representatives, Congressman Dennis Moore said, “It is not a good idea to make permanent
policy for the United States concerning our fundamental rights and freedoms during
extraordinary times of war. We must never allow the terrorists to alter the freedoms that define
our country and make us the greatest Nation in the world.”cdviii In the Senate, Senator Dick
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Durbin of Illinois made a short speech against the provisions in the PATRIOT Act that allowed
the federal government to use national security letters (NSLs) to glean information about
Americans. Durbin was not content with the Bush administration and FBI’s contention that they
did not spy on innocent Americans, he wanted to know how many NSLs had been authorized
since 9/11. He said, “In our democracy, the government is supposed to be open and accountable
to the people and the people have a right to keep their personal lives private, This Justice
Department seems to want to reverse this order, keeping their activity secret and prying into the
private lives of innocent American citizens.” cdix
Clearly, the legislature was showing more backbone now that four years had passed since the
September 11 attacks. Even with a Congress that was less divided along partisan lines than the
2000 one was, the PATRIOT Act legislation faced far greater opposition in 2005 and 2006 than
it did in 2001. This clearly disproves hypothesis 2 above, which asserted that the more divided
the legislature, the less likely civil liberty-abridging legislation was to pass. Here, the critical
variable was not the composition of the government, but rather the temporal proximity to the
crisis. As the years went by and the immediate memory of the attacks faded, opposition to the
PATRIOT Act grew.
On November 16, 2005 the Associated Press reported that a tentative deal had been struck
between House and Senate negotiators on the PATRIOT Act that, “would curb FBI subpoena
power and require the Justice Department to more fully report its secret requests for information
about ordinary people.” cdx However, the Senate blocked the renewed PATRIOT Act from
becoming legislation. Concerns about civil liberties from members of both parties prevented the
bill from receiving the 60 senatorial votes necessary to break a filibuster. The vote ended up
being 52 to 47 in favor of ending the filibuster with four Republicans aiding the all but two

138

Democrats againstcdxi. The bill was blocked on the day a New York Times report was released
stating that, according to government officials, “Under a presidential order signed in 2002, the
intelligence agency has monitored the international telephone calls and international e-mail
messages of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people inside the United States without warrants
over the past three years” cdxii. The news story prompted Vice President Cheney to rush to the
Capitol to support the domestic spying program in the face of accusations of its illegality. At
least one Senator’s decision, Charles Schumer of New York, to support the filibuster was swayed
by the new information on eavesdropping. It was a tumultuous week for the Bush
Administration’s war on terror. The PATRIOT Act was blocked on a Friday. Two days earlier,
“Senate Democrats and Republicans agreed on a measure to require the director of national
intelligence to provide regular, detailed updates about secret detention sites maintained by the
United States overseas. On Thursday, after weeks of resisting Senator John McCain’s effort to
pass a measure banning cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment of prisoners in American
custody, [President] Bush reversed course and embraced the plan.” In response to the filibuster,
President Bush stated that, “The terrorists want to attack America again and kill the innocent and
inflict even greater damage than they did on September 11 … The Senators who are filibustering
the Patriot Act must stop their delaying tactics so that we are not without this critical law for
even a single moment.” cdxiii Clearly, however, the legislature was acting up and Bush’s window
of free reign opened by September 11 was closing abruptly.
A week later, Congress extended the deadline for the sixteen sunset provisions by five weeks.
The Provisions of the PATRIOT Act would thus expire on February 3, 2006, rather than on
December 31, 2005. The House had already passed legislation making 14 of the 16 sunsetting
provisions permanent and adding new civil liberties protections, but the Senate’s filibuster
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blocked the bill cdxiv. The bill’s deadline had to be extended again from February 3 to March 10,
2006 cdxv. On February 9, 2006, it was reported that four key Republican Senators, later joined by
two Democrats, had agreed on language for the amended PATRIOT Act with the White House.
The Democrats response was split. Senators Dick Durban of Illinois and Dianne Feinstein of
California expressed that they were pleased with the changes and that they would support the
bill cdxvi. But Senator Russell Feingold said he was “gravely disappointed in this so-called deal.”
Feingold said that the deal “did not fix what he described as major problems” with the PATRIOT
Act cdxvii. The compromise brought about three changes to the Act: first, it gave recipients of
court-ordered subpoenas for information in terrorism investigations the right to challenge their
“gag orders.” These gag orders previously prevented subpoenaed individuals from telling
anyone about the fact they were being investigated. Second, the compromise eliminated “a
requirement that an individual provide the FBI with the name of a lawyer consulted about a
National Security Letter, which is a demand for records issued by investigators.” Finally, the
compromise made it clear in the text of the PATRIOT Act that most libraries were not subject to
the demands of NSLs for information cdxviii. These changes are in addition to the “30 additional
civil liberties safeguards” that had already been put into the billcdxix.
Thus, on March 1, the Senate voted to accept the changes to the PATRIOT Act by a vote of
95 to 4. The four dissenters were Russ Feingold, independent James Jeffords of Vermont, Tom
Harkin of Iowa, and Robert Byrd of West Virginia. Feingold declared that, “No one has the right
to turn this body into a rubber stamp”cdxx. Still, after some delaying tactics by Feingold, the bill
passed the Senate 89-10 the next day cdxxi. The legislation passed the house on a 280-138
vote cdxxii.
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The PATRIOT Act cdxxiii was passed for the second time with small, but substantive changes.
As stated above, gag orders regarding terrorism subpoenas could now be challenged and NSLs
could no longer target libraries “on their traditional functions of lending books and providing
Internet access to reference materials.” In addition, “Provisions allowing roving wiretaps,
eavesdropping on ‘lone-wolf’ terrorists and FBI demands for business records” would sunset in
four years cdxxiv. Specifically, sections 206 (relating to roving wiretaps) and 215 (only the part
relating to business records orders) were the two of the sixteen sunset provisions that were not
made permanent. Though the bill also requires additional reporting to Congress when PATRIOT
Act powers are used, it also extended government power to infringe on civil liberties in some
important ways. For instance, the act “specifies that notice of ‘sneak and peek’ searches can be
delayed for 30 days” and “increases the duration of FISA surveillance orders and FISA pen
register and trap and trace orders for non-US persons from 90 days to up to one year” cdxxv. Pen
register and trap and trace orders relate to surveillance devices that capture the numbers of
outgoing and incoming telephone calls respectivelycdxxvi. Sneak and peek searches, authorized
by section 213 of the PATRIOT Act, are basically searches that law enforcement officials can
make on a property without obtaining a warrant, and without notifying the property owner.
In sum, this period saw a marked increase in opposition to the PATRIOT Act in the
legislature. Even Congressman Sensenbrenner who pushed a version of the renewed bill that
was more security-focused than the final bill, framed his comments in civil liberties terms. He
was careful to note that his version of the bill, which was produced by a conference of
representatives and senators, contained thirty new provisions that protected civil liberties.
Further, the Act was renewed only after having the deadline extended twice and four moderate
Republicans in the Senate would not vote for the bill until an agreement was brokered with the
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White House that ostensibly provided for more liberties. Still, though the legislature fought the
PATRIOT Act this time around, the bill still passed with most of its powers intact. NSLs were
limited somewhat and two provisions were given four more years before expiration, but still
fourteen of the sixteen provisions set to sunset were made permanent with only some leeway
given to liberties around the edges. Here legislative opposition was notable in its presence, but
only made a slight difference in affecting the abridgment of civil liberties.

Opinion Environment
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This period saw the President’s job approval ratings reach record-lows. According to the
Harris Poll, President Bush had a 34% job approval rating in November 2005, which then went
up to 40% and 43% in January and February before dropping to 36% again in March 2006.
According to the CNN/Gallup/USA Today poll cdxxvii, Americans were moderately fearful of
terrorism during this period. Fear levels were high (47%) in July 2005 following the July 7
bombings in London, but these levels went down to 41% in December 2005 and back up to 43%
in January 2006. August 2005 and January 2006 presented new lows (52% and 53%
respectively) in the amount of Americans who believed that terrorist attacks were likely on the
US according to CBS/New York Times polling. These poll numbers may have to do with
Bush’s comments on Americans “forgetting” about terrorism, which are covered below.
According to the Pew polls, the number of Americans willing to sacrifice liberties for securities
also dropped to new lows in the 2005-06 period. In general, Americans during this period did
not think that attacks were likely, were not willing to forego liberties and did not approve of
George W. Bush’s performance as president, but still were worried about themselves or family
members becoming terror victims.

Executive Statements and Conclusion
During this period President Bush continued to make statements stressing that the country
was at war (call to arms/threat), emphasizing over and over the threat to Americans (threat/threat
magnitude), and highlighting that the PATRIOT Act was a necessary tool in fighting terrorists
(liberty-security tradeoff). On October 6, 2005, in a speech the White House dubbed “a major
policy address,” President Bush spoke about the war on terror. The timing of the speech placed
it about three months before the PATRIOT Act was set to expire. Bush framed the conflict as
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one of good versus evil and emphasized that the threat to the US could not be greater. He said
that America faced “a radical ideology with an unalterable objective, to enslave whole nations
and intimidate the whole world.” Bush also highlighted government successes. He said that the
US and its allies had foiled 10 al-Qaeda terrorism plots since 9/11 cdxxviii.
On November 30, 2005, Bush made a speech on the war on terror at the US Naval
Academy. Notably, according to a CBS News poll, the President’s job approval rating had hit a
low of 35% in November cdxxix. In the speech he stated that the international terrorists led by Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq desired to create a power vacuum in Iraq so that they could form a
base, “from which to launch attacks against America and overthrow moderate governments in
the Middle East and try to establish a totalitarian Islamic empire that reaches from Indonesia to
Spain.” He connected the Iraqi terrorists to those that attacked the United States by saying that
both shared “the same ideology.” Here the President provided a specific threat: Islamist
terrorists and stated that the magnitude of the threat was great. He next framed the conflict as a
broad, global battle. Bush likened the terrorists’ ideology to communism and fascism, and said
that freedom would defeat terror like it once did those ideologies. Finally, he underlined that the
country faced an enemy that “cannot be appeased.”cdxxx During this speech, Bush outlined his
plans for the Iraq war and tried to rally the troops to its favor in light of recent polls that showed
the public was souring on the war effort (call to arms) cdxxxi.
In January, with his approval ratings down (most polls had his ratings in the low-to-mid
40s) cdxxxii and the PATRIOT Act still in limbo, the president discussed the war on terror at
Kansas State University. In the speech he described himself as “a decision-maker” and
emphasized that he did not ask for the September 11 attacks, but still had to react to them. Bush
tellingly said, “I knew right about September the 11th, though, that the attacks would begin to
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fade in people’s memories.” He then “assured” the audience that even though “it’s human nature
to forget,” “The threat to the United States is forefront in my mind.” This statement conjured the
government protection theme. Bush then averred that his ability to protect the public “rests upon
this fact: that there is an enemy which is relentless and desirous to bring harm to the American
people.” Describing the enemy he said, “they have no heart, no conscience.” Bush emphasized
that his job was “to educate the American people about the threats we face” and that the four
years since September 11th were just a “lull in the action,” a statement that clearly spoke to a new
normal existing in the country. Once again, he recanted on the messages that geography no
longer could protect the US, that the terrorists could not be appeased, and that terrorists wielding
WMDs was the country’s greatest threat: a nightmare scenario. After saying that it was
acceptable to disagree with him, Bush stated explicitly that he does not listen to polls or focus
groups. On the PATRIOT Act he pushed the need to make civil liberty-security tradeoffs, “the
Patriot Act may be set to expire, but the threats to the United States haven’t expired.” He then
repeatedly said that the threat to the US from terrorists still exists. Bush defended his
wiretapping program by once again harping on the threat that America faced cdxxxiii.
Finally, when the PATRIOT Act was renewed on March 9, 2006, Bush stated that the bill
would, “improve our nation's security while we safeguard the civil liberties of our people.”
Again, Bush maintained that, “America remains a nation at war.” The President said that the
PATRIOT Act, “was passed with overwhelming bipartisan support.” He said that the bill had
done what it was meant to do by helping law enforcement officials pursue terrorists “with the
same tools they use against other criminals” cdxxxiv.
During this period, the President was clearly on the defensive. His polling numbers were
low due to the Iraq war losing support and the mismanaged response to Hurricane Katrina.
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Further, Congress was opposing the president on the PATRIOT Act, even though Republicans
still held majorities in both chambers. In his speech at Kansas State, Bush hammered on the
message that the country was at threat and that the threat magnitude was great. He noted that
people might “forget” about terrorism, but that it still remained a grave threat to the US. He
declared that the government would continue to protect the people from terrorism and also made
a call to arms. In other words, four-plus years after 9/11, with no aftershock attacks on the US
and little new, significant terrorism detentions or convictions, the President was attempting to
drum up terrorism fears. By this point, the war in Iraq had taken center stage away from the war
on terror. Yet, still the President explained that America was at war with amorphous enemies
that wanted badly to kill Americans because of who they were. In fact, his threat specificity
statements made it clear that the country was at war with an ideology, not an organization. This
nebulous “terrorist” ideology could be placed on any Muslim group and basically served as a
proxy for any group that hated the US and was not a state. In sum, Bush during this period
continued to underline that the public should be fearful of terrorists and continued to cite 9/11 as
round one in an ongoing war between the US and terror. He also continued to emphasize that a
new normal existed in the country, one wherein the nightmare scenario of terrorists wielding
WMDs could take place. In pushing the renewal of the Patriot Act, the President underlined
government successes in combating terrorism that were ostensibly aided by the Act. There were
no significant statements of tolerance made in this period.
Whereas the President continued to assert that security needed to be traded for liberties,
in July 2005, the Pew poll showed that only 40% of Americans were willing to trade liberty for
security, a figure well below polling numbers earlier obtained on this topic. In all, these numbers
bolstered the legislature’s ability to oppose the President since Congress could act knowing that
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the public was behind them. It is important to note that here instead of directly constraining the
President’s ability to shape threats, the lull in mass fears indirectly constrained the President by
bolstering Congress’ ability, or at least willingness, to oppose him. As stated above, though the
Republican-led Congress fought the President on the renewal of the Patriot Act and low mass
fear levels constrained his action, the PATRIOT Act was renewed with few changes.
Before concluding this chapter with general findings, we will now look at the
enforcement variable. This next section will look at deportations, detentions, convictions, and
referrals after 9/11.

Anti-Civil Liberty Law Enforcement
David Cole notes that a National Public Radio poll taken a year after the 9/11 attacks,
“found that only 7 percent of Americans felt that they had personally had sacrificed any
important rights or liberties in the war on terrorism.” Cole asserts that this is because, “For the
most part, the government’s measures have been targeted not at Americans, but at foreign
nationals both here and abroad” cdxxxv. Still, American citizens Jose Padilla and Yaser Esam
Hamdi were each held for three years without being charged. Padilla was recently indicted on
three counts and Hamdi was released to Saudi Arabia after the Supreme Court ruled that he could
challenge his detention cdxxxvi. The New York Times recently reported that the upshot of the
Administration’s approach to the Padilla and other terror-related cases “is that no one outside the
administration knows just how the determination is made whether to handle a terror suspect as an
enemy combatant or a as a common criminal, to hold him indefinitely without charges in a
military court or to charge him in court”cdxxxvii.
Terrorism Prosecutions and Convictions.
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According to a report commissioned by the Social Science Research Council that
compiled information on post-9/11 terror prosecutions, “federal investigators have referred 6400
individuals for prosecution because they have either committed terrorist acts or should be
charged for anti terror purposes. Of these, approximately 1554 referrals were declined for
prosecution, and prosecution was filed against 2001 individuals, of which 879 were convicted.”
Of those convicted, according to the data retrieved from Syracuse University’s Transitional
Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), “506 received no prison sentence and only five persons
received 20 years or more in prison” cdxxxviii.
The Bush Administration, via the US Department of Justice’s web site lifeandliberty.gov,
claims that since September 11, 2001, 401 people have been prosecuted in terrorism related
crimes with 212 convictedcdxxxix. Indeed, a list maintained by the Department of Justice’s
Criminal Division current as of April 28, 2004 records 310 people charged in terror or anti-terror
cases since September 11, 2001. Of these 310 individuals, 179 have been convicted of crimes
relating to terrorism. These crimes include, “material support, hostage taking, violation of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, … money laundering, terrorism transcending
national borders, and false statements.” Of the group of 179, only sixteen convicted offenders
received jail sentences of 10 years or greater cdxl. This finding points to the fact that the
government has largely been convicting people whose connections to terrorist activities are
minor, and who do not greatly threaten national security. It is important here to note the loose
categorization of “terrorism or anti-terrorism cases” employed by the DOJ’s Criminal Division.
It is hard to glean from these designations exactly what sort of cases are being measured, or if the
brunt of these cases have to do with terrorism at all. Further, the DOJ clearly has an interest in
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promoting its ability to prosecute and convict terrorists. Thus, these cases could have been
chosen to highlight the 57.7% conviction rate obtained.
The TRAC data confirms these suspicions. In a report focusing on criminal terrorism
enforcement from September 11, 2001 to September 30, 2003, TRAC shows that the vast
majority of persons the government has processed or convicted of terrorism offenses pose very
little if any threat to the United States. As stated above, TRAC records 6,400 people were
recommended for prosecution by federal investigators “on the grounds that charging them with
some crime might ‘prevent or disrupt actual terrorist threats.’” Based on these government
recommendations, TRAC finds that 2,681 individuals were subjected to investigative referrals.
However, as established above, by analyzing Justice Department data on a case-by-case basis,
TRAC discovered that only five of those convicted of crimes involving terrorism received prison
terms of twenty years or more. Only one person, the attempted shoe bomber Richard Reid,
received a life sentence cdxli. Further, the median prison term for those convicted of international
terrorism was fourteen days cdxlii.
TRAC notes that the high number of referrals made in the two years after 9/11 had to do
with a change in the Justice Department’s definition of terrorism cases. Specifically, the Justice
Department expanded the crime categories it places under the heading “terrorism,” including a
new grouping of crimes it dubs “anti-terrorism.” “Anti-terrorism,” according to the Justice
Department’s data manual, “covers immigration, identity theft, drug and other such cases
brought by prosecutors that were ‘intended to prevent or disrupt potential or actual terrorist
threats where the offense conduct is not obviously a federal crime of terrorism’” cdxliii. Of the
6,400 “terrorism” and “anti-terrorism” cases referred to prosecutors, 3,500 involved acts of
international terrorism, domestic terrorism, or financial terrorismcdxliv. The misuse of the
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“terrorism” label is troubling and points to the government’s desire to show it is doing something
quantitatively even though when the individual cases are peeled back they don’t relate to the
kind of terrorism Americans think the government is fighting. For instance, an April 2002 case
involving the Ku Klux Klan was categorized by the government as domestic terrorism. Further,
the case of an Arab-American sending money to Yemen via an unlicensed money-transfer
business was dubbed financial terrorism cdxlv.
Thus, in a comparison of data from the two years prior to 9/11 to that from the two years
after 9/11, TRAC finds a six-fold increase in terrorism cases either prosecuted or declined in the
later period: “594 such actions before to 3,555 after.” TRAC also finds “an eight-fold jump in
convictions, 110 to 879.” When the new anti-terrorism grouping is separated from terrorism the
jump is less severe, though still substantial. Without the anti-terrorism cases, cases prosecuted or
declined went from 544 to 1,778 and convictions grew from 96 before 9/11 to 341 after cdxlvi.
Importantly, TRAC finds that, “despite the three-and-a-half fold increase in terrorism
convictions, the number who were sentenced to five years or more in prison has not grown at all
from pre-9/11 levels. In fact, the number actually declined, dropping from 24 individuals whose
cases began before the attacks to 16 after.” The individuals causing the jump in convictions
were the hundreds of people convicted for less than a year in prison or no time at all. Even when
TRAC focused on international terrorism, it found the same pattern: “Out of the 184 convictions
under international terrorism, 171 have received either no prison time (80) or sentences of less
than a year (91)” cdxlvii. In fact, the median sentence for “international terrorists” in the two years
after 9/11 was 14 days cdxlviii. TRAC does caution that in the end of 2003 when this document
was published, 600 cases were pending at the referral stage and 82 at the court stage. Further, it
notes that since more serious cases typically take more time, the number of long-term prison
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convictions of those deemed terrorists could show a marked increase cdxlix. Indeed, both Zacarias
Moussaoui (life term) and Jose Padilla (17 years) would be convicted to long prison terms after
this data was published. Further, formal charges were brought against six Guantanamo Bay
detainees accused of central roles in the 9/11 attacks in 2008 cdl.
Over the period studied here, the number of terrorism referrals month-to-month surged in
the period after 9/11. TRAC data from June 2002 shows a dramatic jump in both domestic and
international terrorism case referrals after 9/11. Domestic terrorism case referrals jumped from
14 in August 2001 to 50 in September and 90 in October 2001. Domestic terrorism referrals then
fell until early 2002 when they jumped from 46 in February 2002 to 118 in March 2002 cdli.
International terrorism case referrals followed a similar pattern, going from 15 in August 2001 to
85 after 9/11, then tapering down to 57 in December 2001 and then jumping back up to 83 in
January 2002 cdlii. The TRAC data is summarized in Figure 4.3 below.

<Insert Figure 4.3 here>
<Insert Figure 4.4 here>
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TRAC data that runs through August 2006, confirms that the trends in terrorism
prosecutions and convictions that followed September 11th continues through 2006. The number
of prosecutions continues to dwindle as the number of cases declined shoots up substantially. As
we see in the chart below, the number of cases declined goes up to 82% in fiscal year 2005 and,
as of August, stood at a staggering 90% for fiscal year 2006. Figure 4.4 plainly shows that
terrorism prosecutions have returned basically to pre-9/11 levels cdliii.
The median sentences for those convicted of international terrorism crimes actually went
down even further in the period between October 1, 2003 and May 31, 2006. Whereas the
median sentence for international terrorism stood at 28 days for the period between September
11, 2001 and September 30, 2003, the median sentence in the most recent period researched by
TRAC stands at just 20 days. When compared to the 41 months served by the median
international terrorist convicted in the period between October 1, 1999 and September 10, 2001,
this dramatic drop in sentences reaffirms the conclusion that the Bush Administration’s
international terrorism prosecutions have largely led to small-value convictionscdliv.
The new data reveals 6,472 cases referred for terrorism prosecutions in the period from
9/11/01 to May 30, 2006. Convictions were obtained in 1,329 of these cases, but still only one
percent of these convictions (14 cases) resulted in convictions of twenty years or longer. On the
flip side, 704 of the convictions were for no prison time and an additional 327 for prison time of
one day or less. The small sentences for those convicted of terrorism is due to the fact that many
had little to do with the type of terrorism most Americans envision cdlv. The most common lead
charge for convicted international terrorists by far was that of fraud or false statements (121
convictions), with other cases of identity and visa fraud totaling in 22 convictions and material
support for terrorists next in line with 8cdlvi.
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The TRAC data clearly show that the government’s pursuit of terrorists has yielded few
significant convictions. As David Cole writes, though “the administration boasts that it has
obtained more than four hundred criminal indictments and over two hundred convictions in
‘terrorism-related cases,’” it does not mention that most of these cases are for minor offenses.
Further, a June 2005 Washington Post study, which looked at all the cases that the government
categorized as related to terrorism, “found that only thirty-nine involved any convictions on
charges related to terrorism”cdlvii.

Terrorism Detentions and Deportations.
While the SSRC report focuses on terrorism prosecutions and convictions, James
Dempsey and David Cole look more closely at terrorism detentions and deportations. Cole and
Dempsey count over 5,000 foreign nationals detained by the federal government after September
11. Four years later, not one of these detainees stood “convicted of a terrorist crime” cdlviii. Cole
arrives at this figure using the following logic. First, he notes that, the Justice Department’s
central response to the 9/11 attacks was a new program of “mass preventive detention” cdlix. At
first, the Justice Department and John Ashcroft provided totals of how many individuals had
been detained. However, “The last publicly acknowledged total, on November 5, 2001, was
1,182. The Justice Department has refused to give a number of detainees ever since” cdlx.
Cole goes on to employ the following logic to arrive at his 5,000 detainees figure:
“As noted, the government admits that there were 1,182 detentions in the first seven
weeks of the campaign. As of May 2003, it had also detained some 1,100 more foreign
nationals under the Absconder Apprehension Initiative, which expressly targets for
prioritized deportations the 6,000 Arabs and Muslims among the more than 300,000
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foreign nationals living here with outstanding deportation orders. As of May 2003,
another 2,747 noncitizens had been detained in connection with a Special Registration
program also directed at Arab and Muslim noncitizens. A conservative estimate would
therefore place the number of domestic detentions in the war on terrorism as of May 2003
at over 5,000” cdlxi.
The focus on deportations is important. For whereas the Department of Homeland Security was
established as an agency to counter terrorist threats, the vast majority of its criminal case
workload applies to immigration. This is because “most DHS investigators work for agencies
like the INS and Customs that were transferred to the department on March 1 [of 2003]” cdlxii.
The Bush Administration, via the US Department of Justice’s web site lifeandliberty.gov, claims
that since September 11, 2001, 515 foreign nationals with ties to the 9/11 investigation have been
deportedcdlxiii.
David Cole has written extensively on the fact that non-citizen Arabs and Muslims, not
the general public, have suffered from dramatically reduced liberties after 9/11. Fear of the other
pushes citizens to view post-crisis situations as “us versus them” scenarios. As Cole writes,
“crises often inspire the demonization of ‘aliens’ as the nation seeks unity by emphasizing
differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’”cdlxiv. Cole in a 2006 piece for the New York Review of
Books wrote that since September 11, 2001, “the [Bush] administration subjected 80,000 Arab
and Muslim immigrants to fingerprinting and registration, sought out 8,000 Arab and Muslim
men for FBI interviews, and imprisoned over 5,000 foreign nationals in antiterrorism preventive
detention initiatives” cdlxv. According to Cole of these 93,000 individuals interviewed, made to
register with the government, or detained “not one stands convicted of a terrorist crime”cdlxvi.
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Cole found that, “As of May 2003, only three of the 1,200 ‘suspected terrorists’ arrested
in the first seven weeks [after 9/11], and none of the nearly 4,000 more foreign nationals arrested
since under related antiterrorism initiatives, turned out to warrant even a charge of terroristrelated criminal activity” cdlxvii. Further, the American public supported this ethnic profiling: 60
percent of Americans polled soon after 9/11 supported ethnic profiling as long as it targeted
Arabs and Muslims cdlxviii. Even with all of this ethnic profiling the only terrorist incident in the
US since 9/11 involved shoe bomber Richard Reid who was foiled not by intelligence gathering
but because of an alert flight staff cdlxix. However, government actions against non-citizens soon
started infringing on citizen rights with the detentions of Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padillacdlxx.
The government has used the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) as a means
of detaining alleged terroristscdlxxi. Cole finds that, “by employing immigration procedures, the
Justice Department [after 9/11] was able to avoid those constitutional rights and procedures that
accompany the criminal process but that do not apply in the immigration setting” cdlxxii. For
example, on September 20, 2001, Attorney-General John Ashcroft changed the rule regarding
immigration arrests. The old rule forced the INS to file charges against a detainee within 24
hours of his arrest, Ashcroft changed the rule to state that in times of emergency the government
could hold immigration detainees without charging them for a “reasonable” amount of timecdlxxiii.
In January 2002, the Justice Department prioritized the deportation of 6,000 Arab and Muslim
noncitizenscdlxxiv. Further, the definition of “terrorist activity,” a definition used to prosecute
immigration offenses, was far more expansive than “domestic terrorism” according to the
PATRIOT Act. Whereas domestic terrorism was defined as, “acts dangerous to human life tha
are a violation of the criminal laws” that appear to have the intent of influencing government
policy or of intimidation or coercion. “Terrorist activity,” for immigration law purposes,
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encompassed support for “virtually any group that has used violence, and any use or threat to use
a weapon against person or property” that is not for personal, monetary gain cdlxxv.
Further detentions were achieved using the previously rarely used material witness
authority of the government. The material witness law “permits the government to lock up a
person if it can be shown that he or she has information material to a trial or grand jury
proceeding but would flee before testifying” cdlxxvi. The Aschcroft Justice Department used its
material witness powers “as an end run around the Fourth Amendment rule barring arrest and
detention without probable cause for criminal activity” cdlxxvii.
As of March 2003, the US government had designated 650 foreign nationals held at
Guantanamo Bay as enemy combatantscdlxxviii. American citizens, not just foreign nationals,
namely Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla, have been declared enemy combatants by the government
and “placed in indefinite incommunicado military custody.” The Supreme Court in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld declared that the government had to afford Hamdi due process and the opportunity to
appear before a neutral decision-maker cdlxxix. After the Court’s ruling that Hamdi had a right to a
hearing, “the administration simply let him go, on the condition that he return to Saudi Arabia
and renounce his citizenship.” Padilla was transferred from military to civilian custody when his
lawyers challenged his detention in the Supreme Courtcdlxxx. This action by the Bush
Administration led the Supreme Court to reject Padilla’s detention appeal, since they believed his
case was moot. Yet, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said that it was about time the
Administration’s “enemy combatant” powers were ruled on by the Court, saying that the issues
in the Padilla case were “of profound importance to our nation”cdlxxxi.
Despite the President’s pro-Islam statements, in November 2001, the State Department
installed a twenty-day waiting period for visas for men from 26 mostly Arab and Muslim
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countriescdlxxxii. On the one year anniversary of 9/11, the Justice Department began a program
requiring foreign nationals from select mostly Arab and Muslim countries to “register and submit
to fingerprinting and photographs at entry, thirty days after entry, at one-year intervals thereafter,
and at exit” from the United States. Soonafter, the Justice Department made it a requirement of
all foreign nationals (excluding legal permanent residents) from a list of 25 mostly Arab and
Muslim countries who were already residing in the US to register with the government cdlxxxiii.
Yet, still, in 2005, “more people from Muslim countries became legal permanent United States
residents—nearly 96,000 than in any year in the previous two decades.” Further, 40,000
Muslims were admitted into the US in 2005, more than in any year since the terror attackscdlxxxiv.

Conclusions on Executive, Legislature and Opinion Roles in 9/11 Period
As Professor Oren Gross, and more recently James Fallows, have argued, the power of
terrorists resides not in the damage that they can inflict, but in what they can make us do to
ourselves cdlxxxv. In other words, it is the civil liberty-abridging reactions and the wars that
terrorism has spawned that have caused greater damage to the United States than the attack in
2001. I would like to conclude this chapter with six major findings that were deciphered from
reviewing the empirical data above. First, however, let us recall the outcomes of the two
hypotheses above. Hypothesis one, which stated that when party competition is high the
incumbent will employ fear as a strategy, was supported by the treatment of the 2004 election
period. Hypothesis two, which held that executive-legislative antagonism will be more likely
when the government is closely divided along partisan lines, was proven false. The American
legislature was evenly divided after 9/11 but was cowed, while a few months later the legislature
grew a backbone though its partisan composition favored President Bush.
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Now to the major findings of this chapter. First, the chief executive can affect mass fear
levels, so he does have agency. This is an important finding because one may argue that public
opinion and societal fears are driving the post-terror legislative dynamic. The President’s effect
on the public and his use of statements to clearly ratchet up fear levels proves that the causal
arrow goes from executive-to-public opinion and not vice-versa. The President was able to
move public opinion on terrorism through raising terror alerts and making fear-inducing
statements. The clear connection between the raising of the terror alert level and rises in mass
fear levels proves this point. That said, the second major finding is that public opinion and mass
fear levels do constrain executive action. When mass fear levels and approval ratings for
President Bush were high, the President had carte blanche to set whatever agenda he desired.
When mass fear levels receded and Bush’s approval rating dwindled, the executive’s sphere of
agency shrank. Third, relatedly, the closer the public is temporally to the terror attack, the higher
will be mass fear levels. This finding certainly needs to be honed by looking at cases of terrorist
campaigns as well as other one-off terror attack cases, but it appeared from this case at least that
mass fear levels rose with temporal proximity to the attack.
Fourth, party competition proved to be a critical variable in determining threat-shaping
strategies. The terror threat was repeatedly hammered on and the threat magnitude was
expanded as the 2004 election neared. Fifth, legislative opposition to the chief executive rose as
mass fear levels receded. Congress’ rubber stamp approval of Bush’s war on terror began to
fade slightly in the 2004 election period and frayed significantly in the renewal of the Patriot Act
period. That said, the legislature made little changes to the PATRIOT Act legislation. Finally,
aliens and small-timers were targeted with new terror laws. Indicative of this, David Cole writes
that, “As of May 29, 2002, the government stated that it had subjected 611 noncitizens … to
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secret hearings” cdlxxxvi. Foreigners have typically borne the brunt of counterterror legislation in
America as the liberty of the minority has been time and again traded for the security of the
majority.
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Chapter Five
“We’re Fighting this New Kind of Enemy”: Presidential versus Parliamentary
Democracies in the War on Terror

TIME MAGAZINE: What issue has provided the biggest challenge for you in terms of balancing
competing tensions?
Alberto Gonzales: Most of the hard decisions relate to the war on terror. We’re fighting this
new kind of enemy before an American population that has not seen the US really engaged in
this kind of fight for a generation. They don’t remember that, say, in World War II we captured
a lot of people. We didn’t provide them lawyers. We didn’t read them their rights. We simply
held them because under the laws of war, we’re entitled to do thatcdlxxxvii.
In this chapter, it will be demonstrated that democracies, regardless of their institutional
set-up, act very similarly in compromising civil liberties while under terrorist threat. This thesis
goes against the prevailing wisdom of the political science field. Fear is the driver behind the
like reactions from unlike democratic regimes. When societal fear is heightened, democratic
institutions under all regimes do not work as they should and civil liberties are curtailed.
Liberal democracies are special due to their commitment to government by the people
and to a set of negative rights that allow citizens to live their lives free of heavy-handed
government interference cdlxxxviii. As Michael Ignatieff writes, “Thanks to the rights they
entrench, the due process rules they observe, the separation of powers they seek to enforce, and
the requirement of democratic consent, liberal democracies are all guided by a constitutional
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commitment to minimize the use of dubious means—violence, force, coercion, and deception—
in the government of citizens” cdlxxxix. After September 11, 2001, the anger, hatred and fear that
many Americans’ felt toward the terrorist perpetrators superseded their concern for civil
libertiescdxc. Today, over four years later, scholars and experts, not to mention regular citizens,
are worried that America has overreacted to the terrorist threat. Geoffrey Stone writes that the
tendency to overreact to threats by strongly compromising civil liberties is a consistent theme in
American history cdxci.

Lori Hocking and Laura K. Donohue writing on the British and

Australian cases respectively come to similar conclusionscdxcii. Further, in a 1994 study of six
democracies’ responses to international terrorism, David Charters believes that though none gave
in to terrorism, “the democracies did not survive unscathed”cdxciii.
As Ignatieff highlights, if these countries were tyrannies rather than liberal democracies,
the question of civil liberties would be a moot one cdxciv. The fact that liberal democracies
espouse rights that their citizens and governments value presents a particular dilemma in times of
crisis: balancing national security against civil liberties. This point is not just an “academic” one
since a strong body of theory provides the backbone for why liberal democracies are structured
the way they are. Works such as The Federalist Chapters, the US Constitution, John Locke’s
Second Treatise on Government, and Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws detail the careful
logic behind the institutions of government in liberal democracies. In all of these writings, it is
emphasized that democratic government should be constructed with the people’s rights as its
main focus.
This major research chapter tests the ability of democratic institutions to maintain civil
rights in the face of terrorist threat. EE Schattschneider “observed that political institutions are
not neutral, but in fact bias government actions in favor of particular interests, ideas, and policy
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alternatives” cdxcv. To this end, this chapter asks the question: When societal fear is dramatically
enhanced, do presidential and parliamentary systems react differently or similarly with regard to
protecting civil liberties? This chapter looks specifically at terrorist threats that spur societal
fear. A vast political science literature, which I will detail below, discusses the various
advantages and disadvantages of presidentialist versus parliamentary governments. Crisis
periods serve as great tests of all governments, but they are especially so for liberal democratic
ones because these governments are constructed with the specific aim of maintaining the rights
of the people. Indeed, the checks and balances structured into liberal democratic government
institutions are meant to limit the ability of government to overstep its bounds in compromising
liberties.
However, as Carl Schmitt, suggests “liberal constitutionalism leaves itself especially
susceptible to emergencies.” This is because “Its blind faith in the technical apparatus of its
standing constitutions … encourages liberalism to believe that it needs no technique for the
extraordinary occurrence because the regular constitutional techniques are assumed to be
appropriate”cdxcvi. As Schmitt famously wrote, “Sovereign is he who decides the
exception”cdxcvii. Still, Supreme Court Justice John Marshall would disagree with Schmitt, he
believed that the Constitution must be viewed as “adapt[able] to the various crises of human
affairs”cdxcviii.
Terrorism poses a particularly difficult menace for liberal democracies to contend with.
As Diego Gambetta argues terrorism is especially pernicious to democracies’ commitment to
liberal rights because the terrorist threat is so vulnerable to political manipulation cdxcix. This is
because, “Terrorists rarely make their capabilities and intentions known [and] [t]heir motivations
and intentions also change over time in ways that are hard for analysts to predict” d. Further, a
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major goal of terrorism, implied in the word itself, is to raise societal fear. This fear, then, feeds
into government power. Indeed, “the majority of recent investigations have found a positive
fear-persuasion relationship”di.
The conclusions of this study provide for many interesting findings about the field. If
presidential and parliamentary governments react differently to crises in their protection of
liberty, then the literature on the differences between the two sorts of governments is bolstered.
However, if the two sorts of governments react the same to crises, then the perceived differences
between them may not be as great as previously hypothesized. Indeed, if terrorism fears yield
similar reactions from both types of democracy, then these threats may have greater weight—at
least while they remain threats—than the great edifice of democratic institutions. Further, this
study serves as a test of the school of new institutionalism, which, according to Bernard
Grofman, holds that, “preferences can be understood only in the context of the institutionally
generated incentives and institutionally available options that structure choice”dii.
A bimodal independent variable is employed in this study: either a country is
parliamentary or presidential diii. The independent variable of institutions is meant to protect
liberties. Civil liberties are the dependent variable. Civil liberties, however, is a vast term that
could contain many different concepts. For methodological specificity, the dependent variable of
civil liberties is divided into two major concepts: division and pluralism. These variables come
from a debate between Isaiah Berlin and Judith Shklar about the most important method for
government to maintain liberties. Shklar’s liberalism of fear promotes division, while Berlin’s
negative liberty touts pluralism. Below, this debate is more deeply delved into, but for now it is
important to establish how these concepts will be operationalized. The passage of emergency
powers, especially if their annulment is indefinitely pushed off, will be taken as a sign of
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government’s eroding the division meant to provide checks and balances in liberal democracies.
Paul Wilkinson writes that, “Too many cases come to mind of ambitious politicians around the
world who have exploited [emergency] measures for their own ends, or who would dearly like to
do so. Mainly because of these abuses and the real dangers of permanent dictatorship emerging,
liberals are right to insist that special powers should only be used if there is a fundamental threat
to the political or economic system” div. It is not simply the existence of emergency powers that
will be important, but an analysis of what these powers entail and how they were used. Further,
government centralization in decision-making will also be key to finding that division has been
eroded. Government centralization may not sound like a specific erosion of a liberty, but
democratic institutions are meant to protect against such centralization because fragmented
government is thought to better protect libertiesdv. In the least, the separation of powers restrains
the different branches of government from taking too much power. Further, as Michael Freeman
underlines, “The separation of powers improves the capability of one branch of government to
check other branches if emergency powers are abused”dvi. Moreover, government centralization
is a breach of the right of the people to govern.
Pluralism implies free speech and thriving opposition views. If governments try to tamp
down speech, then I will take this as a sign that they are eroding pluralism. After all, “Vivid,
passionate, occasionally hyperbolic speech about moral and political matters is vital to public
debate in a political democracy” dvii. A government that foments political fear creates an
environment where free speech can be compromised. This is why the manipulation of fear by
government elites will be important to establishing the erosion of pluralism. Minority rights are
also central to maintaining a pluralistic society. The compromising of minority rights through
specific legislation or through the discriminate use of legislation against minorities will be

164

viewed as a clear sign of the erosion of pluralism. In sum, division and pluralism are variables
that are meant to measure the level of government centralization on the one hand and the level of
free speech and minority rights on the other.
Clearly, it is difficult to quantify such occurrences, which is why the case study method
has been chosen. Indeed, in an e-mail correspondence Professor Laura Donohue wrote me that,
“I do not have a central database that summarizes all of the research [on the subject of civil
liberties in times of crisis/emergency/terrorism], primarily because there are so many nuances
that matter in comparing the different regions” dviii. The case-study method allows this study to
look at the maintenance of division and pluralism within a given government. Within each case,
the passage or employment of legislation curtails civil liberties will be catalogued. With regard
to speech, only the actions of the government (since the government type acts as my independent
variable) in compromising speech will be examined. Each case will be looked at with an eye
toward whether the government type—presidential or parliamentary—has anything to do with
how or why decisions were made.
To summarize, in each of the three cases explored in this chapter, the focus will be on
whether rights arising from government division or pluralism were compromised by the response
to the terrorist threat and the fear that arose from it. The threat of terrorism, and the concomitant
fear that pervades a society, works as the intervening variable. The rights that are important here
are those that liberal democratic domestic institutions are meant to protect. Therefore, though
the rights of non-citizens and residents may be touched on, they are not the main focus of this
chapter since in most cases their rights are limited in comparison to those of citizens. Below the
dynamic explored in this chapter is mapped:
<Insert Figure 5.1 here>
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Before entering into a discussion of the literature, of hypotheses, and of definitions, I
would like to discuss the three cases explored here and what has guided me to select them. All
three cases are liberal democracies, differing on the independent variable, which is government
type. One is a parliamentary government, one is presidential and one, Israel, switches between
parliamentarism and a presidential-parliamentary mix over the period studied dix. In all three,
though the nature of the terrorist threat differs, societal fear was dramatically enhanced during or
after a series of terrorist events. The dramatic increase of fear put stress on government
commitments to maintain civil liberties while some people and government officials clamored
for some liberties to be thrown out in favor of national security. The first case, then, is that of
the United States after September 11, 2001. This case provided the original motivation for my
study as I saw the way that the government and the polity in America moved to limit some
liberties after the tragedy. I want to stress here that the US has seen a series of terrorist attacks
perpetrated by jihadists with the September 11, 2001 being the most prevalent, if not the
culminationdx. The second case is that of the United Kingdom’s encounter with Northern Irish
terrorism from 1969- 2000. The third and final case is that of Israel during the period of the
second intifada, which is also referred to as the Al-Aqsa intifada.
These countries were chosen for their similarities as well as their differences. All three of
these countries exhibit high-income levels, common law governance, robust immigration levels,
strong democratic traditions, and multiethnic societies. What differs between them, among other
things, is their geographic size, their population levels, the nature and duration of the threat they
face, and their government type. It is important to note here that these countries deviate from the
many Latin American cases, which have been used to show the weakness of presidential
democracies. The reason for not choosing Latin American cases is that many of these countries
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never were truly able to establish democratic traditions before their democracies fell. For this
reason, Israel, the UK, and America are good cases for showing what happens to entrenched
democratic institutions when crisis arises.
This chapter will be organized in the following fashion. First, we will turn to a
discussion of the literature comparing presidentialist and parliamentary governments. After
defining terms, the theory behind the dependent variable will be touched on. Finally, case
studies of the US, UK and Israel will be described.
Presidentialist vs. Parliamentary Government
I. Definitions:
Before going into the literature on presidential and parliamentary government, it is necessary
to forward a definition of each regime type. Arend Lijphart lays out the three major distinctions
between these types of government. First, in parliamentary governments, “the head of
government … and his or her cabinet are dependent on the confidence of the legislature and can
be dismissed from office by a legislative vote of no confidence or censure.” By contrast, in
presidential governments, “the head of government—almost always called the president—is
elected for a fixed, constitutionally prescribed term and in normal circumstances cannot be
forced to resign by the legislature.” Second, presidents are both popularly elected and elected
directly or by an electoral college. Prime ministers, on the other hand, are “selected by the
legislature.” Finally, “parliamentary systems have collective or collegial executives whereas
presidential systems have one-person, non-collegial executives” dxi. To this end, as George
Tsebelis writes, “In parliamentary systems the executive (government) controls the agenda, and
the legislature (parliament) accepts or rejects proposals, while in presidential systems the
legislature makes the proposal and the executive (the president) signs or vetoes them” dxii.

167

According to these definitions, the United Kingdom and the US fall respectively in the
parliamentary and presidential camps. But, Israel provides an interesting case. Beginning with
the election of the 14th Knesset (Israeli Parliament) in 1996, Israel became “the first country to
directly and popularly elect its prime minister, concurrent with [parliamentary] elections”. As
Reuven Hazan notes, the direct election of the Israeli prime minister placed Israel outside the
category of pure parliamentary democracies. However, this law was rescinded and Israel
returned to a strict PR system in the 2003 Knesset elections. Under the system that reigned from
1996-2003, the prime ministerial election created “a second pole of popular legitimacy,” which
formed a buffer between the executive and the legislature reminiscent of presidentialism dxiii.
Israel, thus, stood in the category of what Shugart and Carey call a president-parliamentary
regime. However, as will be seen below, the hybrid system was actually changed back to a pure
parliamentary system due to the fragmentation of government that it engendered coupled with
the Al-Aqsa intifada. Israel, thus, provides an especially interesting case for testing the power of
institutions in maintaining civil liberties since it changed institutional structures over the period
that is being studied.
II. Hypotheses:
The general consensus in the literature on presidentialist versus parliamentary government is
that presidentialism is the lesser form of government dxiv. Important to a study on the effects of
crisis on institutions is the hypothesis that presidential systems are fragile and can lead to
authoritarian regimes. As Shugart and Carey write, “Mainwaring provides a list of stable
democracies, where stability is defined in terms of longevity, that appears to be a clear
vindication of the argument that presidential systems are inimical to the continued functioning of
democracy” dxv. Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach gather data showing a correlation between
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parliamentarism and stable democracy and presidentialism and democratic breakdown. They
note that presidentialism is correlated with a small effective number of parties and that a small
effective number of parties is correlated with democratic breakdown. Stephan and Skach argue
that, “From the defining condition [of parliamentarism] a series of incentives and decision rules
for creating and maintaining single-party or coalitional majorities, minimizing legislative
impasses, inhibiting the executive from flouting the constitution, and discouraging political
society’s support for military coups predictably flows” dxvi. They contend that presidentialism
provides the opposite incentives and decision rules. This popular hypothesis is also forwarded
by Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi who state that, “Between 1946 and 1999, one in
every twenty-three presidential regimes died (that is, became a dictatorship), whereas only one in
every fifty –eight parliamentary regimes died” dxvii.
Another reason for the supposed inferiority of presidentialism is temporal rigidity. As
Walter Bagehot states, “under a presidential system, a nation has, except at the electing moment,
no influence; it has not the ballot-box before it; its virtue is gone, and it must wait till its instant
of despotism again returns” dxviii. Bagehot goes on to argue that due to this lack of everyday
control by the people, presidential government stifles political debate. Bagehot argues that the
fixed terms given to elected officials in presidential systems, especially in light of the inability of
the parliament to dissolve the government, make the government unduly rigid and slow to adjust
to public opinion or crisisdxix. Thus an element of despotism is inherent in presidential
governments since after the election the people are stuck with the government they elected, and
they have almost no way of changing it. To this end, I submit the first hypothesis:
H1. Due to its temporal rigidity and strong executive, presidential democracy is more
prone to breakdown than parliamentary democracy, and in some instances, even leads to
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authoritarian government dxx. Therefore, in times of crisis, presidentialism should show more
abuse of emergency powers and centralize government more than parliamentarism dxxi.
Supporting presidentialism, the Federalist No. 70 submits that, “Energy in the Executive is a
leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the
community against foreign attacks …”dxxii. This statement construes presidentialism as faster
and more effective in dealing with crises than parliamentary governance. The thought behind
having a separate executive lead government, then, is that this individual could more easily take
the reins of power and get things done in a crisis. To this end, I forward the second hypothesis:
H2. Presidentialism should be more effective, at least at first, in dealing with crises. That is,
it should be faster to act and pass legislation.
Juan Linz criticizes the fact that presidentialist systems are “winner-take-all.” He writes that,
“Presidentialism is ineluctably problematic because it operates according to the rule of ‘winner
take all’—an arrangement that tends to make democratic politics a zero-sum game, with all the
potential for conflict such games portend” dxxiii. Arendt Lijphart concurs with this opinion.
Shugart and Carey write that, “Lijphart’s primary criticism of presidentialism is that it is
inherently majoritarian, providing poor representation for minorities” dxxiv. Since presidentialism
is a “zero-sum game,” people who vote for the losing candidate, no matter how small the margin
of victory, are disenfranchised and their vote “does not count.” This is why Lijphart and
Rogowski argue that, “minority representation in presidential cabinet is characterized by
tokenism or ‘descriptive representation’”dxxv. As we see, presidentialism is generally
hypothesized as a system that is less representative than parliamentarism. Therefore, the third
hypothesis that I espouse about the differences between parliamentary and presidential regimes
is:
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H3. In times of crisis presidential regimes should be less sensitive to minority rights than
parliamentary ones. Note here that the UK employs a first-past-the-post system of voting, so it
too should suffer the same problems with minority rights as presidentialism.
H4. Finally, on the issue of free speech, I hypothesize that the checks and balances of a
presidential system, replete with many veto points (more on this in the US section), legislativeexecutive antagonism dxxvi, and an independent judiciary, should do a better job of protecting free
speech than the parliamentary model.
H5. From the above discussion of presidential versus parliamentary discussions, I forward
the hypothesis that presidential regimes should be more likely to successfully employ political
fear because they are more prone to centralization and can employ the identifiability of the
executive to rally the public.
Finally, a note on the use of the term liberal democracy. By using the term “liberal
democracy,” rather than democracy the aim is to show that countries to be studied here are not
those that simply hold elections. Indeed, in a study of whether rights are compromised, the
countries chosen must have protected the rights in question in the first place. To this end, for the
purpose of selecting cases this study employs Terry Lynn Karl’s definition of democracy. She
writes that democracy is, “a set of institutions that permits the entire adult population to act as
citizens by choosing their leading decision makers in competitive, fair, and regularly scheduled
elections which are held in the context of the rule of law, guarantees for political freedom, and
limited military prerogatives” dxxvii. Now, obviously, it is contestable whether the three countries
chosen here truly fulfill all of Karl’s criteria. Certainly, in none of them does the entire adult
population vote since non-citizens do not have voting rights in these democracies. But, in all, the
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rule of law is prevalent and elections are certainly competitive and free. In the least, all of these
countries attempt to fulfill Karl’s definition of a liberal democracy dxxviii.
One prominent measure of a state’s maintenance of liberties is the Freedom House
Freedom in the World country ratings. Freedom House rates all three of the studied countries as
“free.” Israel has held a 1 (out of 7) political liberties and a 3 (out of 7) civil liberties score since
2000. Further, its scores have consistently been stable over the history of the Freedom House
ratings (1972-2005). The United States and United Kingdom are rated as Free, and both rank
with top scores of 1 in both the civil and political liberties scores. These scores have also
remained remarkably stable, moreso than Israel’s, over timedxxix.
Theory Behind the Dependent Variable: Pluralism vs. Division
Judith Shklar’s notion of a liberalism of fear at first glance looks much like Isaiah
Berlin’s concept of negative liberty. Shklar defines the liberalism of fear as a political
commitment to the maintenance of institutions that protect individuals from undue coercion and
defend individual rights dxxx. Shklar writes that, “What is to be feared is every extralegal, secret,
and unauthorized act by public agents or their deputies. And to prevent such conduct requires a
constant division and subdivision of political power”dxxxi. Thus Shklar groups herself with
Madison as both a skeptic (about the nature of people) and a liberal dxxxii. Shklar believes that
people in power who do not exact cruelties upon their subjects are exceptional dxxxiii.
Though Shklar’s liberalism of fear looks similar to Berlin’s negative liberty, she
underlines that the two views are “not exactly the same” and indeed both concepts have very
different ramificationsdxxxiv. While Berlin defines negative liberty as freedom from coercion and
positive liberty as “self-mastery,” Shklar does not divide her notion of liberty dxxxv. Shklar writes
that Berlin must disconnect negative liberty from “the conditions of liberty” in order to logically
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maintain his dual liberties. She goes on to state that, “ If negative freedom is to have any
political significance at all, it must specify at least some of the institutional characteristics of a
relatively free regime” dxxxvi. Though this could be seen as just an addendum to Berlin’s concept
of negative liberty, the ramifications of Shklar’s critique diverge the two liberal theories much
further. For Shklar asserts that though negative liberty rests on a theory of moral pluralism, the
liberalism of fear does notdxxxvii. This goes to the core of Berlin’s theory in “Two Concepts of
Liberty,” for Berlin believes that negative liberty allows individuals the “freedom to choose”
between belief systems, some of which are incompatible with one another dxxxviii. Berlin touts
pluralism as “a truer and more humane ideal than the goals of those who … assume that all
values can be graded on one scale”dxxxix.
Thus, though both Berlin and Shklar are skeptics regarding human nature, they propose
different solutions to counter natural human tendenciesdxl. Shklar not only desires to create
institutions that limit the cruelties of government, she goes further to state that, “the task of a
liberal citizenry [is] to see that not one official or unofficial agent can intimidate anyone, except
through the use of well-understood and accepted legal procedures” dxli. Further, Shklar writes, in
contrast to Berlin, that, “liberalism has no reason at all to apologize for the inclinations and
habits that procedural fairness and responsible government are likely to encourage” dxlii. So
whereas Berlin reserves his harshest words for those who believe that a singular good exists and
that they know what that good is, Shklar argues that liberalism’s inadvertent shaping of the
individual to make her see it as a singular good is not a contradiction of negative liberty dxliii. For,
to Shklar, negative liberty can only exist in a society wherein it is constantly and diligently
fostered and maintained. Berlin, then, disconnects negative liberty from the real world and
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suffers the fate of liberal philosophers such as Locke and Rawls who attribute too much
autonomy and metaphysical weight to the individual outside of societydxliv.
Both sides of this debate are represented in this study. The pluralism dependent variable
measures liberties as Berlin construes them: free speech and minority rights. The division
dependent variable measures liberties Shklar’s way: by looking at government fragmentation and
the passage of emergency powers. By using both thinkers’ conceptions of liberty, this study
aims to extract comprehensive findings about the nature of liberties under terrorist threat.
Case Study: United States
I. Background
The United States stands as the first instance of a presidentialist democracy. It is also the
“first instance of either type of regime’s [parliamentary or presidential] having been consciously
‘engineered’”dxlv. The US presidential system “is rather unique in that the president only has
‘reactive legislative power’” dxlvi. That is, the president cannot produce legislation. As has been
recounted many times, the United States’ federal government is organized into three branches: an
executive (president), a bicameral legislature (the Senate and House of Representatives) and a
judiciary (the US Supreme Court). The federal government is elected in majoritarian, i.e. firstpast-the-post, elections. The country’s two main parties are the Democrats and Republicans.
An important distinction between the US and the other two cases is that America is governed
by a Constitution. Article VI of the Constitution establishes the document as the “supreme Law
of the Land” dxlvii. As Richard Fallon notes, the Constitution serves two main functions: “First, it
creates and structures the government of the United States. Second, it guarantees individual
rights against the government” dxlviii.
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Both Schattschneider and Tsebelis underline the role of veto points in determining whether
policy will change dxlix. Daniel Tichenor writes that, “The separation of powers, checks and
balances, federalism, and bicameralism unquestionably produced a US political system
exceptionally replete with veto points”dl. Yet, Fallon declares that, “Over the sweep of
American history, power has almost steadily flowed to the President” dli. So which is it? Is the
US system one where policy is difficult to enact or one where the president increasingly wields
the brunt of the power?
Article I of the Constitution provides the Congress with the power to declare war dlii.
Importantly, Geoffrey Stone notes that the First Amendment limits only Congress from
“abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press” dliii. Thus, the executive branch could
constitutionally stifle these freedoms. That said, during war and emergency situations the
Congress and President usually are in agreement, a situation where “the powers of the national
government are at their zenith.” Richard Fallon notes that he is “not aware of any wartime
emergency measure, voted by Congress and signed by the President, that the Supreme Court has
ever found to lie beyond national regulatory power” dliv. For example, “In the case of both the
Gulf War and the war in Iraq, the President ultimately found it politically indefensible to begin a
war without first obtaining congressional authorization. When the President sought such
authorization, Congress followed determined presidential leadership and went along” dlv. A
balanced summary opinion comes, naturally, from William Rehnquist who surmises that,
“Although wartime has been bad for constitutional liberties, there have tended to be fewer, or
less serious, abuses in each war than in those that preceded it” dlvi.
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Yet, Geoffrey Stone is not heartened by this perceived progress. He further does not
agree with Rehnquist that in times of war “the balance between freedom and ordered must shift
‘in favor of order’” dlvii. In an account of free speech in wartime, Stone writes that:
“the United States has a long and unfortunate history of overreacting to the perceived
dangers of wartime. Time and again, Americans have allowed fear and fury to get the
better of them. Time and again, Americans have suppressed dissent, imprisoned and
deported dissenters, and then—later—regretted their actions” dlviii.
He comes to his conclusions by looking at the six episodes in US history where free speech has
been suppressed and civil liberties pushed aside. These, according to Stone, began with the 1798
Sedition Act “which made it a crime for any person to publish or utter any disloyal statement”
against the US government, Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil
War, and World War I’s 1917 Espionage Act and 1918 Sedition Act. Next, came the Japanese
internment and federal government suppression of criticism during World War II dlix. Stone calls
the fifth episode, the Cold War, “the most repressive period in American history” —thus directly
disagreeing with Rehnquist’s supposition that things have gotten better over time—due to “the
excesses of the House Un-American Activities Committee and the rampage of Senator Joseph
McCarthy” dlx. Finally, came the Vietnam War during which the FBI “carried out a far-reaching
program to ‘expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize’ dissident political activities”dlxi.
Stone establishes the premise that in times of great fear or crisis, the American
government has not hesitated in abridging liberties. He also believes that in doing so, the
government “time and again” overreacted. This case study tests Stone’s premise by looking at
America after the attacks of September 11, 2001. First, I will deal with the context of the attack,
i.e. what happened. Then, the reaction will be reviewed. This portion will be divided into two

176

sections: pluralism and division. As established above, division entails the enactment of
emergency powers and government centralization while pluralism captures the stifling of
minority rights and speech.
II. The Terrorist Context: The Rise of Fear after 9/11
On the morning of September 11, 2001, four teams of al-Qaeda operatives hijacked four
American commercial airplanes, all originating on the East Coast and en route to California.
Two of the planes hit the World Trade Center in New York City destroying both towers, one
crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, DC, and the last crash-landed into a field in
Shanksville, Pennsylvania dlxii. Over 2,500 people were killed in the attacks, including 343
firefighters and paramedics who fought to save those trapped in the World Trade Center
towers dlxiii. The nation suffered billions of dollars worth of damage dlxiv.
Though al-Qaeda had previously attacked US interests, most recently with the USS Cole
attack on October 12, 2000, these attacks were an absolute shock to Americans for two main
reasons. First, this was the first foreign attack on US soil since the Japanese bombing of Pearl
Harbor in World War II. Americans had grown accustomed to political violence occurring
elsewhere due to the oceans separating the United States from Europe, Asia, and Africa. As
such, when Usama bin-Laden declared war on America in 1998, stating in an ABC-TV interview
that “it was more important for Muslims to kill Americans than to kill other infidels,” it was hard
to know how seriously to take his declaration given the paucity of foreign attacks on US soil dlxv.
The second reason that Americans were shocked is that they viewed the attacks as largely
unprovoked. The attacks seemed to come out of nowhere and Americans, including the
President, were left asking, “Why do they hate us?” dlxvi The President surmised that they “hate
our freedoms,” but due to the fear that pervaded American society he had already begun
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curtailing these very freedoms dlxvii. For “[a]fraid that September 11 brought merely the first of a
wave of terrorist attacks, Americans expected and, indeed, demanded that their government take
immediate and decisive steps to protect the nation” dlxviii.
The high-damage, low-probability nature of the attack made it very difficult to assess the
level of threat that the nation faced dlxix. Further, as Diego Gambetta makes clear, “the cognitive
dissonance experienced by someone who, feeling strong and safe, is suddenly hit by an attack of
the scale of 9/11 is extremely intense.” By June 2002, the Bush Administration had assessed the
threat as “unprecedented, very large, and ridden with unknown unknowns” dlxx. Such an
amorphous, potentially massive threat is replete with the potential for manipulation by politicians
due to the amount of fear it strikes in the hearts of the populace. Indeed, Jessica Stern
emphasizes that terrorist attacks, such as 9/11, fall into the category of “dreaded risks” for most
people. She writes that psychologists and risk analysts have found that “fear is
disproportionately evoked by certain characteristics of risks, including: involuntary exposure,
unfamiliarity, and invisibility” as well as “when long-term effects or the number of people likely
to be effected is difficult to predict”dlxxi. The uncertainty of what would happen next and the
people’s demands for action on the part of their government, led to compromises of civil liberties
that, in retrospect, probably were not justified. In Jon Elster’s words, “Traditionally, liberties
could be overridden only in the case of a ‘clear and present danger.’ Now it seems as if they can
be overridden if the danger, although far from clear, is sufficiently large” dlxxii. The following
sections deal with the responses of the US government to these attacks.
III. Reaction: Division
As Richard Fallon underlines, the Constitution provides a variety of rights to fair procedures
for those accused of crimes. Guarantees of fair procedures serve two purposes. The first is “to
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promote accurate decision-making” and the second “involves the dignity of those subject to
adverse government action” dlxxiii.

In November 2001, President Bush “issued an executive

order authorizing the trial of alleged terrorists who are not United States citizens before …
military tribunals, without right to trial by jury, rather than in the civilian courts normally used
for criminal trials.” The Justice Department has further taken the position that if the President
designates an individual as a terrorist, “the government can hold that person in jail for as long as
it thinks necessary without providing any kind of trial at all.” Emergency powers after 9/11
included the indefinitely long detention of over a thousand non-citizens with no judicial review
and no access to an attorney. Further, the scope of the Freedom of Information Act was
markedly limiteddlxxiv.
The Bush Administration not only worked to centralize government power in the executive
but also did so in secret. Tim Golden writes that in early November 2001 “a small group of
White House officials worked in great secrecy to devise a new system of justice for the new war
they had declared on terrorism.” He notes that some of the officials involved, which included
secretary of state Colin Powell, Vice President Dick Cheney, and national security advisor
Condoleeza Rice, “hardly thought of consulting Congress.” The Administration set out to claim
the authority to create military tribunals for prosecuting terrorists out of a “desire to strengthen
executive power.” The military commissions “would give the government wide latitude to hold,
interrogate and prosecute the sort of suspects who might be silenced by lawyers in criminal
courts.” More importantly, these commissions would “put the control over prosecutions
squarely” in the President’s hands. Further, the military tribunals would allow for lower
standards of proof, more secrecy provisions and heightened use of the death penalty dlxxv.
Clearly, here the Bush Administration sought to subvert power from the judiciary. They have
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further subverted the judiciary with the creation of secret CIA detention facilities abroad dlxxvi,
and with the prolonged detention of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay dlxxvii and of those who are
declared enemy combatants without charges being brought against them. Indeed, the Bush
Administration still does not have a clear notion of what they want to do with some of these
enemy combatants. Yet, what is known is that the government reserves the right to declare any
American an enemy combatant and hold them without charges for years on end dlxxviii. Indeed,
American citizens Jose Padilla and Yaser Esam Hamdi were each held for three years without
being charged. Padilla was recently indicted on three counts and Hamdi was released to Saudi
Arabia after the Supreme Court ruled that he could challenge his detention dlxxix. The New York
Times recently reported that the upshot of the Administration’s approach to the Padilla and other
terror-related cases “is that no one outside the administration knows just how the determination
is made whether to handle a terror suspect as an enemy combatant or a as a common criminal, to
hold him indefinitely without charges in a military court or to charge him in court”dlxxx. Without
question, the executive branch has moved to centralize its powers, and it has done so largely by
using a single piece of legislation.
The centerpiece of the Bush Administration’s response in terms of liberties was the USA
PATRIOT Act dlxxxi, which Geoffrey Stone observes was passed “in an atmosphere of urgency
and alarm that precluded serious deliberation” dlxxxii. Included in the voluminous 132-page act,
were increased government abilities to search citizens’ “transactional records.” These new
powers have yielded a hundredfold increase in the amount of national security letters over
historical norms. These letters allow the FBI to track a person’s spending habits, where they
live, what they buy online, where they travel, what they read on the Web, and who telephones
and e-mails them. Remarkably, the 30,000 national security letters the FBI issues a year can be
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collected “about people who are not suspected of any wrongdoing.” As former congressman
Robert L. Barr put it, “The beef with the NSLs is that they don’t have even a pretense of judicial
or impartial scrutiny … There’s no checks and balances whatever on them. It is simply some
bureaucrat’s decision that they want information, and they can basically just go and get it. … The
abuse is in the power itself” dlxxxiii. It is important to note that the PATRIOT Act was created
with a sunset requirement for some of its provisions, which expires at the end of 2005 dlxxxiv.
Indeed, Congress is reportedly near a compromise that would renew the PATRIOT Act while
cutting from it some FBI subpoena powers and “[requiring] the Justice Department to more fully
report its secret requests for information from ordinary people” dlxxxv. In summary, The
PATRIOT Act makes “it easier to search property as well as detain individuals” dlxxxvi. In
January of 2003, the Justice Department revealed plans for PATRIOT Act II, which “would have
reduced judicial oversight over surveillance, created a DNA database resting on unchecked
executive ‘suspicion,’ lifted existing judicial restraints on local police spying on religious and
political organizations, authorized the federal government to obtain library and credit card
records without a judicial warrant, and permitted the federal government to keep secret the
identity of anyone detained in a terror investigation.” The proposed legislation was so badly
received, that “the administration buried the proposal”dlxxxvii.
IV. Reaction: Pluralism
In the US, speech guarantees are taken very seriously. The Supreme Court case
Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) establishes near categorical protection to “even loosely political
speech” and “recognizes no wartime exception” dlxxxviii. Though the Bush administration did not
make speech illegal, it did create an atmosphere where free speech was stifled by stating shortly
after September 11 that, “You are either with us or with the terrorists” and by “tarr[ing] their
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opponents as ‘disloyal’” dlxxxix. For example, Attorney-General John Ashcroft made the
following statement rebuking civil libertarians: “To those who scare peace-loving people with
phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our
national unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America’s enemies” dxc. A
telling sign that the Administration stoked public fear was that Congressional opposition to the
establishment of military tribunals “melted in the face of opinion polls showing strong support
for the president’s measures against terrorism” dxci.
The Administration’s obsession with secrecy also is troubling to free speech advocates. For,
as Dennis Thompson notes, “the less that citizens know about a policy, the less accountable the
government is for the policy” dxcii. Stone writes that the Administration has limited the Freedom
of Information Act, closed deportation hearings and marked “tens of thousands of government
documents and Web Sites” as “sensitive” dxciii.

Laura Donohue observes that after the 9/11

attacks, the US government “immediately took steps to ensure that ‘sensitive but not classified’
information under its control … be removed from public scrutiny.” The State Department, thus,
“withdrew some 20 million pages of previously unclassified information and put the brakes on
another 20 million pages already declassified and due to be released. The new review system
created a five year backlog” dxciv. Indeed, the 9/11 Commission judged that too many documents
were being held from the public, “and that this undermined the state’s ability to respond
effectively to growing national security threats”dxcv. Further, among the Patriot Act’s provisions,
“the act overrides laws in forty-eight states that made library records private” dxcvi.
On the minority rights front, in 9/11’s immediate aftermath, a thousand foreign citizens,
mostly of Arab descent, who were residing in the US were detained and “held for relatively long
periods without access to courts or lawyers” dxcvii. Michael Ignatieff notes that though “Hundreds
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of illegal aliens, mostly of Islamic of Arabic origin, have been targeted for detention and
deportation,” these measures are less severe than American actions against minority immigrants
in 1919 and 1942 dxcviii. Still, “Muslims and persons from the Middle East have increasingly
become suspect communities” in America dxcix. Donohue reports that Attorney General John
Ashcroft, after 9/11, “informed the editor of the largest Arab-American newschapter [the ArabAmerican News] that he was lucky that he and his family and friends (American citizens) had
not been detained.” Making an important point, she goes on to state that, “While not outright
prohibitions on free speech, these measures impacted the ability of individuals to express
themselves without fear of state action” dc.
Yet Geoffrey Stone sees lessons learned in the US response to al-Qaeda terrorism. He
contrasts Wilson’s statements against German-Americans and Roosevelt’s handling of JapaneseAmericans with Bush’s rhetoric toward Muslim Americans and finds that “President Bush
deserves credit for his response to the risk of hostile public reactions against Muslims.” He also
notes that “no federal criminal prosecutions of any individuals for criticizing the administration’s
policies against terrorism” or for antiwar dissent have taken place dci.
V. Case Findings
It is clear that the Bush Administration used the 9/11 attacks to stoke public fears, Bush
claimed for instance that “the war against terrorism will never end,” thus creating an atmosphere
where emergency legislation could more easily pass dcii. Further, by using the roundly panned
threat assessment color scheme, the Bush Administration was able to keep fear high by
frequently switching threat levelsdciii. By doing so, the Administration was able to push through
both the PATRIOT Act and the creation of a Department of Homeland Security, both of which
centralized government power under the executive dciv. As Michael Ignatieff summarizes,
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terrorism in the US has led to “more secretive government, more police powers, and increasing
executive authority at the expense of the other branches of government” dcv. Indeed, after the
9/11 attacks, Congress did not fulfill its oversight role. Yet, the judiciary, though circumvented,
has played a large role in maintaining liberties as seen in the Hamdi v. Rumsfeld case and the
Administration’s cutting their losses in dealing with Jose Padilla. Still, the very fact that the
Administration was able to detain each of these citizens without pressing charges for three years
is testament to the compromising of liberties. In sum, the US case shows much government
centralization under the executive and some erosion of pluralism. The response to al-Qaeda
terrorism was certainly severe, but it also can be overblown. After all, the US is still a free
country, dissent is still ubiquitous, and minority rights, though curtailed, were certainly not as
severely abridged as they were in previous episodes.

Case Study: the United Kingdom
I. Background
Great Britain is a parliamentary democracy that functions with no written constitution. The
country today has three main parties: Labour, the Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats.
The voting procedure is “first-past-the-post,” that is, the candidate with the majority or plurality
vote wins dcvi. Arend Lijphart uses the British system of government as a major model of
democracy, dubbing it the Westminster Model. He attributes the following characteristics to the
Westminster Model in the UK: concentration of executive power in one-party and bare-majority
cabinets, cabinet dominance, a two-party system dcvii, a majoritarian system of elections, a unitary
and centralized government, concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislaturedcviii,
constitutional flexibility, and the absence of judicial reviewdcix. Cheibub and Limongi see the
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cabinet as being the main lever of power in Great Britain. They state that, “the English
parliament is … characterized by the complete control of the cabinet over the legislative agenda”
and “is marked by a high rate of success for the executive’s initiatives” dcx.
Since it has no written constitution and civil liberties are not protected by a bill of rights dcxi,
rights in the UK are derived “from a mixture of historical precedents, legislation, common (i.e.,
case) law, custom and tradition.” Bruce Warner notes that though the UK has a bicameral
parliament (the House of Commons and the House of Lords), “the real power lies in the office of
the prime minister, the leader of the governing party in the House of Commons. The prime
minister exercises authority through several influential channels: the cabinet ministers, drawn
from the elected party members and sometimes from the House of Lords; the Cabinet Office,
staffed by appointed advisors; and a complex array of committees, managed by senior civil
servants, which transmit executive branch decisions to the departments and agencies of
government” dcxii. Further, the prime minister has great freedom in the realm of internal security
due, for example, to her control of the MI5: the domestic security service dcxiii. So though the UK
is a parliamentary democracy, the executive still holds a great deal of power. Indeed, Michael
Freeman writes that because it is a parliamentary system, Britain’s government is “susceptible to
tyranny of the majority.” This is because “the Cabinet, as the representative of the majority party
in Parliament, is the central legislative and executive organ in the British political system” and
parliament does not, as in the US, face an executive veto dcxiv.
II. The Terrorist Context: Northern Ireland Terrorism 1969-2000
The conflict in Northern Ireland has existed in some form since the 1600s when Scottish
Protestants settled in the Northern Irish provinces of Ulster dcxv. On December 23, 1920, almost
two years after the Irish government declared independence, Britain separated Ireland into two

185

regions: the independent south became the Republic of Ireland while the six counties of Ulster
became Northern Ireland and remained under British rule. The Irish Republican Army (1RA)
fought a bloody civil war against Unionist forces from independence until 1922 dcxvi.
The round of violence studied here began on October 5, 1968 when the loyalist Royal
Ulster Constabulary (RUC) attacked peaceful marchers in Londonderry with batons. This set off
a period of rioting and violence in 1968 and 1969 dcxvii. The IRA, however, stayed out of the
conflict during this period. In August 1969, the British army arrived in Ireland to separate the
sides. Michael Freeman writes that, “the brutality and violence of British actions drove many
Irish Catholics into the arms of the IRA.” This was especially so due to the fact that the British
army was in Northern Ireland to protect the union with Britain and discriminated against
Catholics. In January 1970, the IRA split into two groups: the Official IRA and the Provisional
IRA (PIRA). Since its inception, PIRA has been “the largest and most active guerilla and
terrorist group in Northern Ireland.” PIRA killed its first British soldier in February 1971 after
the British army’s brutal searches led to a number of deaths in the Lower Falls area of
Belfast dcxviii. This set off a series of terrorist attacks and British reprisals.
Since violence erupted in 1969, over 3,600 people on both sides have died. In January
1972 alone, there were over 100 IRA bombings and the bombing campaign between August and
January of that year killed 231 people dcxix. On October 5, 1974, terrorism from Ireland reached
the British mainland when “the IRA bombed two pubs in Guildford, killing seven and injuring
hundreds” dcxx. This attack was followed by a November 21, 1974 bombing in Birmingham that
yielded twenty-one dead and 160 injured dcxxi. After these bombings, fears of terrorism reached a
high in Great Britain. Indeed, Donohue writes that the bombing campaign “reached a climax” in
1974, a year that saw ninety-nine terrorist incidents yielding seventeen deaths and 145 injuries in
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its first ten monthsdcxxii. The actions of the government in the face of terrorism are recounted in
the following two sections. Important to note here is that though the IRA was only responsible
for eleven deaths in Great Britain from 1990 to 1994 dcxxiii, much of the emergency legislation
that compromised civil liberties remains on the books in some form todaydcxxiv. Further
exhibiting the role of fear in the UK’s emergency legislation, Donohue notes that “the vast
majority” of emergency legislation against terrorists was introduced “in a panic mode” and
characterized by “being rushed through Parliament at an unbelievable pace”dcxxv.
III. Reaction: Division (Centralization and Emergency Powers)
On January 30, 1972, on what came to be known as “Bloody Sunday,” British soldiers killed
thirteen civilian protesters in Londonderry dcxxvi. After this incident, “Westminster suspended the
Northern Ireland Parliament and took direct control of the Province” dcxxvii. Ignatieff writes that
one reason Great Britain “suspended local self-rule in Northern Ireland” was because it feared
that “the political wing of the IRA might have passed security-sensitive information to
terrorists”dcxxviii. The fact that Britain had to change the way its institutions were structured,
taking direct rule over Northern Ireland, to deal with terrorism, clearly shows that the democratic
institutions presently available to the British government were insufficient in dealing with the
fear that Irish terrorism fomented. These institutions also proved not good enough to protect
liberties. After all, direct rule “did little to eliminate the continued use of emergency legislation”
by Westminster dcxxix.
After the inception of direct rule, Great Britain instituted emergency laws to deal with Irish
terrorism. As will be seen below, these laws were basically facsimiles of emergency laws used
by the Northern Irish government decades earlier dcxxx. The first of these was the 1973 Northern
Ireland (Emergency Powers) Act (EPA). Part of the basis of the EPA came from the findings of
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Parliament ordered commission headed by Lord Diplock. Diplock recommended the temporary
continuance of internment without trial for Irish terrorists as well as suspending trial by jury for
terrorists “in favor of courts (later known as Diplock courts) where a tribunal of judges would
decide the guilt of the accused suspect” dcxxxi. In addition to suspending trial by jury and allowing
the government to intern prisoners from 48 to 72 hours, the 1973 EPA “relaxed evidentiary
requirements to allow confessions obtained under interrogation to be sufficient for
conviction”dcxxxii. Donohue writes that the EPA, “retained extensive powers of detention,
proscription, entry, search and seizure, vehicle restriction, the stopping of roads, the closing of
licensed premises, and the collection of information by security forces. The statute established
certain crimes as ‘scheduled’ offenses, regardless of their motivation, and eliminated juries from
the process of adjudicating those offenses” dcxxxiii. Donohue estimates that the EPA was applied
an average of 2,000 times each year, even though just a quarter of those arrested by it had
charges brought against themdcxxxiv.
More emergency powers came in 1974, with the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), which
“introduced extended powers of arrest and detention, forcible removal (exclusion) of suspected
terrorists from Great Britain, proscription of organizations, and several new offenses relating to
support for terrorists”dcxxxv. Michael Freeman writes that the EPA and PTA allowed, “the police
to arrest suspects without warrant, allowed prisoners to be detained without an arrest, gave police
broad authority for search and seizure, and denied prisoners the right to trial by jury.”

Still,

Freeman emphasizes that, “The emergency powers used by Britain were limited in duration
because they had to be renewed yearly by Parliament, and in scope because free speech, the right
to vote, and other such freedoms were unaffected” dcxxxvi. Yet, though the PTA was set to expire
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six months after its passage, it was renewed repeatedly with minor changes in 1976, 1984, 1989,
and 1996 dcxxxvii.
Donohue notes the reluctance of courts to “assume the responsibilities of the executive when
national security issues are at stake” dcxxxviii. The UK case clearly shows government
centralization in the inception of direct rule of Northern Ireland and the narrowing of the
judiciary’s role in favor of detentions and internments. Further, Hadden, Boyle, and Campbell
write that during this period, “There have been repeated allegations of unlawful killings by the
security forces, of torture during interrogation, of widespread and random arrests, of ‘assembly
line’ justice and show trials, of mass detentions without trial and of systematic ill-treatment of
prisoners” dcxxxix.
More emergency legislation came after the Official IRA detonated a car bomb in Omagh,
killing twenty-eight people on August 15, 1998 dcxl. “Following the 1998 Omagh bombing, the
Terrorism and Conspiracy Act made the decision to remain silent in the face of questioning
admissible as evidence of guilt” dcxli. In addition, the new act made the testaments of a police
officer about a person’s membership in a terrorist organization admissible in courtdcxlii.
Not only did the UK establish numerous emergency laws, but these laws remained on the
books for decades. Freeman surmises that the emergency powers were maintained for much
longer than intended because of their symbolic effect: they showed the British people that the
government was fighting terrorism. Revoking these powers, then, would have been akin to
giving up the fight on terror dcxliii. Laura Donohue, who has written extensively on the seeming
permanence of the UK’s “temporary” emergency powers, maps a genealogy of today’s
emergency powers. She shows that they began with the 1914 Defence of the Realm Acts and the
1920 Restoration of Order in Ireland Acts, which were incorporated into the 1922-43 Civil
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Authorities (Special Powers) Acts (SPAs). The SPAs dcxliv were “later subsumed” into the 1973
EPA and the 1974 PTAdcxlv. What were meant to be emergency powers, remain on the books in
some form todaydcxlvi. In fact, even though the EPA and PTA were meant to be temporary dcxlvii,
the powers this emergency legislation provided were actually expanded over timedcxlviii. By
1996, the emergency laws had been amended to include “the removal of juries, changes in rules
governing admissibility and new measures for young offenders” dcxlix.
Freeman forwards the position that under this period the separation of powers retained most
of its vigor through the creation of government commissions, and the continued independence of
the courts and of Parliament dcl. Supporting his case, Freeman touts Labor’s partial opposition to
the EPA in 1978 and its official opposition to the emergency law in 1983 dcli. Yet, quizzically, he
categorizes “the lack of vigorous debates” during other periods as being “reflective of a general
consensus,” even though such a consensus could have been forced by the political manipulation
of fear dclii.
Though Freeman’s case is not without merit, it is clear that government centralization took
place in the UK. The Northern Ireland government was disbanded in favor of direct rule and the
normal functioning of the judiciary was subverted by emergency powers. Further, the
entrenchment of emergency legislation had a lasting effect in curtailing civil liberties.
IV. Reaction: Pluralism (Free Speech and Minority Rights)
In 1971, “unionists … amended the [1922-43 Special Powers Acts] to make it illegal to print,
publish, circulate, distribute, sell, offer or expose for sale, or have in possession for purposes of
publication, circulation, distribution or sale, any document advocating: (a) an alteration to the
constitution or laws of Northern Ireland by some unlawful means, (b) the raising or maintaining
of a military force, (c) the obstruction or interference with the administration of justice or the
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enforcement of law, or (d) support for any organization which participates in any of the
above” dcliii. Donohue writes that though informal censorship of Northern Irish nationalist
organizations had occurred for some time, a six-year formal ban against these groups
(specifically against Sinn Fein, Republican Sinn Fein, and the Ulster Defence Association) was
passed after the home of the head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service was bombed in October,
1988 dcliv. This ban went so far as prohibiting the song Streets of Sorrow by the Pogues because
“it expressed sympathy for the Birmingham Six” dclv. Yet, Bruce Warner writes that the ban
“does not appear to have inhibited routine reporting on the Northern Ireland conflict or coverage
of non-Irish international terrorism in the UK or overseas.” That said, he does underline that the
ban had a chilling effect on “democratic discourse” dclvi.
Minority rights were clearly compromised. When the United Kingdom placed limits on civil
liberties, “The Irish became a suspect community … because of the IRA and its activities” dclvii.
After the 1973 Birmingham bombing, which The Times declared an “act of war,” Parliament
passed the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act. The PTA “proscribed
specific terrorist organizations, excluded suspected terrorists from entering Great Britain,
allowed the police to search and make arrests without warrant, and extended the time prisoners
could be detained to seven days” dclviii. Under the EPA and PTA provisions, thousands of
suspects were arrested and hundreds of thousands of houses searched. Freeman writes that, “For
example, over 2,000 suspects were arrested under the provisions of the PTA or EPA in 1981,
while 75,000 houses were searched in 1973” dclix. Donohue holds that special powers were
“inequitably applied to the two communities in Northern Ireland,” in that they were “levied
almost exclusively against the Catholic population,” since the inception of the SPAs dclx.
Donohue emphasizes that, “of particular concern was the way in which the powers were being
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used to ‘trawl’ for potential terrorists, resulting in the curtailment of the freedom of the
population and the construction of an enormous database on the Northern Irish population in the
North and Irish subjects in Great Britain” dclxi.
Additionally, the PTA outlawed the IRAdclxii. The bill also allowed the government to
proscribe other Northern Irish groups as illegal dclxiii. In 1996, twelve Northern Irish groups,
including the IRA, were proscribed dclxiv. The PTA further prohibited forms of dress that the
British government believed to be “indicative of membership of a proscribed organization”dclxv.
Interestingly, the bill “captured overwhelming bipartisan support,” which speaks to the
atmosphere of fear that yielded a feeling of solidarity among Britons dclxvi. The PTA also limited
free movement of people into and out of the UK dclxvii. Donohue writes that, “As of 1 August
1978, 100 persons had been excluded from Great Britain and returned to Northern Ireland.”
Only thirteen of these people were detained on arrival and only one of those thirteen was
eventually charged dclxviii.
Freeman believes that free speech remained vibrant in the UK. He states that, “The right to
free speech, in the form of a free press, publicized any potential” abuses by the government dclxix.
Still, Freeman acknowledges that the BBC canceled a 1985 program under government pressure
and that the government “imposed a ban that restricted press coverage of individuals supporting
terrorism” in 1988—though, this ban, he says, “has not been enforced” dclxx. I contend, however,
that pluralism was clearly constricted in the Northern Irish case. Minority rights were
compromised and censorship was at least forwarded, if not enforced. Further, the EPA
“extended powers relating to unlawful assembly” dclxxi. In 1989 and 1991, the release of those
convicted for pub bombings of Guildford and Birmingham in the 1970s, stressed the risk to civil
liberties posed by the PTA because the Act allowed these people to be held “based on
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confessions coerced by police and were not substantiated by sufficient corroborating
evidence”dclxxii. Though the emergency legislation passed against terrorists did not appear on its
face to target minoritiesdclxxiii, the way it was enforced compromised the rights of Irish in Great
Britain as well as Catholics in Northern Ireland. Speech, however, was largely protected.

V. Case Findings
Bruce Warner concludes that the British response to “the Irish dimension,” “changed the face
of British society … to a marked, if unquantifiable degree” dclxxiv. He writes that the brutality of
terrorist acts led the public to support changes such as the rise of an armed police force, the
restriction on media coverage of terrorism and the return of the death penalty for terrorists. He
believes that infringements on civil liberties brought about by the PTA and the media ban are
“incompatible with democracy” dclxxv. Indeed, Donohue notes that, “What began as a way to stop
attacks became a way to ‘preserve peace’” dclxxvi. Some measures granted by emergency
legislation, even “seeped their way into ordinary criminal law” dclxxvii. As Donohue astutely
observes, “Reason of state degenerated into a technique of domination and became a device to
consolidate power—not to defend the body politic against clear attack”dclxxviii. The reaction to
Northern Irish terrorism in the UK certainly led to government centralization, the entrenchment
of emergency powers that curtailed civil liberties, some limits on speech and expression, and the
erosion of minority rights. The fact that the UK government differs in how it is structured from
the US government seems to have made little difference in how it reacted to terrorism.

Case Study: Israel
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I. Background
Israel has a parliamentary government. Its members are voted into the Knesset by a system
of single-district, proportional representation. The Israeli political system of nation-wide
proportional representation was installed at the inception of the state. Elections in Israel are
supposed to take place regularly every four years, but the Knesset can decide to dissolve the
government at any point during its tenure. Government dissolution, of course, results in new
elections. Since Israel like the UK has no Constitution, major governmental changes are made
through the passage of Basic Laws. Further, Israel has adopted remnants of the Ottoman Laws
and those that operated under the British mandate’s legal code dclxxix.
The extremely fragmented nature of the Israeli political system in the 1980s, led to intense
difficulties in the formation and maintenance of coalitionsdclxxx. As Reuven Hazan writes,
“Weak governments, and frequent crises, came to be perceived as extremely disruptive to the
stability of Israel’s democracy by both the electorate and politicians” dclxxxi. The Knesset, thus,
decided that beginning with the 1996 election, the prime minister would be elected directly (and
separately) while the Knesset would continue to be elected by list PR. The 1.5% threshold for
attaining a seat was retained. The new electoral institution came with a clause that was intended
to force the stability of the government. Both the prime minister and the Knesset were given the
power to dissolve the government, but doing so did not protect either. The Knesset could move
for new prime ministerial elections, but these would have to come with new Knesset elections,
and vice versa for the prime minister dclxxxii. Thus, Israel “cease[d] to be a parliamentary
democracy and became an institutionally unique and hybrid type of regime, one which grants
both the executive and the legislature a double-edged sword—the power to oust the other without
much difficulty while simultaneously incurring its own downfall” dclxxxiii. The idea was that by
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linking the fates of the executive and the legislative bodies, the two would be more apt to work
together.

II. The Terrorist Context: the Al-Aqsa intifada
Like the United Kingdom, Israel also changed its democratic institutions largely due to
terrorism. The Palestinian intifada, or popular uprising, played a major role in the move to
change the electoral system in Israel. On December 9, 1987 the popular uprising began and one
month later, the Palestinian Liberation Organization called for an independent Palestinian state
alongside Israel dclxxxiv. The fits and starts in the peace process between Israel and the
Palestinians that ensued and the immediate and constant security threat created by Palestinian
bombings in Israel made the need for stability in the Knesset urgent. The “political and
psychological earthquake” that ripped through Israel after the signing of the Oslo Accords with
the PLO in 1993 made political institutions in Israel even tougher to govern for the prime
minister than they ever had been dclxxxv. The need for a unitary actor to boldly make peace with
the Palestinians led to the notion that the prime minister needed to more tightly hold the reins of
power.
Further, the Israeli public was more deeply divided than ever about the peace process.
Baruch Kimmerling asserts that the notions of accepting Palestine as a neighbor state on
formerly Israeli land was not a “commonly accepted” idea for “most of [Israel’s] Jewish
population”. The assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by an Israeli right-wing radical
on November 4, 1995 was testament to the passions underlying the political decisions to
recognize the Palestinians. Under such conditions, it was thought that direct elections for the
prime minister would “bring political stability to the country and give leaders commanding
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majorities in order to lead Israel decisively through the challenges of the Middle East peace
process” dclxxxvi.
The period studied here, the second or Al-Aqsa Intifada, saw another institutional change
occur in the face of mounting terrorism. The Al-Aqsa Intifada was much more violent and
caused many more deaths than the first uprising. In fact, though Gal-Or holds that politicians
had overblown reactions to the first intifada dclxxxvii, it is harder to make this case for the second
intifada. The violence that the Palestinian terrorist organizations wrought exacted a heavy price
in Israeli lives and created an atmosphere of intense fear. As Ariel Merari notes, the Palestinian
organizations, which include Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, are among the largest
insurgent groups in the world, and rival Afghanistan’s Mujahideen in size and military
capabilitydclxxxviii. Noemi Gal-Or writes that, “The main motivation of anti-Israeli terrorists, the
Palestinian issue, is nourished by the deprivation of their rights as individuals and as a people
and by the fact that they have been prevented from achieving national self-determination” dclxxxix.
From the Israeli perspective, however, terrorism is a tool used both by Palestinians and by
outside Arab states meant to destroy Israeli societydcxc.
The second intifada began after now Prime Minister of Israel Ariel Sharon visited the
Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif on September 28, 2000. The next day, Israeli police killed four
Palestinians and injured 160 at the Temple Mount and the intifada began. On October 12, two
Israeli soldiers were lynched in Ramallah by a Palestinian mobdcxci. In the first two years of the
Al-Aqsa intifada more than 600 Israelis were killed in about 13,000 attacksdcxcii. Charles
Enderlin writes that between October 2001 and March 2002, repeated suicide attacks in Israel
created “an atmosphere of deep anguish and insecurity” dcxciii. The Middle East Policy Council
records that the Al-Aqsa intifada, through September 21, 2005, claimed 974 Israeli lives, while
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Israeli reprisals in the same period left 3,679 Palestinian dead. The height of the Israeli deaths
came between March and May of 2002, when hundreds of Israelis were killed dcxciv. Among
these attacks was a March 27, 2002 Hamas suicide bombing of a Passover Seder in Netanya that
killed twenty-nine Jewsdcxcv. The Ha’aretz newschapter charts the number of Palestinian suicide
attacks that yielded deaths versus those that were thwarted. The data paint a picture of a country
flooded with suicide bombers. For example, in 2003 while twenty-four suicide bombers caused
deaths, a staggering 184 were stopped dcxcvi. Under such conditions, in an atmosphere where
tension was already present between Israelis and Palestinians, fear rose to unprecedented levels.
III. Reaction: Division
The Israeli electoral system changed during the Al-Aqsa intifada, just like it had during the
first intifada. This time, it changed back to strict list PR with no direct election for the prime
minister. In 2001, Ariel Sharon was directly elected to PM in a landslide victory amidst the
rising intifada. Sharon ran on the issue of security and won the election with a very clear
mandate to govern, especially since he arguably started the intifada by visiting the Temple
Mount. With only nineteen Likud seats in Knesset, however, Sharon had to do some cajoling in
order to form a coalition government, he even had to include rival Labor whose popularity had
been reduced drastically over PM Ehud Barak’s term. Sharon’s party held so few seats because
voters had taken to voting for the smaller parties for Knesset and the larger ones (Labor and
Likud) for prime minister. Indeed, the two major parties’ share of Knesset seats fell from 55% to
37.5% after the 1999 election, it went back up to 47.5% after the direct election law was
canceleddcxcvii. This diluted the prime minister’s power. Sharon’s popularity among the
electorate translated into an ability to cancel the direct elections lawdcxcviii. This popularity, at
least partially, had to do with the fear that had been stoked by the intifada.
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This second institutional change signaled Israel’s lack of a clear strategy for dealing with
terrorism. Merari observes that, “Israel has never formally devised a comprehensive doctrine or
strategy for dealing with Palestinian political violence,” nor has it evaluated its ad hoc approach
to counterterrorism dcxcix. In short, “In practically all cases, Israeli investment in anti-terrorist
measures came only after” an attackdcc. This is a markedly different approach than that of the
UK and US, countries which passed much legislation following terror attacks.
Israel’s tit-for-tat response to the second intifada was encapsulated by Operation Journey of
Colors (February 28- March 15, 2002) and Operation Defensive Shield (March 29-April 28,
2002), both of which entailed a military reoccupation of Palestinian Authority land dcci.
Operation Defensive Shield, which included a siege of PA President Yasir Arafat’s compound,
was especially brutal dccii. Cheryl Rubenberg writes:
“Operation Defensive Shield was qualitatively and quantitatively different than anything that
had proceeded it. Israel reoccupied every major city, refugee camp, and Palestinian locale in
the West Bank. The population was placed under curfew; water, electricity, and phone lines
were cut; tanks bulldozed their way through every street and alley” dcciii.
More politically significant was the wanton destruction of the PA’s civil institutional structure.
Forty years of final examination scores were destroyed at the Ministry of Education, the
information held by the Palestinian Census Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Health was
obliterated, and the Palestine International Bank and the Ministry of Culture were ransacked dcciv.
Israel did not have to install emergency powers because a state of emergency rule has
been in effect in Israel since 1945dccv. Israel, having dealt with terrorism, since its inception, has
been drawing from old laws to counter attacks for decades. As Ariel Merari underlines,
“Israeli’s antiterrorist measures are legally based on the 1945 British Defense Regulations,”
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which were designed to tamp down internal strife in British Palestine dccvi. This regulation puts
offenses such as possession of weapons or explosive devices and wearing of unauthorized police
or military uniforms under the jurisdiction of military courts. It also makes these offenses
punishable by life imprisonment dccvii. The Prevention of Terrorism Decree, passed in 1948,
prohibits terrorist groups completely and also prohibits individuals from aiding terror groups. In
1986 this law was amended to allow the police “to close down any place serving a terrorist
organization” without judicial approval dccviii. Also in 1986, also in accordance with the 1948
Decree, 21 Palestinian groups, including the PLO, were declared terrorist organizations dccix.
Further, Israel treats many Arab prisoners as “security prisoners,” which is a similar category to
the US’ “enemy combatant.” Security prisoners do not have the rights of a regular prisoner, but
they are afforded Geneva Convention protectionsdccx. Finally, Israel uses a Decree of Security
Regulations, based on the British mandate’s emergency powers, to govern the Palestinian
territories and to empower its security forces there to deport, demolish houses, set up roadblocks,
and generally react with force to the local populacedccxi.
Since Israel has faced terrorism for a long time, its legislative actions were not as drastic
as in the UK or US cases but it did centralize its governing structure. Decision-making during
terrorist episodes lasting days or weeks has been done at the cabinet-level. Ariel Merari notes
that during crises, policy decisions have been made among a small group of top officialsdccxii.
Further, the cancellation of direct prime ministerial elections proved a successful attempt to
centralize power.
IV. Reaction: Pluralism
Squelching societal pluralism and minority rights, Israel has built along its border “at great
cost, a complex counterterrorist system comprising electronic fences, minefields, detention
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devices, and patrols” dccxiii. Most recently, to this system of fences, a fence around the West Bank
is being added. This fence is clearly being built as a result of the second intifada. To many
Palestinians the new fence signifies yet another land grab by the Israeli government. Indeed, an
EU report holds that Israel in this period has increased illegal settlement activity in and around
East Jerusalem and accuses Israel of “using the route of its separation barrier ‘to seal off most of
East Jerusalem, with its 230,000 Palestinian residents, from the West Bank,’” thus de facto
annexing Palestinian landdccxiv. Still, the judiciary has remained strong in Israel, especially in the
face of the new security fence. It “ordered that certain portions of the fence be rerouted …
conclud[ing] that, ‘this reduction in security must be endured for the sake of humanitarian
considerations’” dccxv.
Speech rights have, to Israel’s credit, largely been maintained. Minority rights groups such
as Adalah and human right’s groups such as B’tselem have been largely allowed to say what they
want. While speech has been protected, minority rights largely have not.
Minority rights have been a lag on Israeli democracy since the country’s inception dccxvi.
Arabs citizens make up about 20% of Israel’s population dccxvii. Though the Al-Aqsa intifada
turned the situation worse for Arab citizens of Israel, they were already second-class citizens in
the state. For this reason, As’ad Ghanem categorizes Israel as an ethnocracy: a country that is
procedurally democratic, but that is explicitly committed to the promotion of one group over
anotherdccxviii. Even the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs features a quote from the Or
Commission, which investigated the October 2000 incidents, stating that,
“The treatment of the Arab population … requires immediate, interim and long term
attention. A principal goal of the state must be to attain true equality for the Arab citizens of
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the state. … Therefore, it is in the interest of the state to act to erase the blemish of
discrimination of its Arab citizens in all forms and expressions” dccxix.
Just as in the previous intifada, Palestinian terrorism has allowed the Israeli government to
castigate the PLO and label all Palestinians as a gang of terroristsdccxx. Searches of Palestinian
cars at roadblocks in the territories and inside Israel are common during times of heightened
alert. Palestinians, after all, are required to have different colored license plates than Jewish
Israelis. Further, due to terrorist fears, bags at entrances of virtually all public places in Israel are
routinely checked dccxxi. In general, the laws against terrorists have, in practice, been used against
Arab citizens much more stringently than against Jewsdccxxii.
Still, there have been new laws passed in the face of the second intifada. In 2002, the Israeli
Supreme Court “upheld the new law allowing for the forcible relocation of the relatives of
Palestinians involved in violent acts. Another recently adopted law legalizes the indefinite
detention of ‘illegal combatants’ who are suspected of ‘taking part in hostile activity against
Israel, directly or indirectly’” dccxxiii. On October 9, 2005 a bill entitled “Criminal Law
Procedures Bill (Powers of Implementation—Special Directives for Investigating Security
Violations Perpetrated by Non-Residents)” was proposed to the Knesset. The bill would allow
Israel to detain non-residents for 96 hours, up from 48 hours for citizens and residents, and
would also lengthen the amount of time a court could extend a detention for non-residents.
Adalah believes that this bill “would create a two-track criminal procedure law governing
investigation, interrogation and detention—one for Israelis and one for Palestinians” dccxxiv.
Further, on July 31, 2003, the Knesset passed the Nationality and Entry into Israel Law
(Temporary Order) – 2003, which “prohibits the granting of any residency or citizenship status
to Palestinians from the 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territories … who are married to Israeli
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citizens. The Law affects thousands of families comprised of tens of thousands of individuals.”
Though it was originally slated to last just one year, Knesset has extended this law repeatedly
and, as of now, it will last until March 31, 2006 dccxxv.
Most egregious on the minority rights front were the events of October 2000. In the
October 2000 riots, Israeli police killed thirteen Arab citizens. Remarkably, the case was
initially closed with no convictions. But after Arab Israelis protested, the case was recently
reopeneddccxxvi. Ghanem describes the October 2000 incident as one where “security forces
opened fire with live ammunition on citizens attempting to express their distress concerning AlHaram A-Sherif … after Sharon’s visit there” dccxxvii. As seen by the bloodless, non-violent
treatment of Gazan settlers during the Gaza evacuation, the Israeli army and police are clearly
capable of dealing with its citizenry in an extremely dignified and professional manner. That
security forces simply opened fire on Arab citizens speaks volumes both to the discrimination of
Arabs in Israel and to the level of fear and distrust that terrorism has sown in the country.
V. Case Findings
Noemi Gal-Or believes that terrorism has yielded stringently anti-democratic attitudes in
Israel, due to the treatment of Palestinians in the country and in the occupied territories, though
Jewish civil rights have generally not been curbed dccxxviii. The shooting of Arab civilians in
Israel and the explicitly discriminatory treatment of the Arab minority speak to this fact. The
government did centralize in its actions against terrorism in this case as decision-making
occurred among a select group of individuals. Still, little centralizing legislation was passed.
Israel already had been acting under a state of emergency so additional emergency powers were
unnecessary. This is similar to the UK case where emergency powers simply became entrenched
over time. Importantly, and also like the UK, Israel actually changed its institutional structure in
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the face of terrorism when it revoked direct prime ministerial elections due to the difficulty PM’s
had with ruling under this system.

Conclusion
Emergency legislation was consistently passed and arguably abused across all three
cases. Interestingly, the two parliamentary regimes actually changed their institutional structures
in the direction of centralization to deal with terrorism. That said, all three regimes acted
similarly with regard to centralizing and attempting to centralize the government and in
bolstering executive control. For this reason, presidentialism had little to no effect on
government centralization or the passage of emergency legislation (H1). The US did act quickly
to pass legislation after the 9/11 attacks but the UK also passed legislation quickly after terrorist
attacks, and Israel did not have the need to pass much additional legislation. Presidentialism
proved no quicker to act under duress (H2).
Minority rights were another liberty consistently compromised among the three cases.
Minorities were actually treated worse in the parliamentary cases than in the US case, thus
hypothesis three, that presidentialism should do a worse job than parliamentarism in protecting
minority rights, is proved false (H3). As for speech, in a study of speech in terrorist times in the
US and UK, Laura Donohue concludes that, “As states overreact, the history of both countries
demonstrates that strictures on persuasive speech end up being applied to political opponents”
and that “In both states, the judiciary demonstrates great deference to the executive”dccxxix. Still,
the cases bear out that speech in all three states was largely maintained. There was some
censorship in the UK case and some tamping of dissent in the US case, but by and large no
government stood out as a particular protector or inhibitor of speech (H4). Finally, considering

203

that the threat to the US was less constant and less immediate than in the other two cases, the US
did employ political fear more successfully than the other two regimes (H5).
In the words of Justice John Marshall Harlan, “liberty is not a series of isolated points
pricked out in terms of … freedom of speech, press, and religion … and so on. It is a rational
continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints” dccxxx. The findings of this study exhibit that institutions
have little effect on whether or how democracies will protect liberties under terrorist threat. This
is, I believe, because terrorism creates an atmosphere of fear in a society that yields mass-level
demands for strong governance as well as a stage for facile political manipulation. One
interesting finding is that though all the governments reacted similarly, the parliamentary
systems actually arguably centralized more and protected minority rights less than did the US.
This may be because these governments were dealing with a more constant, secessionist, and
nationalist terrorist threat.
I would like to end here with some proposed solutions to the problem of balancing rights
and security. Grant Wardlaw proposes four principles for guiding state’s counterterrorist
actions: commit to the rule of law, settle on a definition of terrorism, do not inflate political
language, and realize that there is no simple solution to terrorism dccxxxi. To these proposals I
would add one: make protecting minority rights a priority.
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Chapter Six
Balancing Fear: Why Counterterror Legislation was Blocked after the Oklahoma City and
London Bombings
Post-9/11 conventional wisdom holds that counterterror legislation is quickly passed after
terror attacks due to a wave of mass fear and a bump in presidential approval levels. But
sometimes—even after a terrorist attack—security-enhancing legislation that restricts civil
liberties is blocked by the legislature. This chapter explores such cases.
The focus so far has been on factors that make legislative reactions to terror the same
across cases, but this chapter will look at variation on the dependent variable. Here threatshaping will again be examined to see why it did not produce the same speedy passage of
legislation as it did in the cases explored in chapter five. Recall that the theory proposed here
does not hold that executive response and threat-shaping always yields counterterror legislation.
Instead, I contend that threat-shaping is the primary factor behind these outcomes, but that it is
constrained by political constellations (i.e., institutional arrangements, government composition
and party competition) and mass fear levels and other public opinion metrics. This chapter will
conclude by showing which of these broad constraint factors have the most power in actually
restraining executive action after terror attacks.

Why Should We Have Expected Legislation to Pass in the London Bombings Case?
Why should we expect counterterror legislation to have been passed after the July 7, 2005
London bombings? There are myriad reasons why we should expect legislation to have passed
in this case. First, in the British system the prime minister controls government. That means that
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as long as the prime minister is head of government, all legislation that he proposes should pass
parliament. Indeed, Tony Blair’s counterterror legislation after the London Bombings that
sought to prolong detentions for terror suspects from 14 days to 90 days, was the first legislation
that had been blocked by parliament in Blair’s eight-plus years in power to that date.
Second, the US, a system replete with checks-and-balances, passed extensive
counterterror law after 9/11. If a system that has many more checks on executive power than
does the British system could pass legislation after a major terror attack, then why couldn’t the
UK do the same? Third, the United Kingdom has a much more extremist Muslim population
than does the United States. For one, recall the August 10, 2006 arrests of 24 suspected terrorists
who allegedly were plotting to blow up ten airliners flying from London to the United
Statesdccxxxii. Further, a 2006 poll in the London Telegraph found that 4 in 10 British Muslims
wanted Islamic Law implemented in the United Kingdom; that same year a poll in the Sunday
Times found that 1 in 5 British Muslims sympathized with the London bombers dccxxxiii. Fourth,
the UK has passed counterterror legislation many times before as seen in chapter five, for
instance. Fifth, Britain was at war with terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan already, making the
case for more domestic strictures on terrorists, thus, should not have been difficult.
Finally, consider the case selection chart below. As is evident, most threats that are
shaped as war lead to the quick passage of civil liberty-abridging legislation. To these, we could
add many cases, including, for instance, AB Vajpayee’s passage of the Prevention of Terrorism
Act (PTA) after the 2001 Parliament bombing in India dccxxxiv, as well as anti-terror laws passed in
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan after 9/11 dccxxxv. Tony Blair was the only executive
who both shaped the terror threat as war and was substantially blocked in his attempt to pass
anti-terror law, making his case a critically important one.
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<Insert Figure 6.1 here>

1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act
Now let us turn to a capsule review of how counterterror law has typically been passed in
the UK. The 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act was passed through Parliament and became
statute eight days after the November 21, 1974 Birmingham pub bombings, which killed 21
people and wounded 160dccxxxvi. The executive at the time, Harold Wilson, plainly stated that the
attacks meant that the country was in a state of war against the IRAdccxxxvii. The bill passed
through the House of Commons and House of Lords with remarkable speed despite the small
majority that Harold Wilson’s Labor Party enjoyed. Indeed, the previous month’s election had
given the Labor Party a slim three-seat majority dccxxxviii.
The speedy passage of the Prevention of Terrorism Act did not preclude the legislation
from vocal dissent in Parliament. Sir Keith Joseph, of the Opposition Conservative Party, called
the bill “distasteful,” but “necessary” dccxxxix. Leo Abse, a Labor Party member, pointed to the
fact that previous supposedly temporary counterterror legislation, passed in 1939, remained on
the books for fifteen years and stated that the new legislation under review would greatly erode
the rights of minoritiesdccxl. Conservative parliamentarian J. Enoch Powell emphasized that,
“both haste and anger are ill counselors, especially when one is legislating for the rights of the
subject”dccxli. Still, voices pushing for speedy action prevailed. As Liberal Democrat AJ Beith
declared, “I do not think the public would retain much confidence in us if we were prepared
simply to defer provisions which it could be shown were needed for the exercise of authority in a
situation as desperate as present” dccxlii.
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The PTA outlawed the Irish Republican Army, extended powers of arrest and detention,
and limited the movement of people into and within the United Kingdom. The PTA allowed the
police to arrest suspected terrorists without warrant for an initial 48 hours and for an additional
five days with permission of the Secretary of State dccxliii. Though the bill was subject to biannual
reviews, parts of it remain on the books to this day dccxliv.
The case, and others like it from Britain’s history of dealing with the IRA, shows that
even divided UK governments have quickly passed emergency counter terror legislation. When
compared to the 2005 London Bombings, we can conclude that the 1974 Act came after a
similarly devastating attack and the law proposed was similarly repressive. In fact, the passage
of the 1974 bill makes the blocking of Blair’s post-London Bombings bill even more curious
since Blair enjoyed a greater majority in Parliament, the London Bombings killed significantly
more people, and the new laws Blair proposed would not have been much different from laws
that had already been passed time and again in the United Kingdom. One further cannot argue
that the UK was not at war in 2005 and was in 1974. Both Tony Blair, as will be seen below,
and Harold Wilson shaped the terrorist threat as a war, and British forces are today still at war in
Iraq and Afghanistan with Islamist extremists.
The July 7, 2005 London Bombings
So what happened in the Blair case? Let us go through the theory point by point to find out.
I. The Attacks
On the morning of July 7, 2005, as rush hour was drawing to a close, a series of
explosions carried out by radical jihadist suicide bombers hit the London public transportation
system. At 8:50 a.m. a bomb exploded on a subway train leaving Edgware Road station killing
seven people and wounding 40. At the same time, a bomb exploded on a train traveling between
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Liverpool Street and Aldgate Station killing ten people and wounding over a hundred. In the
deadliest attack of the day, also on the tube and also at 8:50 a.m., 27 people were killed and
dozens injured when a bomb exploded on the Picaddilly line train near King’s Cross station.
About an hour later, at 9:47 a.m., a bomb exploded on the upper deck of the No. 30 bus as it
traveled through Tavistock Square; fourteen people were killed and dozens wounded dccxlv. All
told, 56 people, including the four bombers, were killed and over 700 wounded due to the attacks
on July 7, 2005 dccxlvi. Two weeks later to the day, on July 21, 2005, four more bombers failed to
carry out an identical attack targeting three underground stations and a bus. The bombers were
thwarted by the failure of their bombs to fully explode dccxlvii.
The first reports about the bombings held that the attackers were Britons of Pakistani
origin who were born, raised and radicalized in the UKdccxlviii. But whereas three of the bombers
were British nationals of Pakistani origin who lived in West Yorkshire (the fourth was a
Jamaican-born British national), their radicalization had strong foreign connectionsdccxlix. Two of
the bombers visited Pakistan in 2004. Further, an al-Qaeda member that had entered England via
a Channel port two weeks before the blasts, left the UK a few hours before the bombings.
Moreover, the explosives used in the bombings were similar to those used by al-Qaeda dccl. A
year after the bombings, al-Qaeda’s spiritual leader Ayman al-Zawahiri claimed that two of the
bombers had been trained for suicide operations at an al-Qaeda campdccli.
Though there were clearly tensions between Britain’s Muslim and Christian populations,
the attacks were not as “home-grown” as initially reported. Indeed, terrorism analyst Peter
Bergen stated a year after the bombings that, “the London attacks were a classic al-Qaeda
operation and not the work of self-starting terrorists as has been repeatedly suggested in the
media” dcclii. It turns out, then, that this was one case of international terrorism that was framed
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by the media as an attack by local elements. The response to the London attacks, thus, may have
been more muted due to this local-framing by the media (as opposed to the media framing the
attack as perpetrated by foreign forces and part of a larger war) dccliii. As will be seen below, this
media framing had little to do with how Tony Blair sought to shape the threat.

II. Executive Response
At the time of the bombings, Tony Blair was hosting the G-8 meetings in Scotland. That
day, he made a statement framing the threat of terrorism as war, stating that, “It is important …
that those engaged in terrorism realize that our determination to defend our values and our way
of life is greater than their determination to cause death and destruction to innocent people in a
desire to impose extremism on the world. Whatever they do, it is our determination that they
will never succeed in destroying what we hold dear in this country and in other civilized nations
throughout the world” dccliv. Blair’s statement framed the conflict against terror as a worldwide
one. He implied that the world was entangled in a war between civilized nations and extremist
terrorists. The threat magnitude was thus large, but, Blair suggested, the government would
protect its people.
Three days later Blair made a speech wherein he spoke of his “revulsion” at the terrorist
attacks. Blair outlined what had transpired during the attacks and framed the conflict by naming
the probable perpetrators as “Islamic extremist terrorists, of the kind who over recent years have
been responsible for many innocent deaths in Madrid, Bali, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Kenya,
Tanzania, Pakistan, Yemen, Turkey, Egypt[,] Morocco” and on September 11th. Blair asked for
additional anti-terror legislation, noting that Parliament had already pledged to pass further
counterterror legislation earlier in the year. He also set the tone for future statements when he
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stated that, “If, as the fuller picture about these incidents emerges and the investigation proceeds,
it becomes clear that there are powers which the police and intelligence agencies need
immediately to combat terrorism, it is plainly sensible to reserve the right to return to Parliament
with an accelerated timetable.” He closed with a statement of tolerance, lauding the British
Muslim community by saying that, “We will work with you to make the moderate and true voice
of Islam heard as it should be” dcclv. Blair’s statements framed the conflict as one between
innocent civilians and Islamic extremists, he stated that liberty-security tradeoffs would have to
be made, and that Muslims in England should be tolerated. Blair’s linking of the 7/7 attacks to
9/11 and other terror attacks from around the world, implied a high magnitude of threat.
Two weeks after the London bombings, on July 26, 2005, Blair stated that he would not
give “one inch” to terrorists and that he sought to confront them on “every level.” He also stated
that, “September 11 for me was a wake up call. Do you know what I think the problem is? That
a lot of the world woke up for a short time and then turned over and went back to sleep again.”
Meanwhile, Conservative Party leader, and head of Blair’s opposition, stated that, “One of the
principle objectives of the terrorists is to divide us, one from another. So far … they have failed
in that objective. … [W]e believe it is so important that we approach these difficult issues in a
spirit of consensus, with the objective of reaching agreement wherever we possibly can”dcclvi.
This speech was Blair’s most urgent yet and it framed the threat as an alarming issue that could
not be ignored. It is important to note that at this stage, Tory rhetoric supported Blair.
Three and a half months after the London bombings, on October 13, 2005, Tony Blair
unveiled new counterterror legislation that would allow the British government to detain terror
suspects for three months without charge, make the glorification or encouragement of terrorism
an offense, and outlaw attending terror training camps in the UK or abroad. The proposed bill
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would have greatly affected free speech in Britain. According to Guardian columnist Seamus
Milne, “under the terms of the bill, anyone who voices support for armed resistance to any state
or occupation, however repressive or illegitimate, will be committing a criminal offense carrying
a seven-year prison sentence”dcclvii. The legislation was introduced about one month after a
video of one of the July 7, 2005 bombers was released that linked him to al-Qaeda dcclviii.

III. Legislative Opposition
In this section, Prime Minister Tony Blair’s attempts to pass a 90-day detention will be
focused on. Blair felt strong opposition to his legislation almost immediately after he presented
it. On November 3, 2005, Blair made the case for his legislation by stating that, “We have got to
decide whether the civil liberties of people who are terrorism suspects should come before the
civil liberties of the vast majority of people in this country. I say the civil liberties of those law
abiding people should come first.” Blair’s legislation was already struggling to pass due to a
coalition between ministers of parliament on the right and the left that were fed up with Tony
Blair’s rule dcclix. These parliamentarians represented the large group of Britons who opposed the
unpopular Iraq War. Indeed, Britain’s participation in Iraq was opposed from the start by 3/5 of
Britain’s citizensdcclx. Still, the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, and Labor rebels that opposed
Blair’s legislation proffered a compromise: a 28-day detention period dcclxi.
Blair convinced Labor MP David Winnick to re-table the “rebel” Terrorism Bill
amendment that would have set the detention limit at 28 days. Still, ministers in Blair’s own
party were disappointed with the legislation the PM sought and criticized him by saying that his
politics were not in line with those of the Labor Partydcclxii. By November 6, 2005, Blair was
convinced that his legislation would not pass. He withdrew negotiations on the 90-day limit and
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told the Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, to seek a compromise over the detention issue, as well
as over separate plans to criminalize religious hatred and outlaw the glorification of
terrorismdcclxiii.
After attempts to magnify the terrorist threat once again backfired—Blair called the
potential blocking of the 90-day detention, a “defeat for the security of the country” and accused
Parliament of “woeful complacency”—the Prime Minister finally accepted that his bill would not
pass dcclxiv. Yet the very next day, on November 8, 2005, Blair once again tried to push through
the 90-day detention limit, this time with a sunset clause. The Prime Minister stated that, “If we
are forced to compromise, it will be a compromise with this nation’s security.” Blair pointed to
a Times (of London) poll that found that 64% of the British public supported the 90-day rule.
The head of the Conservative Party, Michael Howard countered that, “if you want to look for a
precedent for 90 days, I suggest you find it in the apartheid regime in South Africa when the 90day rule was one of the most notorious aspects of that regime” dcclxv.
It is important to note here that Blair’s strategy for passing his terrorism legislation
included repeatedly pointing to the fact that the police requested the 90-day detention limit. In
essence, Blair was arguing that it was not he who desired this law, but rather heads of police that
had asked for it. This strategy was ineffective as it shifted the process from one of an executive
demanding legislation from the legislature to one of the executive asking the legislature, on
behalf of experts, for legislation. Further, Parliament never fully understood why the police
“required” the 90-day detention limitdcclxvi. This tactic proved weak, as it was easier for
ministers of parliament to oppose the police than it was to oppose Blair and the public he
purportedly represented. The reasoning behind Blair’s bill was hidden in a letter from Andy
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Hayman, the assistant commissioner for the Metropolitan Police, rather than pronounced
publicly and repeatedly by the Prime Minister dcclxvii.
As expected, Blair’s counterterror legislation was blocked—the first legislation Blair had
proposed in eight-plus years of power to be blocked—when 49 members of his own party joined
the opposition to defeat the bill. In its stead, Parliament passed the 28 day detention limit
proposal dcclxviii. Statements such as those of one Tory MP who shouted, “We aren’t a police
state” trumped Blair’s calls that the 90-day limit was necessary to protect the country from
terrorismdcclxix. The fallout from the blocked passage of Blair’s anti-terror bill eventually led to
Tony Blair’s resignation, which he announced would occur within a year on September 7,
2006 dcclxx.
IV. What Happened?
How did Tony Blair’s own party block his anti-terror legislation? In order to answer this
question, we will now examine each variable described in the above theory chart to decipher the
main cause behind Tony Blair’s counterintuitive fate. As detailed above, the independent
variable in this book is executive response and threat-shaping. Blair clearly tried to push a civil
liberty-reducing response and did so by shaping the terror threat as a broad and urgent one that
was part of a larger war on terror. He framed the conflict as a fight between Western society and
Islamic extremists and repeatedly stated that liberty-security tradeoffs would have to be made
since the UK was under threat.
Blair continued to forward this response months after the 90-day detention period was
turned down by parliament. For example, on March 21, 2006, Blair made a speech where he
framed the battle between terrorists and democracies as “a clash about civilization.” He stated
that, “this is not a clash between civilizations. It is a clash about civilization. It is the age-old
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battle between progress and reaction, … between optimism and hope on the one hand; and
pessimism and fear on the other” dcclxxi. So, Blair did push counterterror legislation and he did
frame the terror threat as an urgent and large threat that required imminent action. Still, he faced
strong legislative opposition, had to fall back on using the police as an excuse for his
counterterror agenda, and finally was thwarted in his anti-terror efforts.
Could the institution of parliamentary government have been the cause of Blair’s demise?
As established above, and in chapter five, this cannot be the case. Parliamentary governments
actually allow prime ministers to pass law much more easily than executives can in presidential
governments. Moreover, the analysis in chapter five on the variant responses of presidential and
parliamentary governments’ reactions to terror attacks, showed few differences if any between
the two systems’ responses to terror. Further, counterterror laws have been repeatedly passed in
Britain and have passed quite quickly, as seen in the above case on the 1974 Prevention of
Terrorism Act. The only way that prime ministers can have their legislation blocked is if they
lose their ruling coalitions. In this case, it appears that Blair lost his, despite the continuation of
Labor rule. But it was not due to institutional constraints.
Next let us turn to findings on public opinion and mass fear. First, did the public desire
that the government gain extra-police powers after the July 7, 2005 bombings? The answer is
yes. An ICM/ News World survey polled respondents using the following prompt: “There are a
number of people living in Britain who the authorities have identified as posing a potential
terrorist threat. Do you think extra powers should or should not be made available to deport or
detain them?” A full 88% of respondents to the July 17, 2005 poll said that their government
should have extra powers to deport or detain terrorists, or to do both. In fact, a recent
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Economist/YouGov poll found that, “Britons are more willing than Americans to curb civil
liberties in pursuit of security” dcclxxii.
<Insert Figure 6.2 here>
An alternate explanation for the blocked legislation may be that fear levels did not rise
after the attacks. After all, many pundits have pointed to the famed “stiff upper lip” of
Londoners and their stoic, balanced response to terrorismdcclxxiii. Yet, mass fear levels in Britain
did rise after the London bombings by 20 percentage pointsdcclxxiv. Though fear levels receded
precipitously within a year of the attacks, this drawdown of fear levels is a common occurrence.
Mass fear levels after terror attacks occur generally spike, then recede. Therefore, Britons
responded rather typically to this terror attack dcclxxv.
<Insert Figure 6.3 here>
The important poll figure in explaining this case is Tony Blair’s approval rating. As seen
in the below chart, compiled from data acquired from the Ipsos-MORI Political Monitor
approval rating polls, Tony Blair saw no rally ‘round the leader effect after the July 7, 2005
bombings. His approval ratings, already at 39%, moved upward slightly due to the bombings but
then dipped back down to 39% a month later. Without sufficient public support, Blair did not
have a strong enough mandate to pass further civil liberty reductions in support of his
counterterror effort. Notice in the below chart that Tony Blair did see a surge in his support after
the September 11, 2001 attacks in America. As
the chart on Blair’s approval ratings clearly demonstrates not all terror attacks yield increased
support of the executive. As will be exhibited in this chapter’s conclusion, executive approval
ratings are critical to the passage of counterterror legislation. This finding exhibits that the
independent variable in this work, executive response and threat-shaping, is constrained mainly
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by approval of the executive and that, in addition to mass fear levels, executive approval ratings
are the most important public opinion factors in determining whether counterterror legislation
will be passed or not.
<Insert Figure 6.4 here>

Contributing Factors: Executive Mandate and Previous Legislation
There are two other contributing factors for the failure of Blair’s post-London bombings
anti-terror legislation. The first is that in addition to Blair’s low approval ratings, he did not have
a strong mandate. Though it is true that the partisan composition of the House of Commons
clearly favored Tony Blair, as Labor held the majority in parliament, his party was not behind
him. Statements like those above about Tony Blair’s actions not being indicative of the Labor
Party’s platform are testament to that fact; so too, of course, is the fact that Blair’s own ministers
of parliament voted against him on the anti-terror bill. Though Blair’s approval ratings had been
low for at least a year, his party may have felt pressure from the opposition due to its recent
electoral gains. Indeed, Labor had recently lost 47 parliamentary seats in the 2005 election. The
election losses, coupled with the PM’s low approval ratings, drove home the fact that the British
public was growing weary of Blair’s rule of Labor. Blair’s mandate, thus, was weak and his
party chose to stand against him for this reason.
A second reason why Blair’s legislation was blocked is that anti-terror legislation had just
been contentiously passed in March 2005. The March legislation made house arrests for terror
suspects, without charge or trial, legal dcclxxvi. These house arrests, called control orders, forbade
a terror suspect from using the phone or Internetdcclxxvii. The control order law came into effect
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only after raucous debate in the House of Commons and a rare hold-up in the House of
Lords dcclxxviii.
Blair’s leadership of the Labor Party had basically become synonymous with the new
“security state” that Great Britain had become. His parliament passed the 2005 Serious
Organized Crime and Police Act, which prohibited protestors from demonstrating within one
kilometer of Parliament. He also spearheaded the creation of the national system of license-plate
recognition cameras and, in 2006, the national identity card system dcclxxix. Under Blair, certainly
due to the very real threat of terrorism, Britain has become a surveillance state, in which there is
one closed-circuit TV camera for every 14 citizensdcclxxx. Blair’s rule had incrementally, but
radically changed the nature of government in Britain; government was now more pervasive,
intrusive and powerful. The public’s distaste for this outcome was made clear in the debates
over the 2005 pre-London bombings terror bill, and eventually led to the defection of Labor
Party members and the ouster of Tony Blair. Blair’s weak mandate, exhibited most obviously in
his low approval ratings but also in Labor Party electoral losses, and previous legislative actions
contributed to the blocked passage of his anti-terror legislation.

The Oklahoma City Bombing
Let us now turn to a second case of counterterror legislation being substantially blocked
by a legislature in order to assess the results of the London Bombings case. The subsequent case
examines the blocked passage of Bill Clinton’s counterterror legislation after the April 19, 1995
Oklahoma City bombing. Like in the previous case, compromise legislation was eventually
passed, in the form of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Still, the
AEDP was not passed until a year after the Oklahoma City bombing—and three years after the
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first World Trade Center bombing. This section will examine the Oklahoma City bombing
looking at threat-shaping after the bombing, the legislative debate that transpired, the content of
the counterterror legislation proposed, and the reasons for the stalled passage of the post-terror
attack legislation. The case will be examined, once again, by going through the variables in the
above theory chart. First, threat-shaping will be surveyed, then legislative debates and the
content of the proposed legislation will be looked at, and finally public opinion and institutional
constraints on the executive will be evaluated. In the end it will be shown that low presidential
approval ratings, an unfavorable partisan composition of the legislature, and the fact that Clinton
shaped the terror threat as a crime all contributed to the blocking of the post-Oklahoma City
bombing legislation.
I. The Bombing
On the morning of April 19, 1995 at 9:03am, Timothy McVeigh, an anti-government
extremist, drove a rented Ryder truck full of homemade explosive into the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The resulting explosion destroyed half of the
nine-story federal building and damaged twenty-five surrounding buildings. It also took the lives
of 168 people and wounded 674 moredcclxxxi. The Oklahoma City bombing was the largest
terrorist attack to date on US soil.
II. Threat-shaping: A Moving Target
In the immediate hours after the Oklahoma City bombing, Middle Eastern terrorists were
thought to have been the perpetrators of the attack. In fact, it was reported on the CBS Evening
News that a government source had stated that the bombing had, “Middle Eastern terrorism
written all over it”dcclxxxii. As will be shown below, the fact that a white, US-born, antigovernment extremist was behind the attack drastically changed the way in which Bill Clinton
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framed the threat. Instead of calling for a war against terrorists, Clinton called for the crimes of a
narrow group of anti-government extremists to be contained. Clinton’s framing of the threat as a
crime clearly did not make his proposed counterterror legislation appear urgent.
On April 21, 1995, President William Jefferson Clinton made broad threats against the
potential bombers, calling the bombing, “an attack on the United States.” He declared that he
would consider military retaliation if the bombers turned out to be foreigners. “There is no place
to hide,” Clinton announced. “Nobody can hide any place in this country, nobody can hide any
place in this world, from the terrible consequences of what has been done” dcclxxxiii. Still, Clinton
preached tolerance stating that, “This is not a question of anyone’s country of origin. This is not
a question of anybody’s religion. This was murder, this was evil” dcclxxxiv. Counterterror
legislation had already been introduced in February 1995 under the Omnibus Counterterrorism
Act, but the bill had stalled in Congress; now it appeared that passage of new counterterror
legislation would be inevitable dcclxxxv.
Four days after the bombing, with the news out that the perpetrator was not a Muslim but
rather a right-wing extremist, President Clinton spoke in Oklahoma City at the post-bombing
memorial prayer service. He tried to calm the families of the victims by recalling the words of a
widow whose husband was murdered when Pan American flight 103 was bombed in 1988. She
said that, “The hurt you feel must not be allowed to turn into hate, but instead into the search for
justice.” But only a few paragraphs later, Clinton asserted that, “one thing we owe those who
have sacrificed [i.e., the victims] is the duty to purge ourselves of the dark forces which gave rise
to this evil.” Clinton continued to frame the conflict as one between regular Americans and
members of irrational hate-groups. He was not attempting to shape the threat as a war, but rather
as an important internal struggle between those Americans who followed the rule of law and
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those who believed it did not apply to them. Indicative of his even-keeled message, Clinton
declared that, “we will stand against the forces of fear. When there is talk of hatred, let us stand
up and talk against it”dcclxxxvi. The magnitude of the threat seemed to recede as Clinton now
assailed militia groups, right-wing extremists and even “the influence centers in our culture—the
entertainment industry, the sports industry” dcclxxxvii.
Clinton ratcheted up his rhetoric in a May 5, 1995 speech at Michigan State University in
which he defended the American government. The President said that Americans have more
freedom than most people in the world, and recanted the limits on government that the
Constitution imposes. He stated that, “Our founding fathers created a system of laws in which
reason could prevail over fear”dcclxxxviii. That said, he continued to state that Americans were
vulnerable due to the existence of “evil” ultra-right paramilitary groups and pushed the terror
threat as one with a great magnitude. He did this by playing on Americans’ worst fears, “No one
is free in an America where parents have to worry when they drop off their children for day care,
or when you are the target of assassination simply because you work for the government,” he
said dcclxxxix. Though hate speech and far-right paramilitary groups did not seem to be a rampant
problem in America aside from this isolated case, the President pushed the threat as one of great
magnitude; albeit one that did not amount to war.
Even with the threat framed as a criminal matter that needed to be contained, the passage
of liberty-abridging counterterror laws appeared certain after the bombingdccxc. Yet, an April 24,
1995 Irish Times article that doubted the passage of Clinton’s new law proved prescient. It
stated that, “while the mood in the US can be compared to that in Britain in 1974 when
parliament rushed through the Prevention of Terrorism Act in the wake of the Birmingham
bombings, it is by no means certain the Republican majority in Congress will favor a curtailing
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of civil liberties, especially when targeted against groups that are more likely to have Republican
sympathies” dccxci.
III. The Proposed Legislation and the 1996 Antiterrorism Act
Before delving into the year-long debate between the President and Congress over new
antiterror legislation, let us first look at the content of the legislation that Clinton proposed, and
that was eventually passed. Looking at the legislation here will provide context for the
legislative debate that transpired. Clinton’s proposed counterterror legislation contained the
following provisions that made it into the final legislation. The 1996 Antiterrorism Act,
“established a special court that would use secret evidence to deport noncitizens accused of
association with terrorist groups; it gave the executive branch the power to criminalize
fundraising for lawful activities conducted by organizations labeled ‘terrorist’; it repealed the
Edwards amendment, which prohibited the FBI from opening investigations based on First
Amendment activities; and it resurrected the discredited ideological visa denial provisions of the
[1952] McCarran-Walter Act to bar aliens based on their associations rather than their acts”dccxcii.
The legislation allowed the FBI to gather information more freely on paramilitary groups dccxciii,
but increased wiretapping authority was blocked by Republicans in Congress who were worried
about the curtailment of civil libertiesdccxciv.
Basically, the Act allowed the Secretary of State to designate groups as “terrorist,” which
made granting visas to their members and providing these groups with humanitarian aid or
donations a crimedccxcv. US banks would also have to freeze the funds of the members of any
organization deemed a terrorist group dccxcvi. Further, under the Act the government could
“invoke … secret evidence provisions whenever the attorney general determine[d] that public
disclosure of the evidence against an alleged ‘alien terrorist’ would ‘pose a risk to the national
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security of the United States or the security of any person’” dccxcvii. The bill impacted mainly
Muslims who were accused of association with terrorist groupsdccxcviii.
IV. The Debate: Republicans Defend Civil Liberties against Security-Minded Democrats
With the terror threat framed as a marginal one, Clinton’s antiterror legislation, originally
proposed in February 1995, appeared out of place. The President was harping on the threat of
hate speech and right-wing zealotsdccxcix, while forwarding legislation that made it easier to
deport immigrants allegedly linked to terror groups dccc. Five days after the bombing, the Senate
passed a symbolic resolution condemning the bombing and praising the President for the rapid
aid he helped the victims receive. The resolution also vowed that the Senate would
“expeditiously approve” new counterterrorism legislationdccci. On April 27, 1995, the Senate
leaders of the majority Republican Party introduced an updated anti-terror bill to the judiciary
committee. Amending the previously proposed counterterror bill, the new, proposed bill would
add tags made of microscopic particles to raw materials that could be used for bomb making,
allow the military to participate in domestic criminal cases, give the FBI more leeway in
conducting electronic surveillance, and stiffen penalties for attacks on federal employees dcccii.
Though the American public was in a state of fear and Bill Clinton was pushing new
legislation, Republican Senator Bob Dole, the majority leader in the Senate, counseled patience.
Dole stated, on an ABC news program, his view that, “we better move slowly on the legislation
we’re considering, make certain we get it right so we can sit here a year form now … and say we
did the right thing … instead of getting caught up in emotion and going too far and maybe end
up trampling on” an innocent person or group’s rights dccciii. In response to the Republican
Party’s sense of calm, Clinton unleashed a fiery speech on May 2 in which he stated that
America’s open society was vulnerable “to the forces of organized evil,” while US Treasury
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officials asked Congress for increased funding and legal authority to combat what they described
as a war on the federal government dccciv. On May 31, 1995, Clinton made a statement of threat
declaring that, “Congress has a right to review this legislation to make sure the civil liberties of
American citizens are not infringed … but they should not go slow. Terrorists do not go slow,
my fellow Americans. Their agenda is death and destruction on their own timetable” dcccv. In
response, Senator Dole threatened to “pull down” the counterterror bill if President Clinton did
not rein in Democrats who had added 67 amendments to the billdcccvi.
Three days later, on June 7, 1995, seven weeks after the Oklahoma City bombing, the Senate
overwhelmingly passed Bill Clinton’s counterterror legislation in a 91-8 vote dcccvii. The bill
contained a key provision fought for by Republicans that limited the appeals of death row
inmates in Federal courtsdcccviii. Two weeks later, the House Judiciary Committee approved the
legislation dcccix, but it would rot in the House for a year before finally being passed. A coalition
of far-right and far-left members of the House of Representatives stymied the bill on grounds of
civil liberties and gun ownership rights dcccx.
Clinton’s anti-terrorism bill had been heralded by House Democrats, such as Dick Gephardt,
who stated on May 15, 1995 that,
“We must do more than merely convicting those responsible for this horrific act of violence,
and bringing them to swift and certain punishment. We must serve warning to all who would
use extremist means to advance their extremist ideas: We will use the full force of our laws
to find them, to punish them, and to rid our society of their hateful acts. And when those laws
aren't enough, we'll write tough new laws to rein in their wanton bloodshed and
terrorism”dcccxi.
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While House Republicans counseled patience, Democrats such as Representative Charles
Schumer repeatedly stated that the passage of new counterterror legislation was both necessary
and urgent dcccxii.
Despite the Democrats’ claims of urgency, an unlikely coalition of special interest groups
made up of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the National Rifle Association (NRA),
and Arab and Muslim groups, joined together to block the bill in the House. House Republicans
were also uneasy about passing a bill aimed against anti-government libertarians and gun
owners. Meanwhile, House Judiciary Committee chairman Henry Hyde (a Republican) excised
the legislation of its roving wiretap provision and tucked into it Republican Party Contract with
America crime provisions that relaxed laws on habeas corpus and allowed for speedier death
penaltiesdcccxiii. The Contract with America was a list of promises that Republican Party
candidates ran on in the 1994 electoral campaign dcccxiv, it was credited with helping the
Republicans gain control of the House of Representatives for the first time in 40 years.
On March 13, 1995, the Republican House majority voted 246- 171 to weaken Clinton’s
antiterrorism bill. House members said that they feared the federal government more than they
feared terrorists dcccxv. Finally, the anti-terror legislation, now called the Anti-terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, was passed by the House on April 15, 1995. Democratic
Representative Charles Schumer complained that, “this bill should be called the better-thannothing anti-terrorism bill”dcccxvi. The final contents of the bill can be seen in the above section.
In his weekly radio address, the President bitterly complained that House Republicans had gutted
the counterterror bill, largely by removing its provision for roving wiretaps “under pressure from
the Washington gun lobby” dcccxvii. The House gave its final approval for the bill in a bipartisan
293-133 vote on April 18. Rep. Henry Hyde stated that the compromise legislation, “maintains

225

the delicate balance between freedom and order” dcccxviii. Five days after the one-year anniversary
of the Oklahoma City bombing, Bill Clinton signed the new counterterrorism legislation dcccxix.
V. Why Was Clinton’s Anti-terror Legislation Blocked for One Year?
There are numerous reasons for why it took Bill Clinton’s proposed anti-terror legislation
over one year after the Oklahoma City bombing to pass through Congress. In this section, we
will evaluate those reasons looking first at executive response and threat-shaping, then public
opinion and mass fear, and finally institutional variables. The way in which President Clinton
shaped the terror threat certainly hurt his legislation’s cause. He shaped the threat as a crime and
though he continually spoke to the urgency of the terror threat, his framing of the conflict as one
between law-abiding Americans and anti-government hate groups and right-wing extremists did
not resonate with Congress. One might argue that he had no choice in shaping the threat as such,
but he could have pointed more often to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the original
cause for the proposed legislation, as well as the 1993 siege of the Branch Davidians in Waco,
Texas. Instead, the President pointed fingers at right-wing personalities such as Rush Limbaugh
and at the right to bear arms, a strategy which alienated the majority Republican Congress.
On the public opinion front, mass fear levels were high after the Oklahoma City
bombing, but the nature of public opinion surveys makes it difficult to tell whether or not there
was a bump in mass fear levels. At best, available data allows us to surmise that there was a rise
in fear levels after the bombing and conclusively state that fear levels were high. This is because
polling on terrorism tends to occur after terror attacks occurs. That said, as Brigitte Nacos notes,
terrorism rises and recedes very quickly as a salient issue in the mind of Americans. She notes
that after the 1985 TWA hijacking, 13% of Americans saw terrorism as the most important
problem facing their country according to a CBS/New York Times survey, whereas six months
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earlier terrorism had not been mentioned at all as an important problem facing America and six
months later, less than 1 percent of respondents mentioned terrorism when faced with the same
querydcccxx.
The below chart combines data from polls asking Americans about whether they
personally feel danger from terrorism dcccxxi. It clearly shows a rise in terror fears after Oklahoma
City, though obviously not as high as the fear levels after 9/11. Evidently, even though President
Clinton’s threat-shaping strategy did not affect Congress, it resonated with the public as mass
fear levels rose between April and July of 1995. Note that the first poll taken in the below chart
comes from March 1993, after the first World Trade Center bombing transpired. In addition to
this data, polls asking Americans how worried they were that they or someone in their family
would become victims of terrorism found that 42% of Americans were very or somewhat
worried about this scenario in April 1995, a figure which receded to 35% a year later and 27%
two years later dcccxxii. Moreover, in the days after the Oklahoma bombing, 84% of Massachusetts
residents polled by The Boston Herald believed that is was “very likely” or “somewhat likely”
that an incident similar to the Oklahoma City bombing would occur in the US in the next few
years dcccxxiii. It is safe to say, then, that mass fear levels were high after the Oklahoma City
bombing.
<Insert Figure 6.5 here>
There was also a public demand for government action after the Oklahoma bombing.
This is indicated by polls that show that Americans were willing to trade liberties for security
after the Oklahoma City bombing. An April 1995 Los Angeles Times poll found that 49% of
Americans thought that it was necessary for the average person to give up civil liberties in order
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to bolster security after the Oklahoma City bombing compared to 43% who thought that curbing
liberties was unnecessary.
Just as in the previous case, however, approval ratings were not in the executive’s favor.
President Clinton’s approval rating after the Oklahoma City bombing was a paltry 45%
according to the Harris Interactive poll. Moreover, Clinton’s approval ratings saw no rally after
the terrorist incident in Oklahoma. Indeed, his average approval rating for 1995 was 47%,
similar to his 46% average rating from the previous year dcccxxiv. Here it is important to
emphasize that once again approval ratings seem to have played a big part in determining the fate
of an executive’s counterterror legislation.
All three political constellation variables contributed in explaining this case. Recall that
these variables are legislative composition, party competition, and political institution. First let
us look at the composition of the government. In 1994, President Clinton’s party lost more seats
than in any midterm election since 1946; Democrats lost 54 seats and control of House for first
time in 40 years as well as nine Senate seats dcccxxv. The historic shift of power emboldened the
GOP to challenge Clinton, and also was indicative of a weak executive mandate.
Party competition, as measured by temporal proximity to an election, also had something
to do with why the legislation was blocked as 1996 was a presidential election year and the head
of Senate Republicans, Bob Dole, was running for president. Finally, the bicameral nature of the
American legislature played a strong role in halting the quick passage of counterterror
legislation. Though the Senate quickly passed Clinton’s anti-terror bill after Oklahoma City, the
House halted its passage for a full year. Though many scholars have posited that presidential
systems are more likely to lead to abuses of power, due to the presence of a more powerful
executive dcccxxvi, here the legislative-executive antagonism inherent in the American system and
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particularly the existence of the bicameral legislature served as a strong check against executive
power.
Case Comparison
We now turn to a comparison of the two above cases to glean findings. Two main factors
jump out as being behind the failed passage of legislation in these cases. The first is the timing
of the attacks and the second is the lack of a rally ‘round the executive, a factor which needs to
be explained. In order to bolster the findings here, I will add data from the 2004 Madrid
bombings case. On March 11, 2004, a series of ten bombs exploded within minutes of each
other on four commuter trains in Madrid, Spain killing 191 people and injuring 1,841. It was the
deadliest terror attack in Spanish history. Three days later, the Spanish Prime Minister Jose
Maria Aznar’s Popular Party lost power in a scheduled election dcccxxvii. In the Madrid case, Jose
Maria Aznar “hastily tried to pin” the Madrid bombings on ETA, the Basque- nationalist
separatist terrorist organization, but “[h]e failed miserably” and a few days later “an outraged
electorate voted his party out of power” dcccxxviii.
First, the timing of all three attacks was critical. All three executives, Blair, Clinton and
Aznar, had low approval ratings before the attacks and inter- or intra-party competition was high.
In the Spanish case, Aznar’s participation in the Iraq War led to his approval rating falling to
31% dcccxxix. In the British and Spanish cases, opposition legislators used the terror attacks to
push out the incumbent prime minister. Therefore, it is evident that when inter- or intra-party
competition is high, especially before an election, opposition legislators use terror attacks for
political gain.
Second, the lack of rallies ‘round the leader in these cases needs to be explained.
Analyzing public opinion data after major international events, Richard Brody found that in 42
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of the 65 situations “the president pick[ed] up support” dcccxxx. Brody writes that, “the fact of
different responses to similar international crises makes it unsatisfying to hypothesize that the
rally [for the executive] is caused by an upwelling of patriotism in the face of some international
threat.” Instead, Brody submits that, “Opposition leaders in some crisis situations lose their
incentive to criticize presidential performance, and when this happens, the public rallies” dcccxxxi.
Rallies ‘round the executive occur when opposition elites choose not to criticize executive
action. In the post-crisis cases where opposition legislatures fulfill their usual critical role of
executive policy-making, rallies of executive support do not occur. This finding clearly
demonstrates the top-down nature of post-crisis responses to terror attacks. The presence of high
political competition (more on this below) seems to explain why opposition legislators counter
civil liberty-abridging legislation even after large, sometimes historic, terrorist attacks.

Conclusion
In the majority of cases where large terrorist attacks lead to executives pushing for broad
counterterror legislation, the executives get their way. The cases in this chapter exhibited the
value of the following five factors. First, threat-shaping was once again bolstered as the
independent variable in pushing counterterror legislation. Though both Clinton and Blair were
blocked in their initial pursuits of legislation, they both eventually got most of what they wanted
from their respective legislatures though with a time delay. Shaping the terror threat as a law
enforcement issue or a crime proved to be a hindrance to passing anti-terror law. Both Clinton
and, at times, Blair framed the terror threat as a criminal matter and this framing simply made the
threat appear less urgent. Second, also bolstering the importance of the executive in pushing
post-terror attack responses, executive approval ratings proved to be critical in determining
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whether or not anti-terror laws would be passed. Neither case saw a rally ‘round the leader after
the terror attack and both leaders examined had poor approval ratings both before and after the
attacks.
Third, the executive’s mandate proved to be particularly important in these cases. Even
with a favorable partisan composition of the government, Tony Blair’s mandate was weak given
poor election results and a poor approval rating. Clinton’s mandate, also given poor election
results and a poor approval rating, was also weak. This weak mandate allowed opposition
legislators to capitalize on the terror attacks for political gain, an outcome that also occurred in
the 2004 Madrid bombings case.
Fourth, party competition was heightened in the Clinton case, and arguably in the Blair
case. For Clinton, impending elections emboldened opposition Republicans. For Blair, growing
unrest within the Labor Party and calls for Gordon Brown to replace him as leader of the party
created internal party competition. The most dramatic case of temporal proximity to elections
hurting an executive after terror attacks came in the elections following the 2004 Madrid train
bombings. Finally, political institutions were critical in shaping the Oklahoma City bombing
case dcccxxxii. The bicameral nature of the American legislature created a strong and sufficient
check on Bill Clinton’s counterterror bill.
Given these findings, the above theory can be revised to look as it does below. In the
below revised theory chart, all of the variables remain the same with the exception of the
constraint variables that appear below the executive response and threat-shaping independent
variable. Instead of generally showing public opinion and mass fear levels constraining the
executive, it has now been shown that executive approval ratings and mass fear levels constrain
executive action. Further, the political constellations variable has exhibited that proximity to

231

elections, composition of government, temporary right-left government coalitions, and bicameral
legislatures can stymie the passage of anti-terror legislation. The political constellations variable
is here revised as “political competition and number of checks on the executive.” Political
competition, as opposed to party competition, means both temporal proximity to an election and
internal competition within a party that, in a parliamentary system of government, may lead to a
leadership change or the calling of a new election. The political competition variable looks at
temporal proximity to an election and general inter-party or legislative-executive tensions in
addition to examining the probability that the party in power will be ousted in upcoming
elections.
Checks on government can come in the form of a bicameral legislature, a temporary
coalition, or an opposition party controlling the legislature. Other cases may show that other
checks are important, but it is clear that the more checks on the executive, the harder it will be
for him to pass legislation. That said, these checks, such as the partisan composition of the
legislature and temporary coalitions, are not necessarily etched into institutions. Rather some are
institutional but many are borne out of the regular legislative process. By defining this constraint
variable as “political competition and number of checks,” I have taken account of the findings
made here while allowing for future idiosyncratic outcomes in other cases.
Though stating that increased checks on government executives can stop civil libertyabridging legislation sounds heartening, most of the time counterterror laws get quickly passed
after major terror attacks. Weak executive mandates, exhibited by low executive approval
ratings and poor recent election results for the executive’s party, high levels of political
competition, and shaping the terror threat as a crime, rather than an act of wardcccxxxiii, were the
main factors behind the blocked passage of counterterror laws. These factors allowed existing
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checks to take effect and new checks—in the form of right-left coalitions—to form. After all,
both the 1974 Birmingham bombings and the 9/11 attacks occurred recently after elections were
held and led to quick passage of liberty-abridging legislation through divided legislatures. Thus,
political competition and number of checks are really secondary constraints, while approval
ratings and mass fear levels are the primary constraints on executive action. The order in which
these constraints are listed reflects this reality.
<Insert Figure 6.6 here>
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Chapter Seven
Living with Terrorism: Executive Power and the Future of Civil Liberties
Jerrold Post contends that, “No matter what the political constraints, idiosyncratic
personality features can play a determinant role” in policymaking dcccxxxiv. Post contrasts the
“great man theory of history” with “rational national actor analysis,” to illustrate “[w]hen in the
course of human events leader personality affects political behavior” dcccxxxv. There are two major
issues with which this book has grappled. One is the power of personalities to determine the
course of events after crises. The other is the power of democratic institutions and public
opinion to restrict executive action.
Political science, unlike history, attempts to understand social, political phenomena by
using the scientific method. That means developing hypotheses, conducting tests, and trying to
reach conclusions that are replicable and universal. But human behavior is rarely predictable. In
a field that wants badly to be respected as hard science, the concept of rational choice theory has
flourished. Rational choice holds that an individual’s behavior can be explained and predicted if
we know how he ranks his preferences, what his beliefs are, and what information is available to
him. Gary Becker has done a remarkable job of fitting economic theory, through the study of
utility/preference curves, into a wealth of human activitiesdcccxxxvi. Rational choice has its values:
it allows social scientists to create models of behavior that can then be tested in the real world.
But too often that second step is passed over.
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What’s been lost is a study of personalities. In the quest to rationalize the world and
compartmentalize it into rules, we lose the ability to appreciate the complexities and wonder of
the human psyche dcccxxxvii. Everyone has preferences, beliefs, and varying degrees of
information, but people also have personalities. When crises occur, all the work of the rationalchoice scholar many times flies out the window. As Peter Baehr and Gordon Wells emphasize,
Max Weber “repeatedly noted that, from the standpoint of individual conduct, history is deeply
irrational. Between action and consequence lies a chasm that no one can bridge, let alone
control”dcccxxxviii. Though many have decried George W. Bush’s campaign promise not to
nation-build, contrasting it with the Bush Doctrinedcccxxxix, these pundits fail to realize or state the
power of crises to change or reveal a person’s preferences and intentions. When faced with a
personal crisis do we forgive, do we run away, do we act self-destructively, or do we act
constructively? These are important factors that even the deepest dive into our personal histories
and past behaviors cannot answer. We cannot simply look at a preference ranking of an
individual to see how he will react to future events that, in many instances, are presently
unimaginable to him.
By looking at crises and the subsequent reactions, this study examined the personalities
of leaders. But the results of this study do not amount to “different people, different outcomes.”
Responses to terror attacks, and in fact all types of crises, vary. But terrorist attacks in particular
are vulnerable to threat-shaping. After terror attacks, it is frequently unclear who the enemy is,
what their desires are, and most importantly why the attack happened and whether similar attacks
will followdcccxl.
When the Bush Administration pushed through the Iraq War after 9/11, it was because
some of its members had wanted to pursue these actions well before the catastrophedcccxli. Yet
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Congress was also cowed. Compare this to Parliament blocking Tony Blair’s antiterrorism
legislation after the 7/7 attacks of 2005 or Congress sitting on Bill Clinton’s legislation after the
Oklahoma City bombing. As this study showed, the power of the executive to push through
legislation after terrorist attacks is limited by his mandate. With favorable public approval
ratings, a strong governing coalition and fearful society, almost any counterterror legislation can
be passed. But without these elements, even in times of great calamity after terror attacks, the
executive can be blocked in his quest to pass legislation that restricts civil liberties. Further, in
times when political competition is high, especially when elections are near, opposition
legislators have strong incentives to oppose the ruling executive after domestic acts of terrorism
occur.
This final chapter seeks to bolster the findings of the previous chapters. First, the power
of executive response, the first part of the independent variable, will be explained by examining
the cases of Yitzchak Rabin’s response to the first intifada in Israel and Bill Clinton’s handling
of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Next, corollary cases that bolster the theory
forwarded in this book will be covered and directions for future research will be suggested.
Third, policy prescriptions will be discussed. I will end with concluding remarks.
The Power of Executive Response: Yitzchak Rabin and Bill Clinton
The last two cases I wish to cover in this study are those of Prime Minister Yitzchak
Rabin’s handling of the first intifada in Israel and President Bill Clinton’s response to the first
World Trade Center bombing in New York City in 1993. Both leaders exhibited remarkably
restrained responses to the terror threat they faced. Both also largely forewent passing civil
liberty-reducing legislation and, instead, treated the terror threat as a law enforcement matter. To
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this end, both executives chose to simply enforce existing laws against terrorists rather than pass
new legislation.
These cases clearly exhibit the power of executive response, the first component of the
independent variable in this study. Recall that executive response means the executive’s
decision to either seek passage of liberty-reducing laws or not after an attack. All of the cases
covered to this point included leaders who sought to pass counterterror legislation after attacks,
thus executive response was not a major factor in these cases. Here, the response of the
executive will be highlighted to bolster previous findings of the power of chief executives to
enact legislation following terrorist acts. Note that in the case selection chart in chapter one
these cases are categorized as “threat framed as crime,” with the Israel case in the “legislation
quickly passed” row and the U.S. case in the “legislation blocked or not pursued” row. Though
in both of the following cases civil liberty-abridging legislation is largely not pursued, Yitzchak
Rabin did pass some minor changes to counterterror law in response to the first intifada, while
Bill Clinton sought no legislative changes in response to the first World Trade Center bombing.
Yitzchak Rabin and The First Intifada
The first intifada (Arabic for “shaking off”) began in 1987 as a popular uprising aimed at
helping Palestinians gain sovereignty through large demonstrations, civil disobedience, and
violence. The uprising was touched off by “an otherwise unremarkable collision involving an
Israeli truck and some other vehicles,” which “resulted in the deaths of several Palestinian
workers.” The accident spurred “an explosion of Palestinian rioting” that soon became the
intifada dcccxlii. Though the intifada began as a series of largely nonviolent demonstrations, the
uprising became increasingly violent as time dragged on dcccxliii. Most scholars place the end of
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the first intifada at September 1993 with the signing of the Oslo Accords yet terror attacks and
Israeli reprisals carried on throughout Yitzchak Rabin’s 1992-1996 term as Israel’s prime
minister. Btselem an Israeli human rights group’s statistics show that between 1992 and 1994,
93 Israelis (44 of them members of security forces) were killed, while “only” 34 Israelis were
killed in the first five years of the intifada, 1987-91. Meanwhile, 394 Palestinians were killed by
Israeli security forces between 1992 and 1994 dcccxliv. So, Rabin’s response to terrorism here will
focus on 1992-94.
Yitzchak Rabin was elected Prime Minister in 1992 on a platform of peace. On September
13, 1993 in Washington, DC,, Rabin and Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat signed a historic interim
peace agreement, known as the Oslo Accords, between Israelis and Palestinians in dcccxlv. About
one year later, on October 26, 1994, Rabin signed a peace treaty with Jordan dcccxlvi. Rabin’s
commitment to the peace process presented him with a “difficult dilemma,” as he sought to
“strike the right balance between advancing peace on the one hand and maintaining security on
the other” dcccxlvii.
Despite the growing violence of the intifada, Rabin pushed forward with peace accords with
the Palestinians and Jordanians. Still, the prime minister did make minor changes to Israeli
counterterror law and, more importantly, he deported 415 Hamas activists to southern Lebanon
in December 1992 dcccxlviii. This latter act came after five Israeli soldiers and a member of the
Border Police were slain by terrorists that year dcccxlix. Rabin punished these individuals for their
political affiliationsdcccl, but the deportations turned out to be a serious miscalculation. Rabin
intended to deport the Hamas members to avoid cracking down collectively on Palestinians
living in the territories, but the deportations insteadraised support for the Islamic extremists
among Palestinians while also allowing the Lebanon-based Hezbollah terror group to train
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Hamas. In fact, Rabin’s deportation of the 415 Hamas extremists was critical in Hamas’
decision to begin using car bombings and suicide attacks against Israel dcccli. Indeed, the first
Hamas suicide car bombing occurred on April 6, 1994 and the first suicide human bombing
against Israel took place one week later on April 13, 1994 – both occurring after the Oslo
Accords were signed dccclii.
Other than the deportations and the tinkering with terror legislation, Rabin engaged in a ritual
of post-terror responses that has become all too common in Israel. This practice involved the
closure of the Occupied Territories and empty threats made to the Palestinians, including calls to
end peace talks. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) would make “a few
demonstrative moves against terrorist infrastructure” and Israel would drop its threats in a matter
of “hours or days” dcccliii.
Yitzchak Rabin tried to balance fighting terrorism with pushing for peace. For a while, he
was successful in doing this. A 1995 speech was indicative of the prime minister’s statements;
he said that there was “no other alternative” to pursuing peace “for this is the solution for the
long term, and to the terrorism, even if it is difficult for us now. I am convinced that the path the
government has taken is the path which will lead to the end of control over another people”dcccliv.
Auerbach and Greenbaum posit that Yitzchak Rabin was extremely concerned with the public’s
views of his actions during the peace process and show that Rabin’s few tough stands on terror
helped maintain his credibility in the public’s eyes dccclv.
This case shows the power of a popular leader who decided not to submit to terrorism
and, instead, responded with some enforcement measures against terrorists. This was done in
concert with the pursuit of a peaceful solution to a terror-producing conflict. The case also
clearly exhibits the power of the chief executive in government to decide whether or not to
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pursue counterterror legislation. That said, once again, approval ratings were still critical in this
case. As Auerbach and Greenbaum show, without healthy approval ratings, Rabin could not
have pursued his bold strategy. Further, the support the late prime minister had from his
government coalition was also a necessary condition to the pursuit of his dovish counterterror
strategy. As is too frequently the case, Rabin’s strategy ended tragically. He was assassinated
by a right-wing Israeli extremist on November 4, 1995. As Paul Wilkinson writes:
“There is no doubt that the loss of Prime Minister Rabin, a man widely admired and
trusted by the public to protect Israel’s vital interests, combined with the strong feelings
of anger and insecurity engendered by the terrorists’ [continued] suicide bombings,
helped to ensure the defeat of Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin’s successor. The coming to
power of Prime Minister [Binyamin] Netanyahu in 1996 and a right-wing-dominated
government that for the most part was fundamentally opposed to the underlying
principles of the Oslo Accords radically altered the prospects for peace. Hence terrorism
from both Palestinian and Israeli rejectionists and the outcome of the Israeli general
election led to a situation where the peace process was very nearly extinguished” dccclvi.

Bill Clinton and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing
President Bill Clinton dealt with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in a similar
manner to how Yitzchak Rabin dealt with the first intifada. Of course, Clinton was not trying to
balance a peace process with a terrorist threat, but he did deal with the terror attack as a criminal
matter and simply enforced existing law in response to the bombing. This section will briefly
recount the events of February 26, 1993 then summarize Bill Clinton’s response to the terrorist
attack. Again, the purpose of this case is to show the power of the chief executive in deciding
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how to respond to terror attacks. Specifically, the Clinton and Rabin cases exhibit the
executive’s ability to tamp down public fear after an attack and quickly move on from it.
On February 26, 1993, a group of Islamic extremist terrorists drove a rental van into the
basement of the World Trade Center in New York City and “set a timer to detonate the 1,500pound urea-nitrate bomb” inside the van. At 12:18 local time, a massive blast erupted
“creat[ing] a cavernous crater 200 feet by 100 feet wide and seven stories deep in the garage of
the World Trade Center.” The terror attack killed six people, injured 1,042, and caused almost
$300 million in damagesdccclvii.
As Richard Miniter recalls, “On a Saturday morning, a day after the World Trade Center
explosion, there was no sense of crisis in the White House.” Clinton treated the bombing as, “a
sideshow, a distraction from what the president really wanted to discuss—his economic agenda.”
After all, the World Trade Center bombing came 39 days into Bill Clinton’s presidency and he
had been elected on a platform of strengthening America’s economy (his campaign’s famous
catchphrase was “It’s the economy, stupid”). In Clinton’s first and only speech about the
bombing, he stated that the innocent victims of the attacks would be in his “thoughts and
prayers” and he thanked the NYPD and the emergency response teams for their efforts. Clinton
ended by explicitly framing the terror attack as a law enforcement issue and then segued into a
discussion of economic matters. The President declared that, “Just this morning I spoke with
FBI Director Sessions, who assured me that the FBI and the Treasury Department are working
closely with the New York City police and fire departments. Working together we'll find out
who was involved and why this happened. Americans should know we'll do everything in our
power to keep them safe in their streets, their offices and their homes. Feeling safe is an essential
part of being secure. And that's important to all of us.” He, then, abruptly changed the subject,
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stating, “I also want to take this opportunity this morning to talk about another crucial aspect of
our security, our economic security” dccclviii. In a 1995 interview with CBS’ 60 Minutes news
magazine, when asked about the 1993 attack, Clinton continued to frame it as a law enforcement
or legal issue. He stated that, “We have been working hard to try to get the legal support we
need to move against terrorism, to try to make sure that we can find out who's doing these kinds
of things before they strike” dccclix.
In line with Clinton’s statements minimizing the terror threat, the response to the 1993
bombing amounted to a simple law enforcement matter. The perpetrators of the attack were soon
rounded up. Mohammed Salameh, a Palestinian fundamentalist, was captured after repeatedly
trying to get back the $400 deposit he put down for the rental truck he blew up dccclx. Soon after,
more of his co-conspirators were rounded up. In October 1995, the Islamic extremist Sheikh
Omar Abdul Rahman and nine others were found guilty of conspiracy to bomb the World Trade
Center. The bombing’s mastermind, Ramzi Yousef, was captured in early 1995 after he set fire
to his Manila apartment while mixing bomb-making chemicals. At the time, Yousef was plotting
to blow up eleven US airliners using liquid explosives that could pass through airport metal
detectors. This same plan of attack was attempted, and thwarted, in London on August 10, 2006.
Further, in the 1993 bombing, Yousef intendedto topple one of New York City’s largest towers
onto its twin, causing catastrophic damage dccclxi.
This case clearly shows the power of the chief executive to respond to a terror attack as
he saw fit. Clinton treated the first World Trade Center bombing as a law enforcement matter
and went on with his economic agenda. Civil libertarians will certainly laud Clinton’s stance on
terrorism, but the facts of the case are troubling especially in light of the second World Trade
Center attack in 2001. As Peter Katzenstein notes, “Al Qaeda… learned from its bungled 1993
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attempt to bring down the World Trade Center”dccclxii. It is hard to argue that a more heavyhanded, civil liberty-reducing reaction to the 1993 attack would have prevented future
catastrophes, but it is clear that this case and its links needed to be considered much more
thoroughly.
Corollary Cases and Suggestions for Future Research
The previous two cases showed that terrorism can be shaped as a law enforcement matter
but that this shaping is no panacea. Indeed, soon after Rabin and Clinton’s terms of office,
terrorism shook both Israel and the United States like never before. It is chilling to think that
both the second intifada and 9/11 had their antecedents in the terror attacks (and counterterror
responses) from the early 1990s.
This section seeks to provide supporting evidence for the theory forwarded in this book
by highlighting cases where a terror attack led to the swift passage of civil liberty-abridging
legislation. In Canada, Bill C-36 was passed about one month after the 9/11. The bill expanded
government wiretapping powers and allowed police to preventively arrest terror suspects. It also
banned the existence and funding of terrorist groups in Canada dccclxiii. Around the same time,
France passed legislation expanding police search-and-seizure powers dccclxiv, and Australia and
Japan also approved (typo!, no a)new anti-terror billsdccclxv. Germany, a country especially
sensitive to the passage of liberty-reducing laws that might erode “the foundation of the polity,”
passed two new counterterrorism laws after 9/11 dccclxvi. The passage of these counterterror laws
speaks to the enormity and worldwide effect of the attacks.
Case studies from India and Russia also exhibit the quick passage of liberty-abridging
legislation after a window of opportunity for executive action opened due to terror attacks. AB
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Vajpayee’s passage of the repressive Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) after the 2001
Parliament bombing in India is an example dccclxvii. In Russia, by no means a liberal democracy,
President Vladimir Putin has used the threat of Chechen terrorism to erode democratic rights and
centralize power into his positiondccclxviii. France’s dealings with Algerian extremists, the Armed
Islamic Group (GIA), also fits the pattern of a terror campaign yielding greater executive power
and reduced civil libertiesdccclxix. Of course all of these cases need further study to tease out the
factors behind the new counterterror legislation.
The theory supported here holds that the executive is presented with an opportunity by the crisis
created by a terrorist attack, but that he is constrained by levels of mass fear, public satisfaction
ratings, and political constellations.
Suggestions for Future Research
The efficacy of counterterror legislation needs to be evaluated. In this study, I examined
the various domestic reactions of chief executives to terror attacks. Of special concern was the
passage of civil liberty-abridging legislation and its enforcement. However, it is still unclear
whether this legislation is effective in fighting terror or whether treating terror as a law
enforcement matter is more effective. Deporting foreign aliens after the Oklahoma City
bombing or calling for lengthy detentions after the 2005 London bombings sound like quizzical,
ad hoc responses to terror attacks that have more to do with action bias than anything else. That
said, it is unclear whether Bill Clinton’s muted response to the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing was as effective as it could have been. After George W. Bush’s harsh domestic
response to 9/11, civil libertarians shuddered. But would Americans all be living in constant fear
if Bush had not acted strongly? Could legislation such as the PATRIOT Act have averted the
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attacks if it were on the books at the time or are counterterror laws largely symbolic, ineffective,
and reactive?
Clearly, some of these laws erode liberties. The question is whether they serve their
purpose in bolstering security. Evidence from the Israeli and British cases on terrorist attacks
going down as detentions rose gives some credence to the argument that new laws can stall
terrorismdccclxx. However, it is unclear whether the PATRIOT Act, the 1996 Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, and numerous other counterterror laws have served their purported
purposes. After all, the past two attempted international attacks on America—the 2009
underwear bomber and the 2010 cargo bomb plot—were thwarted, respectively, by vigilant
airline passengers and the coordinated efforts of international intelligence agencies. This is not
to say that the PATRIOT Act is necessarily effective, but rather that more evidence needs to be
brought to show whether counterterror laws are effective.
Second, the rally ‘round the leader phenomenon should be further scrutinized. Here it
was concluded that opposition elites have incentives to use terror attacks to wrest power from the
chief executive when his mandate is weak. Rallies do not form in these instances. However,
more research needs to be done on both rallies and executive approval ratings and the
determinants of each. Specifically, multivariate analysis of the determinants of executive
approval ratings, using mass fear levels as a key variable, should be undertaken to find the
correlation between mass fear levels and executive approval ratings. More work on the reasons
why rallies occur in some instances but not in others is also needed.
Third, more case studies could be done to further test the theory forwarded here. The
cases listed above of Canada, Australia, France, and India along with other European cases
would help to refine my theory, especially on the point of differences between presidential and
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parliamentary governments’ responses to terrorism. Cases where terror attacks yielded full
erosion of democratic practices, such as Russia and other cases of non-democracies dealing with
terrorism, may also be instructive.
Finally, more reliable public opinion data needs to become available for future crosscountry terrorism studies. This study was not hindered by data availability issues, but other
countries do not have extensive public opinion data available on fear of terrorism, executive
approval ratings, and willingness to forgo liberties. Without these metrics, the determinants of
civil liberty-abridging legislation passed will not be fully known.

Policy Prescriptions
Based on the study’s findings, I proffer the following the policy recommendations. First,
it is critical for legislatures in liberal democratic countries to maintain a check on chief
executives during the initial days and weeks after a terror attack. This is because, as seen in
chapter three, spikes in mass fear levels, executive approval ratings, and public willingness to
forgo civil liberties are short-lived, making rapid executive action after terror attacks troubling.
Second, all emergency legislation should sunset and require supermajorities for
repassage. Most emergency legislation is already passed with sunset clauses, but the additional
need of supermajorities to re-pass civil liberty-reducing laws will provide a further check on
government. This addition is necessary due to the permanence of seemingly temporary
counterterror legislation. After all, it is easy for governments to act in times of threat, it is much
harder to decide when a threat has passed.
Third, enforcement of existing laws is usually sufficient in countering the threat of
terrorism. This is especially true now that most liberal democracies have passed strong anti-
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terror legislation after 9/11. Law enforcement agencies should pay close attention to potential
links between terrorists and to tips on potential future attacks. False alarms surely frustrate and
disenchant the public, but actual attacks are surely much worse.
Finally, counterterror laws should be narrowly tailored to deal with the terror threat in
question. Too often counterterror legislation is filled with provisions that previous governments
tried-but-failed to pass. Throwing myriad clauses into counterterror laws such as the PATRIOT
Act needlessly restrains liberties and confuses who the real enemy should be. If governments
need special powers, they should be narrowly tailored to deal with existing threats.
It remains to be seen whether a strong, well-liked executive can be blocked in his pursuit
of liberty-reducing laws after a terror attack. Of course, such a case would be a critical one for
my theory. The hope here is that increased awareness about the tradeoffs of liberty for security
in response to terrorism will encourage both legislatures and the public to stop chief executives
from passing liberty-abridging laws. But what may ultimately be necessary is the rise of
government leaders who have the strength to counsel patience and emphasize the values of our
liberties after terror attacks occur. After all, terror attacks are fleeting, though terrible and tragic,
events. But, the loss of liberties they too frequently portend can be permanent.

Concluding Remarks
Much of the literature discussing reactions to terrorist attacks has fallen into two
categories. The first defends the government. Scholars such as Richard Posner take pains to
note that, “the Constitution is not a suicide pact”dccclxxi. Posner and others who share his
position dccclxxii believe that a strong government is necessary in answering terror threats and that
liberties should be preserved more stringently in times of peace than in times of war. They
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believe that losing our lives is worse than losing our liberties (a fair point), and that their
opponents lose focus of the very real threats that exist in the world.
Unlike security-focused scholars, civil libertarians tout the value of liberty at all costs and
decry any government injunction against liberty as an overreaction dccclxxiii. These scholars
believe that government reactions to threats are always too costly and too extreme. They support
more balanced approaches such as containment dccclxxiv, “off-shore balancing” dccclxxv, or a law
enforcement approach to terrorism dccclxxvi. They are correct in stating that the terror threat has
been greatly overrated in America, but they base this view on a perception that government
inflates all threats. John Mueller, for instance, on a recent episode of The Daily Show, gloated
that in his next book he would write about how the Cold War was an even bigger sham than the
war on terror dccclxxvii.
These scholars are correct in their assessment of terrorism’s threat in America, but their
views are not universalizable. Were America to deal with an ethno-nationalist terror threat like
Israel or Britain has, how would or should it react? Would it be enough to treat the phenomenon
as a “law enforcement problem”? These questions cannot be answered given the present
perception that 9/11 was the end-all and be-all of terrorism—when, in fact, it was a colossal
outlier. This is why this study systematically compared cases to find out how reactions really
happen. In sum, it is much harder to tell an overreaction from an underreaction than some of the
civil libertarian scholars concede.
By composing this work, I aspired to create a study that can be useful to both camps. As
a social scientist, I set up the study as a test of a theorydccclxxviii and employed hypotheses and
tests to decipher why government reactions to terror attacks differ. The purpose of this study is
not to condemn the government, but to make the post-crisis reaction process more transparent so
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that reactions can be better calibrated to events. Further, since few studies exist that compare
responses to terror attacks between different governments dccclxxix, this study will be useful to
institutional scholars as well as scholars of terrorism. The point here is to generate knowledge
that can edify scholars, laypeople and leaders and not to foment a particular point of view.
As was shown, some governments react much differently to terror attacks than others.
Some, as seen in Vladimir Putin’s Russia and post-9/11 America, use terror as an excuse to
curtail many freedoms. Others, as seen after terror episodes in the Bill Clinton or Yitzchak
Rabin administrations, barely react at all. To say that one response is always good or the other
always bad would be to fall victim to dogma. Governments need to maintain their democratic
character in the face of terrorism, but this principle does not need to become an absolute edict.
We must err on the side of rights, but we must also maintain our human capacity to make tough
choices when difficult situations arise.
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10 Who do you trust to do a better job handling the US campaign against terrorism:
Bush or the Democrats in Congress? (ABC News/WP)
Who would better handle the terrorist threat:
George W. Bush or the Democrats in Congress? (GWU/Battleground--10/25/05)
Please tell me whether you think George W. Bush or
the Democratic Party would do a better job handling the war on terrorism? (NPR--12/23/05)
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Bush
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0.39
Democrats
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none
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UK: Irrespective of how you yourself will vote at the next election, which political party do you think is putting forward the best
policies on the fight against terrorism? (ICM/Guardian)
4/14/05
Labour
0.38
Conservative
0.26
Liberal Democrat
0.09
None
0.21

12 Do you think the government, the police and security forces are
doing enough to protect Britain from a terrorist attack? (ICM/News of the World)
3/25/04
yes
0.56
no
0.37
13 MUSLIMS: President Bush and Tony Blair have said war
agianst terrorism is not a war against Islam. Do you agree or disagree? (ICM/Guardian)
3/16/04
agree
0.2
disagree
0.68
14 Do you think the government, the police and security forces are
doing enough to protect Britain from a terrorist attack? (ICM/News of the World)
3/25/04
yes
0.56
no
0.37
15 ISRAEL: Evaluation of Government Performance (Arian, 2003)
1994
1995
1996
1997
Poor
0.28
0.37
0.16
0.16
Not good
0.32
0.34
0.34
0.5
Good
0.34
0.25
0.43
0.31

1998
0.21
0.45
0.29
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0.22
0.44
0.29

2000
0.19
0.48
0.34

2001
0.12
0.51
0.33

2002
0.25
0.53
0.2

2003
0.25
0.51
0.22
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16 Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling the campaign against terrorism? (CBS/NYT)
Date
10/15/01
11/13/01
12/07/01
01/05/02
01/15/02
01/21/02
02/24/02
04/02/02
05/13/02
05/19/02
06/02/02
07/08/02
07/22/02
08/02/02
09/02/02
09/22/02
12/21/03
01/12/04
02/12/04
02/24/04
03/10/04
03/30/04
04/23/04
05/11/04
05/20/04
06/23/04
07/11/04
07/30/04
08/15/04
09/06/04
11/18/04
01/14/05
02/24/05
04/13/05
05/20/05
07/29/05
08/29/05
09/06/05
09/09/05
10/03/05
10/30/05
12/02/05
01/05/06
01/20/06
02/22/06
03/09/06
04/06/06
04/28/06
05/04/06
05/16/06
06/10/06
07/21/06
08/11/06
08/17/06
09/15/06
10/05/06
10/27/06
12/08/06
01/01/07
02/08/07
02/23/07
03/11/07
04/12/07
04/24/07
05/23/07
06/28/07
07/17/07
07/22/07
08/12/07
09/16/07
10/16/07

Approve
0.92
0.88
0.90
0.88
0.87
0.87
0.82
0.80
0.80
0.74
0.72
0.77
0.70
0.72
0.68
0.71
0.70
0.68
0.64
0.65
0.64
0.58
0.60
0.51
0.51
0.52
0.51
0.52
0.53
0.62
0.59
0.56
0.61
0.53
0.58
0.55
0.54
0.51
0.50
0.46
0.47
0.48
0.51
0.52
0.43
0.45
0.47
0.45
0.46
0.46
0.47
0.51
0.51
0.55
0.54
0.46
0.44
0.41
0.43
0.44
0.40
0.45
0.45
0.42
0.42
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.44
0.40
0.41

Disapprove
0.06
0.09
0.06
0.09
0.10
0.09
0.13
0.17
0.15
0.19
0.21
0.17
0.20
0.21
0.27
0.22
0.23
0.28
0.27
0.29
0.28
0.34
0.32
0.39
0.42
0.39
0.43
0.41
0.38
0.31
0.37
0.38
0.33
0.41
0.36
0.39
0.40
0.40
0.43
0.46
0.46
0.45
0.41
0.43
0.50
0.47
0.46
0.45
0.48
0.47
0.46
0.42
0.43
0.38
0.40
0.48
0.48
0.52
0.51
0.49
0.53
0.48
0.47
0.51
0.52
0.53
0.53
0.53
0.48
0.54
0.51
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17) Great Britain Approval Ratings
http://www.ipsos-mori.com/polls/trends/satisfac.shtml#1983
Govt
Aug-79
Sep-79
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Nov-79
Jan-80
Feb-80
Mar-80
Apr-80
May-80
Jun-80
Jul-80
Aug-80
Sep-80
Oct-80
Jan-81
Feb-81
Mar-81
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Jun-81
Jul-81
Aug-81
Sep-81
Oct-81
Nov-81
Dec-81
Jan-82
Feb-82
Mar-82
Apr-82
May-82
Jun-82
Jul-82
Aug-82
Sep-82
Oct-82
Nov-82
Dec-82
Jan-83
Feb-83
Mar-83
Apr-83
May-83
Jun-83 Jul-83
Aug-83
Sep-83
Oct-83
Jan-84
Feb-84
Mar-84
May-84
Jun-84
Jul-84
Aug-84

0.34
0.33
0.35
0.30
0.30
0.26
0.28
0.33
0.32
0.32
0.30
0.27
0.27
0.25
0.26
0.23
0.16
0.24
0.25
0.22
0.22
0.20
0.22
0.20
0.18
0.23
0.23
0.29
0.34
0.49
0.51
0.42
0.40
0.37
0.38
0.41
0.38
0.42
0.41
0.42
0.41
0.43
0.43
0.46
0.42
0.39
0.40
0.38
0.38
0.36
0.32
0.32
0.35

Blair

Thatcher
0.45
0.44
0.44
0.41
0.39
0.37
0.37
0.43
0.42
0.38
0.37
0.35
0.34
0.32
0.33
0.32
0.29
0.33
0.34
0.31
0.29
0.28
0.30
0.28
0.25
0.32
0.30
0.36
0.41
0.56
0.59
0.51
0.49
0.46
0.46
0.48
0.47
0.49
0.49
0.48
0.49
0.51
0.54
0.49
0.53
0.50
0.47
0.48
0.47
0.43
0.43
0.39
0.41
0.41

Major

Govt
Aug-84
Sep-84
Oct-84
Nov-84
Jan-85
Feb-85
Mar-85
Apr-85
May-85
Jun-85
Jul-85
Aug-85
Sep-85
Oct-85
Nov-85
Dec-85
Jan-86
Feb-86
Mar-86
Apr-86
May-86
Jun-86
Jul-86
Aug-86
Sep-86
Oct-86
Nov-86
Dec-86
Jan-87
Feb-87
Mar-87
Apr-87
Jun-87
Jul-87
Aug-87
Sep-87
Oct-87
Nov-87
Dec-87
Jan-88
Feb-88
Mar-88
Apr-88
May-88
Jun-88
Jul-88
Aug-88
Sep-88
Oct-88
Nov-88
Dec-88
Jan-89
Feb-89
Mar-89
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0.35
0.37
0.36
0.33
0.33
0.30
0.29
0.31
0.26
0.29
0.28
0.26
0.28
0.30
0.31
0.30
0.28
0.23
0.27
0.26
0.23
0.25
0.26
0.24
0.26
0.30
0.32
0.34
0.32
0.33
0.37
0.40
0.48
0.47
0.44
0.44
0.45
0.44
0.43
0.40
0.37
0.39
0.38
0.39
0.42
0.41
0.44
0.38
0.40
0.37
0.41
0.38
0.34
0.36

Blair

Thatcher
0.41
0.48
0.44
0.41
0.44
0.41
0.37
0.38
0.35
0.38
0.38
0.33
0.35
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.34
0.29
0.32
0.32
0.29
0.30
0.30
0.27
0.32
0.35
0.37
0.39
0.37
0.38
0.44
0.47
0.51
0.54
0.48
0.48
0.49
0.49
0.48
0.46
0.45
0.47
0.43
0.43
0.49
0.46
0.50
0.46
0.46
0.47
0.48
0.46
0.44
0.43
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17) continued
Great Britain Approval Ratings
http://www.ipsos-mori.com/polls/trends/satisfac.shtml#1983
Govt
Apr-89
May-89
Jun-89
Jul-89
Aug-89
Sep-89
Oct-89
Nov-89
Dec-89
Jan-90
Feb-90
Mar-90
Apr-90
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Jun-90
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Oct-90
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Jan-91
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Apr-91
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Jun-91
Jul-91
Aug-91
Sep-91
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Dec-91
Jan-92
Feb-92
Mar-92
Apr-92
May-92
Jun-92
Jul-92
Aug-92
Sep-92
Oct-92
Nov-92
Dec-92
Jan-93
Feb-93
Mar-93
Apr-93
May-93
Jun-93
Jul-93
Aug-93
Sep-93

0.32
0.33
0.28
0.28
0.31
0.30
0.27
0.28
0.28
0.25
0.19
0.16
0.17
0.23
0.24
0.24
0.25
0.25
0.22
0.22
0.31
0.41
0.34
0.30
0.32
0.27
0.27
0.26
0.32
0.31
0.30
0.29
0.26
0.28
0.25
0.29
0.40
0.41
0.34
0.27
0.25
0.18
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.17
0.14
0.13
0.17
0.12
0.10
0.12
0.12
0.11

Blair

Thatcher
0.41
0.40
0.34
0.34
0.38
0.41
0.35
0.33
0.33
0.31
0.29
0.20
0.21
0.26
0.30
0.30
0.33
0.36
0.29
0.25

Major

0.37
0.61
0.63
0.58
0.59
0.49
0.50
0.53
0.57
0.57
0.54
0.52
0.51
0.51
0.48
0.48
0.55
0.56
0.51
0.50
0.47
0.33
0.21
0.25
0.28
0.31
0.28
0.26
0.27
0.21
0.19
0.19
0.21
0.20

Govt
Oct-93
Nov-93
Dec-93
Jan-94
Feb-94
Mar-94
Apr-94
May-94
Jun-94
Jul-94
Aug-94
Sep-94
Oct-94
Nov-94
Dec-94
Jan-95
Feb-95
Mar-95
Apr-95
May-95
Jun-95
Jul-95
Aug-95
Sep-95
Oct-95
Nov-95
Dec-95
Jan-96
Feb-96
Mar-96
Apr-96
May-96
Jun-96
Jul-96
Aug-96
Sep-96
Oct-96
Nov-96
Dec-96
Jan-97
Feb-97
Mar-97
May-97
Jun-97
Jul-97
Aug-97
Sep-97
Oct-97
Nov-97
Dec-97
Jan-98
Feb-98
Mar-98
Apr-98
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0.11
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.11
0.12
0.11
0.12
0.11
0.10
0.11
0.12
0.14
0.12
0.08
0.10
0.09
0.11
0.09
0.10
0.14
0.11
0.13
0.14
0.15
0.15
0.14
0.14
0.13
0.14
0.15
0.14
0.18
0.15
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.22
0.18
0.21
0.21
0.23
0.46
0.53
0.53
0.48
0.57
0.55
0.52
0.43
0.46
0.44
0.46
0.54

Blair

0.65
0.72
0.70
0.65
0.75
0.72
0.70
0.61
0.60
0.60
0.62
0.68

Thatcher

Major
0.23
0.21
0.24
0.21
0.22
0.20
0.19
0.22
0.20
0.20
0.17
0.24
0.27
0.23
0.18
0.20
0.20
0.22
0.22
0.21
0.28
0.25
0.26
0.28
0.28
0.25
0.28
0.25
0.26
0.26
0.29
0.26
0.29
0.28
0.28
0.29
0.30
0.36
0.30
0.31
0.34
0.32

Data Appendix: The Executive and the Government
17) continued
Great Britain Approval Ratings
http://www.ipsos-mori.com/polls/trends/satisfac.shtml#1983
Govt
May-98
Jun-98
Jul-98
Aug-98
Sep-98
Oct-98
Nov-98
Dec-98
Jan-99
Feb-99
Mar-99
Apr-99
May-99
Jun-99
Jul-99
Aug-99
Sep-99
Oct-99
Nov-99
Dec-99
Jan-00
Feb-00
Mar-00
Apr-00
May-00
Jun-00
Jul-00
Aug-00
Sep-00
Oct-00
Nov-00
Dec-00
Jan-01
Feb-01
Mar-01
Apr-01
Jun-01
Jul-01
Aug-01
Sep-01
Oct-01
Nov-01
Jan-02
Feb-02
Mar-02
Apr-02
May-02
Jun-02
Jul-02
Sep-02
Oct-02
Nov-02
Jan-03
Feb-03

0.52
0.49
0.50
0.47
0.45
0.47
0.49
0.46
0.45
0.45
0.47
0.50
0.46
0.45
0.43
0.39
0.47
0.42
0.44
0.45
0.37
0.35
0.37
0.38
0.36
0.28
0.29
0.33
0.26
0.29
0.35
0.34
0.37
0.39
0.40
0.37
0.45
0.42
0.40
0.54
0.50
0.52
0.43
0.37
0.33
0.41
0.33
0.36
0.34
0.37
0.32
0.32
0.26
0.25

Blair
0.67
0.62
0.62
0.65
0.61
0.62
0.61
0.60
0.59
0.58
0.61
0.63
0.58
0.57
0.55
0.49
0.58
0.53
0.54
0.57
0.53
0.49
0.47
0.52
0.47
0.39
0.42
0.45
0.32
0.37
0.42
0.43
0.47
0.48
0.47
0.44
0.55
0.51
0.49
0.67
0.65
0.64
0.51
0.46
0.42
0.46
0.39
0.46
0.42
0.42
0.40
0.38
0.33
0.31

Thatcher

Major

Govt
Mar-03
Apr-03
May-03
Jun-03
Jul-03
Aug-03
Sep-03
Oct-03
Nov-03
Dec-03
Jan-04
Feb-04
Mar-04
Apr-04
May-04
Jun-04
Jul-04
Aug-04
Sep-04
Oct-04
Nov-04
Dec-04
Jan-05
Feb-05
Mar-05
May-05
Jun-05
Jul-05
Aug-05
Sep-05
Oct-05
Nov-05
Jan-06
Feb-06
Mar-06
Apr-06
May-06
Jun-06
Jul-06
Aug-06
Oct-06
Nov-06
Dec-06
Jan-07
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0.35
0.35
0.30
0.25
0.26
0.24
0.27
0.25
0.27
0.29
0.25
0.27
0.25
0.26
0.26
0.27
0.27
0.28
0.29
0.28
0.28
0.31
0.32
0.31
0.31
0.38
0.34
0.37
0.36
0.29
0.35
0.33
0.32
0.28
0.27
0.22
0.22
0.27
0.23
0.24
0.27
0.22
0.26
0.24

Blair
0.43
0.47
0.38
0.31
0.32
0.30
0.29
0.31
0.32
0.36
0.32
0.31
0.32
0.31
0.29
0.30
0.30
0.29
0.32
0.30
0.32
0.33
0.33
0.35
0.34
0.39
0.39
0.44
0.39
0.31
0.36
0.37
0.36
0.31
0.31
0.29
0.26
0.32
0.23
0.26
0.32
0.27
0.30
0.25

Thatcher

Major

Data Appendix: Mass Fear and Threat Levels
1) Israel % Worried and Very Worried about Personal Safety (they or a family member might become
victim of terrorist attack) (Arian 1999 and 2003 pub-op surveys; Ben-Meir and Shaked 2007)
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

Pctg Worried
82%
84%
76%
85%
78%
77%
66%
58%
79%
85%
92%
83%
78%
78%
72%
69%

Israeli civilian terror
1900%
3600%
5800%
1600%
4100%
2900%
900%
200%
2400%
15100%
27200%
12900%
5300%
2400%
1000%
500%

Fatalities (Btselem)
4%
2%
1%
5%
2%
3%
7%
29%
3%
1%
0%
1%
1%
3%
7%
14%

2) ISRAEL: Policy Statements (Arian, 2003)
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Trade land for peace
43%
53%
44%
47%
49%
42%
37%
40%

Stop peace talks
18%
13%
14%
20%
24%
28%
27%
18%

3) Israelis Concern about Personal Safety (Arian, 2003)
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

very worried
48%
37%
46%
35%
31%
22%
13%
30%
40%
63%
40%

worried
36%
39%
39%
43%
46%
44%
45%
49%
45%
29%
43%

not worried
13%
18%
13%
17%
18%
26%
34%
18%
12%
7%
12%

4) How worried are you that the United States will experience another major attack? (NBC News/WSJ--7/13/05)
How worried are you that there will soon be another terrorist attack in the United States? (Pew)
10/20/04
7/13/05
7/26/05
9/6/06

very worried
17%
31%
26%
23%

somewhat worried
43%
27%
42%
44%

269

not too worried
27%
29%
19%
21%

not at all worried
12%
12%
12%
10%

Data Appendix: Mass Fear and Threat Levels
5) How concerned are you about the chance that you or your family might be the victim
of a terrorist attack? (Ipsos-Public Affairs--9/9/04)
How concerned are you about the chance that you personally might be the victim
of a terrorist attack? (ABC News)

9/9/04
10/9/05
9/10/06

a great deal
7%
8%
10%

somewhat
31%
24%
25%

not much
34%
35%
35%

6 Do you personally feel any sense of danger from terrorist acts wher you live and work, or not?
(Gallup/CNN/USA Today--3/93, 4/95), (CBS/NYT--7/95)
Would you say you personally are very concerned about a terrorist attack in the area
where you live, or not? (CBS and CBS/NYT)
3/1/93
4/1/95
7/1/95
9/11/01
9/12/01
9/13/01
9/20/01
10/8/01
10/25/01
11/13/01
12/7/01
1/5/02

Feel Danger/Concern
12%
16%
20%
43%
36%
39%
32%
30%
26%
27%
24%
22%

No/Not Concerned
87%
84%
79%
56%
62%
59%
66%
68%
71%
72%
75%
77%
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not at all
28%
32%
29%
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7) How worried are you that you or someone in your family will become a victim of a terrorist
attack similar to the bombing in Oklahoma City? (Yankelovich/Time/CNN--4/97),
(Gallup--4/98), (AP--5/01), (CNN/USA Today/Gallup--all other pre-9/11/01 dates)
How worried are you that someone in your family might become a victim of a terrorist attack?
(Newsweek--9/11/04; 8/5/05)
How worried are you that you or someone in your family will become a victim of terrorism?
(CNN/USA Today/Gallup--all other dates 9/11/01 and beyond)
How worried are you that you or someone in your family might become a victim of a terrorist attack? (Pew--9/6/06)
4/1/95
4/1/96
7/1/96
8/1/96
4/1/97
8/1/98
4/1/00
5/1/01
9/11/01
9/14/01
9/21/01
10/19/01
11/2/01
11/26/01
2/1/02
3/1/02
4/1/02
5/1/02
9/1/02
1/1/03
2/7/03
2/17/03
3/1/03
4/1/03
7/1/03
8/1/03
12/1/03
1/1/04
2/1/04
8/9/04
9/3/04
9/11/04
10/14/04
12/17/04
1/7/05
6/16/05
7/22/05
8/5/05
12/16/05
1/20/06
8/18/06
9/6/06
11/5/06
3/11/07
8/8/07
12/9/07

very worried
14%
13%
13%
11%
10%
10%
4%
11%
23%
18%
14%
13%
11%
8%
8%
12%
8%
9%
8%
8%
13%
8%
8%
8%
6%
11%
9%
5%
10%
8%
11%
11%
13%
13%
10%
8%
14%
14%
11%
14%
8%
16%
9%
13%
12%
11%

somewhat worried
28%
22%
26%
27%
26%
22%
20%
23%
35%
33%
35%
30%
28%
27%
27%
33%
27%
31%
30%
31%
35%
28%
30%
26%
24%
30%
28%
23%
30%
26%
32%
27%
34%
28%
28%
30%
33%
26%
30%
29%
28%
28%
31%
31%
30%
28%
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not too worried
33%
33%
35%
29%
32%
38%
41%
34%
24%
35%
31%
33%
34%
34%
39%
32%
39%
37%
37%
36%
34%
33%
38%
39%
38%
33%
38%
42%
36%
36%
36%
31%
33%
34%
37%
36%
30%
32%
37%
34%
36%
35%
33%
31%
33%
33%

not worried at all
24%
32%
27%
33%
31%
29%
34%
32%
16%
13%
18%
23%
26%
30%
25%
23%
25%
22%
25%
25%
18%
31%
24%
26%
32%
26%
25%
30%
24%
30%
21%
30%
20%
25%
24%
26%
23%
27%
22%
23%
29%
20%
27%
23%
24%
28%
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8) How worried are you that you or someone in your family will become a victim of a terrorist attack similar
to the bombing in Oklahoma City? (CNN/Gallup/USA Today--up until 9/11/01)
How worried are you that you or someone in your family will become a victim of a terrorist attack?
(CNN/Gallup/USA Today--after 9/11/01)
Americans Worried About Themselves or Family Members Becoming Terror Victims (Gallup/CNN/USA Today)
4/1/95
4/1/96
7/1/96
4/1/97
8/1/98
4/1/00
5/1/01
9/11/01
9/14/01
9/21/01
10/11/01
10/19/01
11/2/01
11/26/01
2/1/02
5/1/02
7/1/03
12/1/03
1/1/04
2/1/04
8/1/04
9/1/04
10/1/04
12/1/04
1/1/05
6/1/05
7/1/05
12/1/05
1/1/06

Worried
42%
35%
38%
36%
32%
24%
34%
58%
51%
49%
51%
43%
39%
35%
35%
40%
30%
37%
28%
40%
34%
43%
47%
41%
38%
38%
47%
41%
43%

Not Worried
56%
68%
62%
63%
67%
75%
66%
40%
48%
48%
49%
56%
60%
64%
64%
59%
70%
63%
72%
60%
66%
57%
53%
59%
61%
62%
53%
59%
57%

9) How concerned are you about the possibility there will be more major terrorist attacks in the United States? (ABC News)
How concerned are you about the United States suffering another terrorist attack? (Pace U.--9/10/06)
a great deal
somewhat
not much
not at all
41%
40%
13%
4%
10/7/01
36%
46%
12%
6%
10/8/01
35%
43%
14%
9%
10/15/01
27%
43%
22%
8%
12/1/01
23%
47%
21%
9%
3/1/02
30%
43%
18%
9%
4/1/02
29%
44%
20%
7%
7/1/02
22%
52%
19%
7%
9/1/02
27%
45%
18%
9%
2/1/03
29%
47%
16%
8%
3/1/03
25%
46%
20%
9%
9/1/03
45%
40%
12%
3%
7/26/04
24%
42%
23%
10%
10/9/05
29%
45%
17%
8%
9/5/06
29%
45%
17%
8%
9/10/06
10) Americans' Views of Terrorist Capabilities to Strike U.S. Compared with 9/11 (Pew)
8/1/02
7/1/04
7/1/05
1/1/06
12/1/06
2/1/08

Greater
22%
24%
28%
17%
23%
16%

Same
39%
39%
40%
39%
41%
41%

Less
34%
34%
29%
39%
31%
39%
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11) Americans on Likelihood of Future Attack (CBS/NYT, except 4/95, Yankelovich/Time/CNN)
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/07/16/opinion/polls/main630312.shtml
Likely
Not Likely
1/1/91
73%
27%
4/1/95
86%
11%
9/1/01
78%
20%
10/8/01
84%
13%
10/25/01
88%
10%
12/1/01
73%
24%
1/5/02
65%
33%
1/21/02
71%
25%
2/24/02
62%
34%
5/13/02
72%
25%
5/19/02
74%
23%
6/1/02
81%
16%
7/1/02
73%
26%
9/2/02
69%
28%
9/22/02
67%
31%
10/1/02
74%
22%
11/1/02
77%
21%
1/1/03
62%
35%
2/10/03
80%
18%
2/24/03
74%
24%
3/4/03
75%
21%
4/1/04
55%
41%
7/11/04
71%
27%
7/30/04
67%
28%
8/15/04
67%
28%
9/1/04
61%
36%
8/1/05
52%
42%
1/1/06
53%
44%
8/11/06
64%
33%
8/17/06
59%
39%
7/20/07
57%
38%
9/4/07
48%
48%

12) How likely do you think it is that there will be another terrorist attack on the United States in the next few months? (CBS)
very likely
somewhat likely
not very likely
not at all likely
Date

total
19%
48%
23%
5%
8/2/04

Rep
15%
52%
25%
6%

Dem
22%
46%
22%
5%

Indep
21%
45%
23%
5%

total
17%
50%
20%
8%
8/19/04

Rep
16%
52%
23%
5%

Dem
18%
50%
21%
8%

Indep
18%
49%
17%
11%

very likely
somewhat likely
not very likely
not at all likely
Date

total
13%
46%
32%
7%
9/21/04

Rep
12%
51%
27%
9%

Dem
21%
46%
21%
7%

Indep
20%
47%
20%
9%

total
9%
43%
35%
7%
9/10/05

Rep
6%
45%
40%
7%

Dem
12%
41%
36%
9%

Indep
9%
44%
32%
6%

very likely
somewhat likely
not very likely
not at all likely
Date

total
10%
43%
33%
11%
1/26/06

Rep
9%
37%
43%
8%

Dem
12%
42%
31%
12%

Indep
9%
48%
28%
12%

total
17%
47%
27%
6%
8/14/06

Rep
12%
48%
33%
6%

Dem
17%
47%
27%
5%

Indep
20%
46%
24%
6%
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13) How likely do you think it is that there will be another terrorist attack on the United States in the next few months?
(CBS and CBS/NYT) (9/21/03-CBS/MTV)
9/20/01
10/8/01
10/25/01
12/7/01
1/5/02
1/21/02
2/24/02
8/2/04
8/19/04
9/17/04
9/21/04
9/10/05
1/26/06
8/14/06

very likely
36%
48%
53%
23%
18%
23%
18%
19%
17%
18%
13%
9%
10%
17%

somewhat likely
42%
36%
35%
50%
47%
48%
44%
48%
50%
48%
46%
43%
43%
47%

not very likely
16%
10%
8%
19%
27%
21%
29%
23%
20%
23%
32%
35%
33%
27%

not at all likely
4%
3%
2%
3%
2%
3%
4%
5%
8%
8%
7%
7%
11%
6%

14) In your opinion, how likely is a major terrorist attack in the United States itself in 1986? (ABC News--4/86)
In your opinion, how likely is a major terrorist attack in the United States itself in the near future?
(ABC/WP--7/88, 3/89), (CBS/NYT--1/91), (Yankelovich/Time/CNN--4/95)
How likely do you think it is that there will be a major terrorist attack in this country in the next twelve months? (Harris)
4/1/86
7/1/88
3/4/89
1/1/91
4/1/95
2/6/04
10/1/04
6/29/05
2/23/06

very likely
27%
28%
26%
23%
48%
11%
17%
15%
17%

somewhat likely
53%
52%
54%
50%
38%
52%
50%
40%
49%

not very likely

8%
32%
20%
31%
23%

not likely at all
20%
19%
19%
21%
3%
6%
8%
12%
10%

15) US: How important is the issue of terrorism to you personally? (AP/Ipsos)
10/26/06
extremely importa
40%
very important
39%
moderately import
14%
slightly important
5%
not at all importan
2%
16) Do you think that when average Americans think about terrorism they are more fearful or
less fearful than you? (Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks)
October 20, 2006
more
less

total
74%
19%

Rep
74%
22%

Dem
78%
15%

Indep
69%
23%

17) Is the following something you worry about a lot, is this something you worry about somewhat or is this something you
do not worry about? There may be another terrorist attack against the US in the near future (Public Agenda).
10/1/06
worry a lot
45%
somewhat
37%
17%
do not worry
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18) How often do you talk about terrorism (Pew)
9/14/06
frequently
47%
occasionally
36%
hardly ever
12%
never
4%
19) What would you say is the single most important event that has happened in your lifetime, in terms of its
importance to the United States and the world? (ABC News, open-ended, 9/5-7/06)
September 11, 2001

46%

20) UK: How likely do you think it is that there will be a major terrorist attack in this country
in the next twelve months? (Harris--2/04)
How likely do you think it is that London will experience another terrorist attack in the near future? (MORI)
2/1/04
7/1/05
9/1/05
very likely
11%
51%
43%
somewhat likely
53%
36%
39%
not very likely
31%
9%
9%
not at all likely
5%
3%
4%
21) Likelihood that UK will suffer another terrorist attack in next 12 months at hands of
Muslim extremists (ICM/Guardian)
6/21/06
Likely
32%
Not likely
51%
22) How likely do you think it is that there will be a major terrorist attack in Britain
over the next year or so? (ICM/BBC)
2/12/03
certain
7%
very likely
31%
fairly likely
42%
not very likely
10%
very unlikely
4%

23) Importance of the threat of international terrorism in Europe (German Marshall Fund)
7/1/05
extremely important
0.58
important
0.35
not important
0.06
24) UK: How worried do you feel that you or your immediate family might be a victim of a terrorist
attack here in Britain? (ICM/Guardian)
How worried are you about the threat of terrorism in your country? (Ipsos-Public Affairs)
1/22/03
3/5/04
very worried
15%
21%
somewhat worried
37%
45%
not too worried
35%
26%
not worried at all
13%
7%
25) How would you evaluate the threat of terrorism in the United Kingdom today? (Eurobarometer)
11/1/03
very strong
19%
quite strong
57%
quite weak
16%
very weak
4%
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26) UK: Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these please tell me,
if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not. International terrorism (Eurobarometer)
2003
2002
afraid
85%
80%
not afraid
13%
18%
27) How serious do you feel terrorism is here (in your own country)?
Great Britain
USA
Very serious
61%
30%
40%
Only somewhat seriou
31%
Hardly serious at all
7%
27%
2%
3%
Not sure/Don't know
USA data from 12/1977 Harris poll, GB data from 6/1978 SOC poll.
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1) Necessary to Give up Some Civil Liberties to Curb Terrorism? (Pew)
3/1/96
4/1/97
4/1/95
Yes
49%
30%
29%
No
43%
65%
62%
Yes
No

8/1/03
50%
44%

7/1/04
56%
38%

6/1/05
40%
53%

9/1/01
55%
35%

1/1/02
55%
39%

6/1/02
49%
45%

7/1/05
40%
53%

9/10/06
43%
50%

1/9/07
40%
54%

2) In order to curb terrorism in this country, do you think it will be necessary
for the average person to give up civil liberties, or not? (LAT--4/95), (Princeton--4/97)
Do you think Americans will have to give up some of their personal freedoms
in order to make the country safe from terrorist attacks? (CBS--9/13/01, 9/20/01, 10/8/01)
4/1/97
9/13/01
9/20/01
10/8/01
4/1/95
Yes
49%
29%
74%
79%
79%
No
43%
62%
21%
19%
17%
3) Would you favor or oppose the following measures to curb terrorism: requiring that all citizens carry a national
identity card at all times to show to a police officer on request (Princeton--9/13/01)
Here are some increased powers of investigation that law enfrocment agencies might use when dealing with
people suspected of terrorist activity, which would also affect our civil liberties.
For each say if you would favor or oppose it …Adoption of a national ID system for all US citizens (Harris--9/19/01)
In order to reduce thre threat of terrorism, would you be willing or not willing for the government to require
everyone in the United States to carry a national electronic identification card, or "smart card,"
that would have detailed information about each person? (CBS/NYT--9/20/01, 2/24/02)
9/13-17/01 9/19-24/01 9/20-23/01 2/24-26/02
Favor
70%
68%
56%
50%
Oppose
26%
28%
38%
44%
4) Would you favor the following measures to curb terrorism? (Pew)
Requiring that all citizens carry a national identity card at all times to show to a police officer on request
9/1/01
8/1/02
1/4/06
Favor
70%
59%
57%
Oppose
26%
38%
38%
5) Allowing the US government to monitor your personal telephone calls and emails?
9/1/01
8/1/02
1/4/06
Favor
26%
22%
24%
Oppose
70%
76%
73%
6) Allowing the US government to monitor your credit card purchases?
9/1/01
8/1/02
1/4/06
Favor
40%
32%
29%
Oppose
55%
63%
68%
7) Summary of above pro positoins
ID Card
Monitor Phone
Monitor CC

9/1/01
70%
26%
40%

8/1/02
59%
22%
32%

1/4/06
57%
24%
29%

8) Allowing airport personnel to do extra checks on passengers who appear to be of Middle Eastern descent?
8/1/02
1/4/06
Favor
59%
57%
Oppose
38%
38%
9) Do you think most US Muslims are more loyal to the United States than they
are to Islam? (Fox News/Opinion Dynamics)
7/12/07
More Loyal to US
9%
More Loyal to Islam
32%
Equally Loyal
40%
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10) Do you think US Muslims are unfairly singled out for scrutiny by law
enforcement offficials? (Fox News/Opinion Dynamics)
7/12/07
Yes
38%
No
52%
11) Do you think the FBI should or should not wiretap mosques to try to keep an eye out for radical
preaching by Muslim clerics? (Fox News/Opinion Dynamics)
7/12/07
Should
52%
Should Not
39%

12) Thinking about people you know, since the terrorist attacks in the USA do you think they are more
hostile toward Muslims here in Britain, less hostile or do you think it has made no difference
one way or the other? (ICM/BBC Panorama)
9/29/01
more hostile
29%
no difference
62%
less hotile
2%
13) MUSLIMS: President Bush and Tony Blair have said war agianst terrorism is not a war against Islam.
Do you agree or disagree? (ICM/Guardian)
3/16/04
agree
20%
disagree
68%
14) There are a number of people living in Britain who the authorities have identified as posing a potential
terrorist threat. Do you think extra powers should or should not be made available to deport
or detain them? (ICM/News World)
7/19/05
deport
36%
detain
17%
both
35%
neither
9%
15) UK Civil Liberties: Here are some things people have suggested should be done to counter the risks of terrorism.
Others oppose them as they say they endanger the rights of everyone. Bearing these two things in mind,
for each one please say whether you support or oppose the measure to counter terrorism … (ICM)
Make it law that everyone carries an identity card
2/12/03
support
82%
oppose
15%
16) Make new immigrants swear an oath of allegiance to the UK
2/12/03
support
62%
oppose
31%
17) Detain all immigrants and asylum seekers until they can be assessed as potential terrorist threats
2/12/03
support
74%
oppose
20%
18) Ban all asylum seekers
support
oppose

2/12/03
35%
60%
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19) Arm policemen
support
oppose

2/12/03
59%
36%

20) Give police greater powers to eavesdrop on people (like listening to telephone conversations and e-mails)
2/12/03
support
43%
oppose
52%
21) Bring in the death penalty for terrorist offences that kill people
2/12/03
support
60%
oppose
34%
22) Summary Chart
ID Card
Allegiance Oath
Detain Immigrants
Ban Asylum Seekers
Arm Police
Eavesdropping
Death Penalty

Support
82%
62%
74%
35%
59%
43%
60%

Oppose
15%
31%
20%
60%
36%
52%
34%

23) Curtailing civil rights in Israel to deal with internal dissension (Arian, 1997)
1996
1997
Definitely
12%
13%
yes
39%
45%
no
29%
28%
Definitely not
19%
14%
24) ISRAELI JEWS: Israeli Arabs were recently involved in attempted terror attacks in Tiberias and Haifa.
In your view, what portion of the Israeli Arab community supports carrying out such acts?
(Tami Steinmetz Research Institute for Peace at TAU)
9/1/99
only a few
28%
at least half
34%
a sizeable minority
32%
25) ISRAELI JEWS: In your opinion, are Israeli Arabs entitled to all political rights in Israel?
(Tami Steinmetz Research Institute for Peace at TAU)
9/1/99
Should have equal rights
46%
Jews should have more right
50%
26) In your opinion, were the people who flew planes into New York's World Trade Center …? (PORI--9/2003)
Israeli Jews
Israeli Arabs
Palestinians
Terrorists
96%
41%
37%
Martyrs
3%
8%
22%
Freedom Fighters
25%
14%
27) Terrorism is never justified under any circumstances. (PORI, 9/2003
Israeli Jews
Israeli Arabs
Strongly agree
83%
58%
Somewhat agree
10%
11%
Somewhat disagree
4%
6%
Strongly disagree
4%
22%
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Palestinians
34%
32%
18%
9%
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28) Hamas is a terrorist group (PORI, 9/2003)
Israeli Jews
Strongly agree
90%
Somewhat agree
8%
Somewhat disagree
1%
Strongly disagree

Israeli Arabs
16%
11%
14%
45%

Palestinians
5%
8%
14%
67%

29) West Germany, Institut fur Demoskopie poll-If the influence of the state and
the police has to be strengthened in order to combat terrorism, would you go
along with limitations of your personal rights by such measures as surveillance
and house searches or would you reject this?
5/1/75
2/1/78
Accept
69%
62%
Reject
21%
26%
No opinion
10%
12%
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